2025

GLOBAL HUNGER INDEX

20 YEARS OF TRACKING PROGRESS: TIME TO RECOMMIT TO ZERO HUNGER

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On her way home, Ashinur Begum pauses along the banks of the Brahmaputra, as the river steadily erodes the land. Increasingly frequent floods and climate shocks are swallowing homes, farmland, and memories underscoring the growing vulnerability of communities in Bangladesh to rising waters.

FOREWORD

When the Global Hunger Index (GHI) began 20 years ago, it rested on the hypothesis that bringing knowledge together with political will and action could bring about meaningful progress in the fight against hunger. The evidence of the past two decades has proven this hypothesis is largely correct.

Nonetheless, the 20th edition of the Global Hunger Index comes at a moment of rising alarm about food security globally and in certain regions and hotspots. Development finances are under extreme stress, the humanitarian sector is struggling, and in some areas hunger is persistent or even growing. These words are, however, inadequate to describe the situation on the ground in the hardest-hit places, where food crises are destroying the life chances of millions of people. In Sudan, the site of one of the world's most severe humanitarian crises, famine was detected in several locations in 2024 and has threatened to spread since, while half the country's population—24.6 million people—was projected to face acute food insecurity between December 2024 and May 2025. In Gaza, at the time of writing in September 2025, famine is occurring and expanding, while chaotic and inadequate aid deliveries continue to expose the population to starvation and violence. The number of people dying daily as a result of malnutrition reflects the fact that they are denied access to principled humanitarian aid. Aid workers themselves are now reportedly joining the food lines in a dangerous struggle to find daily nourishment. Conflicts elsewhere, such as in Myanmar, Nigeria, and South Sudan, are generating additional food crises. Instead of taking decisive action, the world stands by.

The GHI tracks the state of hunger worldwide, by region, and by country, spotlighting those places where action to address hunger is most urgently needed. Tragically, after decades of slow but steady progress against food and nutrition insecurity, the trajectory has shifted. The 2025 global GHI score has improved only slightly compared with the 2016 score—meaning that nearly a decade of calls to action have produced meager results. Given that progress on ending hunger has stagnated since 2016, the aspiration of achieving Zero Hunger by 2030—Sustainable Development Goal 2, which the community of nations adopted unanimously in 2015—now seems out of reach.

The lack of progress toward achieving the Sustainable Development Goals is evidence of leaders' policy ambivalence: stated ambitions are not being met with adequate resources or actions. Instead of correcting course, many decision-makers are ignoring or underinvesting in expressed commitments and doubling down on destabilizing policies. Monitoring and early-warning systems are being undermined by security risks, bureaucratic impediments, and funding cuts that hamper data collection.

In this climate of uncertainty and crisis, this year's report is highly relevant for tracking and highlighting trends in progress. The ranking of GHI scores by country offers a heartening look at which countries have achieved advances in combating hunger through firm commitments to the food security of their populations, backed by sound policies and supportive investments. At the same time, it gives a sober look at where much more needs to be done. The report also takes the occasion of the 20th edition of the GHI to present two special sections: First, we look back at the evolution of GHI policy recommendations over time to see the changes in thinking and key themes that persist. Second, experts from national governments and academia share their perspectives on food and nutrition security, overcoming hunger, and the contributions of the GHI in the past two decades. These sections emphasize the vital importance of governance—as exemplified by sound policies, laws, and institutions—in overcoming hunger and fulfilling people's right to food.

This focus on governance reminds us that hunger is not inevitable. It is a policy failure, often arising out of conflict. We are reminded of Alex de Waal's powerful words in the 2015 Global Hunger Index report: *"While the United Nations and powerful governments can predict and stop major food crises, ultimately the decision is always political ... Political commitment at the highest levels to prevent famine, no matter what the political context, is needed. Countries in need should be aided, regardless of their standing with any other government."*

At a time of profound crisis, the simple message is that no one should ever go hungry. Today, with millions seeing their human right to adequate food—as set out in Article 11 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights—violated and a growing number facing starvation, we risk making this reality no longer our shame, but our norm. This moral surrender is not and must never be acceptable, and the role of the GHI is to challenge it. Let us recommit to our expressed ideals and bring our resources and energies to bear in the effort to end hunger once and for all.

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



KEY MESSAGES

→ **Global hunger has seen little reduction since 2016, and stalled progress is pushing the 2030 target of Zero Hunger out of reach.** After a period of notable gains up to 2016, the world's Global Hunger Index score with 18.3 in 2025 has barely shifted from 19.0 in 2016, and hunger remains in the moderate category.

→ **As of 2025, insufficient progress in reducing hunger reflects the growing challenges of overlapping and accelerating crises.** The challenges include armed conflicts, accelerating climate shocks, economic fragility, and political disengagement. The climate crisis, no longer episodic, has become a constant threat—2024 was the hottest year on record, and extreme weather events are increasingly devastating food systems. With deteriorating humanitarian assistance systems, the breakdown of data systems, and waning commitment to end hunger, the outlook is increasingly alarming.

→ **In several critical contexts, including Burundi, DPR Korea, the occupied Palestinian territories, Sudan, and Yemen, data gaps prevent the calculation of full 2025 GHI scores, obscuring the true extent of hunger.** Available indicators, however, point to deteriorating conditions and suggest that the reality is more alarming than current figures reveal. As systems to measure and respond to hunger are dismantled or weakened globally, a dangerous feedback loop emerges: invisible needs attract no humanitarian assistance, and neglected hunger deepens further.

→ **Conflict remains the most destructive force driving hunger.** Armed violence fueled 20 food crises affecting nearly 140 million people in the past year. The wars in Gaza and Sudan illustrate how conflict devastates both livelihoods and lifelines: global famine-level food insecurity, concentrated largely in those two settings, more than doubled between 2023 and 2024. Massive destruction will lead to long-lasting threats to food security.

→ **Humanitarian assistance budgets have dropped sharply, while military spending has surged—an inversion of priorities that undermines the global hunger response.** As funding declines, assistance is increasingly limited to only the most acute cases, leaving many without support.

→ **The global GHI score also conceals stark regional disparities:** Hunger remains *serious* in both Africa South of the Sahara and South Asia, while modest global improvement in undernourishment largely reflects gains in parts of South and Southeast Asia and Latin America.

→ **Examples from countries such as Angola, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, India, Nepal, and Sierra Leone show that targeted policies and sustained investments can drive meaningful progress in reducing hunger.** However, these gains remain fragile, highlighting the need for sound policies that promote sustained support, early-warning systems, climate resilience, and food systems transformation to protect and build on success.

PROGRESS AGAINST HUNGER IS FALLING SHORT

Hunger is still considered *alarming* in 7 countries and *serious* in 35 countries.

5 In countries with *low, moderate,* or *serious* 2025 GHI scores—Fiji, Jordan, Libya, Solomon Islands, and Syria— their 2025 GHI scores are even worse than their 2000 GHI scores.

27 In countries with *low, moderate, serious,* or *alarming* 2025 GHI scores, hunger has increased since 2016.

10 In countries with *moderate, serious,* or *alarming* 2025 GHI scores, progress has largely stalled—their 2025 GHI scores have declined by less than 5 percent from their 2016 GHI scores or have not changed at all.

At the current pace, at least **56** countries will not reach *low* hunger—much less Zero Hunger—by 2030. If progress remains at the pace observed since 2016, *low* hunger at global level may not be reached until 2137—more than a century away.

Progress has been most notable in Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia, Togo and Uganda although challenges remain.

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Ali Sonko supports his elderly neighbor Fatuma Oluke to use a local online platform that allows easier access to services for production, processing and transport. In Luwero District, central Uganda, 85% of residents depend on agriculture and digital tools like this help strengthen local food systems.

GLOBAL, REGIONAL, AND NATIONAL TRENDS IN HUNGER

Note: The results in this 2025 Global Hunger Index report supersede all previous GHI results. The 2000, 2008, and 2016 scores and indicator data contained within this report are currently the only data that can be used for valid comparisons of the GHI over time.

After a period of real gains up to 2016, the world's Global Hunger Index score has barely shifted, and hunger remains in the *moderate* category. Although the global GHI score declined slightly from 19.0 to 18.3 between 2016 and 2025, the underlying trends remain deeply concerning. Global undernourishment rose sharply during the COVID-19 pandemic, peaking at 8.8 percent in 2021, and has since declined modestly, reaching 8.2 percent—or an estimated 673 million people—in 2024. Yet the number of undernourished people remains nearly 100 million higher than in 2016 (FAO 2025a). Meanwhile, the other nutritional indicators used to calculate the GHI—child stunting, child wasting, and child mortality—have shown little further improvement over the past decade. The global score also conceals stark regional disparities: hunger remains *serious* in both Africa South of the Sahara and South Asia, the two hardest-hit regions. For seven countries—Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Madagascar, Somalia, South Sudan, and Yemen—GHI scores are now *alarming*, and progress has stalled or reversed in two-thirds of all countries. The modest global improvement in undernourishment largely reflects gains in parts of South and Southeast Asia and Latin America, while hunger has continued to rise in regions affected by conflicts, climate shocks, and economic stress. The reality in 2025 may be worse than the current GHI scores suggest, since they are based on data from 2020 to 2024 (see Appendix A) and therefore do not yet reflect the full impact of recent developments, including escalating conflict, accelerating climate shocks, the deepening economic crisis, and severe funding cuts. These dynamics mark a shift from stalled progress to a likely rise in hunger, with worsening conditions expected to show up in next year's GHI. The goal of Zero Hunger by 2030 now seems out of reach, underscoring the urgent need for renewed commitment and greater efforts.

Conflict remains the most destructive force driving hunger and persistently high GHI scores in affected countries. In 2024, armed violence intensified globally, further destabilizing food systems already under strain. The Conflict Index compiled by ACLED (Armed Conflict Location & Event Data) recorded nearly 200,000 violent events in 2024—a 25 percent increase over 2023 and almost double the 2020 count (ACLED 2024). Armed violence remained the most consistent driver of acute food insecurity, directly affecting 139.8 million people across 20 crises last year. Displacement linked to conflict rose above 122 million people, the highest number ever recorded (FSIN and GNAFC 2025; UN Security Council 2025). The wars in Sudan and Gaza illustrate how conflict destroys both livelihoods and lifelines: markets are bombed, fields are mined, humanitarian corridors are closed, and hunger is used as an additional and deliberate weapon of war. Between 2023 and 2024, the number of people facing famine-level food insecurity more than doubled to about 2 million, with 95 percent located in those two settings (FSIN and GNAFC 2025). A June 2025 FEWS NET update reports that Famine (IPC Phase 5) likely persists in parts of Sudan. Conflict has escalated with drone strikes on critical infrastructure, disrupting humanitarian access, while prolonged siege-like conditions are driving rising mortality amid extreme hunger, severe malnutrition, and surging disease. Escalating violence continues to shred coping capacity and block aid delivery in Democratic Republic of the Congo, northern Nigeria, and Mozambique's Cabo Delgado. Where warfare collides with extreme weather, the descent can be brutally fast, as areas of northern Mozambique affected by heavy rains linked to tropical cyclones discovered when armed groups raided villages already weakened by weather-related production shortfalls—attacks that are expected to intensify during the dry season, driving further displacement and restricting access to fields (FEWS NET 2025b).

At the same time, climate change has shifted from episodic weather extremes to constant threats. The year 2024 was the hottest on record, with land temperatures about 1.5 °C above the pre-industrial baseline and unprecedented levels of ocean warming (WMO 2025b). Agricultural and fishing yields are increasingly at risk as ecosystems struggle under the pace and scale of climatic change. In Southern Africa, even after rains returned in early 2024, an El Niño—driven dry spell slashed cereal output by 30–50 percent across six countries (FSIN and GNAFC 2025). Looking ahead, modeling shows an 80 percent chance that at least one year between 2025 and 2029 will eclipse 2024 as the hottest on record, stacking the odds toward more heat stress, floods, and storms—conditions likely to disrupt planting cycles and livestock feed (WMO 2025c). Regions already under extreme strain—such as parts of East Africa, where Somalia yet again posts the highest GHI score this year—are likely to face recurrent harsh climate shocks (FEWS NET 2025).

What begins on the battlefield or in the atmosphere is magnified in the marketplace. Economic shocks were the primary hunger driver for 59 million people in 2024, often layered atop conflict and climate stress (FSIN and GNAFC 2025). Global growth remains below

its pre-pandemic average; currency depreciation and debt service siphon public spending from safety nets just as household purchasing power collapses. In Yemen, the rial lost almost 30 percent of its value in a year, pushing the cost of the minimum food basket to record highs despite nominal price controls. Ethiopia's food inflation fell from early-2024 peaks but still hovers near 12 percent—painful after years in double digits and amid repeated aid suspensions—further undermining hunger reduction, as reflected in a GHI score that has shown little improvement over the past decade. Trade tensions add another layer: prospective reciprocal tariffs on agrifood goods risk shaving up to 0.4 percent off global GDP and diverting staples away from low-income, import-dependent countries (FEWS NET 2025).

Amid these pressures, official development assistance (ODA)—once a lifeline for economic stabilization—has fallen sharply. Humanitarian ODA fell by 9.6 percent in 2024, and overall development assistance dropped by 7.1 percent, with projections of a further 9–17 percent decline in 2025 (Obrecht and Pearson 2025). The trend appears to be holding: by July 2025, the United Nations Global Humanitarian Overview (GHO) had received only 16.8 percent of its annual requirement—about 40 percent less than at the same point in 2024—following aid reductions by the United States, Germany, and the United Kingdom (UN OCHA 2025a; Obrecht and Pearson 2025). The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) estimates that 79 million people will consequently be cut from planned assistance, while nutrition services for 14 million children are at risk (UN OCHA 2025b). Nutrition specialists estimate that collapsing funding for the treatment of severe wasting could leave 2.3 million children without care and trigger an additional 369,000 child deaths each year (Osendarp et al. 2025). Meanwhile, military spending reached US$2.7 trillion in 2024—more than 100 times the amount allocated for humanitarian assistance—an inversion of priorities UN OCHA calls "a choice, not an inevitability" (UN OCHA 2025b).

FIGURE 1.1 **GLOBAL GHI SCORES AND PREVALENCE OF UNDERNOURISHMENT IN RECENT DECADES**



Note: GHI scores for the year 2000 include data from 1998–2002; 2008 GHI scores include data from 2006–2010; 2016 GHI scores include data from 2014–2018; and 2025 GHI scores include data from 2020-2024. Data on undernourishment are from FAO (2025). The undernourishment values are for the world as a whole, including countries both included in and excluded from the GHI. For a complete list of data sources for the calculation of GHI scores, see Appendix A. Colors correspond to the GHI Severity of Hunger Scale.

As funding falls, the reliability of humanitarian metrics is starting to erode. Austerity is no longer just starving programs of cash; it is distorting the very yardsticks used to measure need. The 2025 GHO appeal was reduced from US$56 billion in late 2023 to US$47 billion—a political haircut of 16 percent, even as overall needs continued to grow. To justify the reduced appeal, UN-led response planning narrowed its target: only 61 percent of those assessed as "in need" are now counted as people to be targeted by actual assistance, down from a decade-long average of around 70 percent. By shrinking the target population—often to those with the most acute needs—the average cost per person tends to rise, giving the impression of strong coverage, even as fewer people actually receive assistance. This shifting of goalposts risks eroding donor confidence (Lilly and Pearson 2025). The result is a vicious feedback loop: governments cite slimmer appeals to justify deeper cuts, humanitarians respond with harsher "prioritization," and each round further distorts the very data meant to drive a response. Austerity is not just shrinking the pie—it is warping the pie chart.

In parallel, the data systems that track and anticipate crises are themselves in crisis. Widespread funding cuts have triggered severe data disruptions. The Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) program, a cornerstone of global child nutrition tracking, faces closure after four decades (Khaki et al. 2025; Lenharo 2025). The Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET)—a core source for forecasting acute food insecurity, including famine-level conditions—was suspended early in 2025 and resumed only limited reporting in May. Reporting is now "limited" not only because of reduced funding to FEWS NET but also because it depends on inputs from other agencies also affected by funding cuts—including the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) for satellite imagery and climate data. The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), a critical tool for assessing the severity of acute food insecurity, is also deeply affected. While only partly funded by USAID, it relies on FEWS NET inputs and the wider data ecosystem (Mersie 2025a). Without health data from DHS, forecasts from FEWS NET, and timely assessments from IPC, the global picture of hunger becomes not only blurrier but structurally biased. As the world enters deeper turbulence with weakened instruments for tracking need, it risks a vicious cycle—where invisible hunger attracts no aid and unmet need grows ever harder to detect (Mersie 2025b).

Hunger persists not only because crises are becoming more frequent and protracted, but because the systems meant to track and respond to them are being weakened. A response built on data cannot function without it. When monitoring budgets are slashed, reporting pipelines break down, and vulnerable people fall out of view, needs do not disappear—they simply go unrecorded. Those most affected—the poorest, most food-insecure communities—are also those least equipped to demand recognition or support. In a world committed to ending hunger, knowing who is left behind is not optional—it is foundational. If we do not count hunger, we cannot hope to confront it.

Africa South of the Sahara

Africa South of the Sahara continues to record the highest hunger levels globally. The region has made some progress since 2000, with hunger moving from *alarming* to *serious*. Furthermore, 35 of the region's 47 countries have moved to a lower GHI category since 2000, and Cabo Verde has become the first to reach *low* hunger. Since 2016, however, progress has slowed sharply, with hunger rising in 10 countries. This reversal is driven primarily by the rising number of undernourished people, reaching *extremely alarming* levels in six countries: Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Madagascar, Kenya, Somalia, and Zambia. Despite two decades of decline, child stunting remains at *extremely alarming* levels and has even increased in Angola, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Niger. Child wasting shows the least improvement and remains at *serious* levels, with Sudan and South Sudan posting the highest rates globally. While the region has reduced its under-five mortality rate by more than half since 2000, it still holds the highest rate worldwide, with Chad, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia all in the *extremely alarming* category.

Successive and compounding shocks are threatening fragile gains in the region. In 2024, the strongest El Niño in decades brought prolonged drought to Southern Africa, causing widespread crop failures and power shortages in countries like Zambia and Zimbabwe, while exceptionally heavy rainfall and devastating floods displaced millions and damaged infrastructure across parts of West and Central Africa—with Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Cameroon, and Central African Republic among the hardest hit (WMO 2025a). Armed conflict continues to displace millions and disrupt markets, and severe funding shortfalls now threaten to suspend World Food Programme assistance for 2 million people across the Central Sahel and Nigeria—including refugees in Chad and Mauritania (WFP 2025d; 2025i). Without urgent measures to safeguard livelihoods, invest in sustainable agrifood systems, expand climate adaptation, and scale up humanitarian support, the region will continue to see a reversal of progress at a significant pace.

Somalia has recorded the highest hunger levels in both the region and the world for more than two decades. Despite steady improvement from *extremely alarming* in 2000, hunger in the country remains in the alarming category. Until 2016, Somalia also had the highest prevalence of undernourishment globally and was only recently surpassed by Haiti. Despite earlier declines, undernourishment remains *extremely alarming*—with over half the population affected. Child stunting and wasting have both decreased since 2000, with current levels classified as alarming and serious, respectively, although progress on wasting has slowed in recent years. Child mortality has also declined substantially since 2000 but remains extremely alarming and ranks as third highest in the world. Recurrent drought, flooding, protracted conflict, and sharp reductions in humanitarian assistance have pushed an estimated 4.6 million people—about one-quarter of the population—into crisis-level food insecurity in 2025 (IPC 2025e; UN 2025d). The famines narrowly avoided in 2022–2023 underscore both the severity of risk and the urgent need for sustained humanitarian interventions (FSIN and GNAFC 2025).

Sudan and South Sudan also represent two of the region's gravest hunger emergencies. In Sudan, incomplete data prevent the calculation of a 2025 GHI score, but available indicators point to a *serious* or even worse situation—including the world's third-highest child wasting rate. Conflict since 2023 has fractured food systems, obstructed delivery of assistance, and displaced millions of people. Famine was confirmed in parts of Darfur in mid-2024, with approximately 0.76 million people experiencing catastrophic food insecurity (IPC Phase 5), and projections suggest continued deterioration into 2025 (FSIN and GNAFC 2025). South Sudan—together with Democratic Republic of the Congo—holds the second-highest GHI score in 2025. With improved data availability, its previously provisional classification as *alarming* is now confirmed. South Sudan registers the world's highest rate of child wasting, *extremely alarming* levels of stunting, and—though declining—still *alarming* child mortality. IPC projections estimate that between April and July 2025, 7.7 million people—57 percent of the population—faced crisis-level

food insecurity or worse, with over 80,000 individuals confronting famine conditions (IPC 2025f). Ongoing subnational violence, successive floods, and an influx of refugees from Sudan are straining markets and overburdening humanitarian operations (WFP 2025c).

Burundi, like Sudan, lacks a composite GHI score for 2025, though its available indicators point to a deepening nutrition crisis. Child wasting has risen to the upper *serious* category, while child stunting—at 55.3 percent—remains the highest globally and has increased from 54.0 percent since 2016. Research in Muyinga and Ngozi provinces links high child malnutrition to reliance on subsistence farming and limited income diversification (Emera et al 2025). In 2024, recurrent rainfall shocks, elevated transport costs, and health system strains due to outbreaks of mpox, cholera, and measles left 2 million people in high levels of Acute Food Insecurity (IPC Phase 3+). As of early 2025, this number has declined to 1.2 million, likely reflecting improved harvest prospects and favorable rainfall (FSIN and GNAFC 2025; IPC 2025c). However, humanitarian agencies caution that overstretched support systems and spillover from conflict in Democratic Republic of the Congo continue to challenge response efforts (UN 2025a).

The crisis in Democratic Republic of the Congo is among the most severe in the region. Together with South Sudan, the country holds the second-highest 2025 GHI score globally, remaining firmly in the *alarming* category and showing only slight improvement since 2000. Undernourishment has escalated to *extremely alarming* levels, and the country now hosts over one in seven of the region's undernourished people. Child stunting is *extremely alarming* at 44 percent and rising, wasting has stagnated at *serious* levels, and while child mortality has halved since 2000, it remains *alarming*. Intensifying conflict in eastern provinces and El Niño–induced drought in the south displaced 7.8 million people in 2024, pushing 25.6 million into crisis-level food insecurity or worse in early 2025. Disease outbreaks and shrinking humanitarian access continue to erode already limited coping capacities (FSIN and GNAFC 2025).

Other countries in the region show that progress is possible—though often fragile. Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, and Angola demonstrate how targeted policy interventions can reduce hunger, but also how quickly those gains can be undone. In Ethiopia, the Productive Safety Net Programme has helped raise calorie intake, increase household income, and enhance environmental resilience through labor-based public works (Hailu and Amare 2022; Hirvonen et al. 2022; Tadesse and Zeleke 2022). Sierra Leone's government reports that the country has shortened seasonal food gaps and diversified diets by expanding school meals and—through the Feed Salone program—boosting rice self-sufficiency through irrigation, mechanization, and high-yield, climate-resilient seed varieties (Sierra Leone 2024). Post-conflict Angola made significant strides in implementing vaccination campaigns and developing rural infrastructure. Today, however, new shocks are undermining those gains. Renewed conflict and elevated food prices in northern Ethiopia, flooding in Sierra Leone, and prolonged drought in southern Angola are stretching households' resilience. Undernourishment is now rising again in Angola and Ethiopia and stagnating in Sierra Leone, and stunting rates are increasing sharply in Angola (FSIN and GNAFC 2025; FAO 2025d). Still, these examples underscore the potential of targeted safety nets, resilient food systems, and basic health services to reverse hunger trends when adequately financed and bolstered by early-warning and climate adaptation mechanisms.

South Asia

South Asia's 2025 GHI score indicates that hunger in the region remains *serious.* Though every country has made long-term gains since 2000, the region's trajectory has recently slowed. The prevalence of undernourishment has risen since 2016, and Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka have recorded notable increases in GHI scores, indicating rising hunger. Trends across the GHI indicators are mixed. Undernourishment, while substantially lower than in 2000, still affects nearly one in eight people, and the region accounts for 36.4 percent of the global undernourished population. Rates of child wasting—and even more so stunting—have declined but remain consistently the highest of any region. Rapid progress in several countries—Nepal and Bangladesh have each cut stunting by nearly 30 percentage points since 2000—has brought the regional average down to 32.3 percent, now identical to that of Africa South of the Sahara. These gains have been linked to multisectoral approaches and stronger policy and governance frameworks (Jalaludin et al. 2025). Despite this progress, stunting and wasting persist at *extremely alarming* levels, driven by intergenerational factors—poor maternal nutrition, a high share of low-birth-weight births, and uneven access to antenatal and child-health services (FSIN and GNAFC 2025). While nutrition outcomes remain troubling, child survival has seen marked improvements. Child mortality has fallen by more than half, placing it at a *moderate* level today. Recurrent climate shocks—ranging from record monsoon floods and cyclones to glacial lake outburst floods—have severely disrupted agricultural production and livelihoods, driving up food prices and placing further pressure on overstretched public and humanitarian budgets. In parallel, prolonged droughts threaten rainfed farming zones (FSIN and GNAFC 2025; World Bank 2025). Without strengthened investment in resilient food systems and inclusive social protection mechanisms, the region risks losing hard-won progress.

India reflects this broader trend of uneven progress. Its 2025 GHI score remains *serious* but continues a gradual improvement—one severity category below its 2000 level and 3.4 points lower than its 2016 score. Undernourishment has declined modestly since 2021 but continues to affect 172 million people in India—13.5 million more than in 2016. Child stunting has declined yet remains *extremely alarming* at about one in three children, driven largely by persistent maternal undernutrition (IIPS and ICF 2021). Child wasting shows slight improvement, keeping India in the *extremely alarming* category. Socioeconomic disparities, such as differences in parental education and access to sanitation, along with entrenched poverty, continue to mute the expected nutrition gains from India's economic growth (Shah et al. 2024). At the same time, overweight and obesity are rising, signaling a growing double burden of malnutrition (Ji et al. 2024; Venkatrao et al. 2020).

Afghanistan continues to have the highest GHI score in South Asia, remaining in the *serious* category, with earlier gains now partly reversed. Conflict, rights-related insecurity, economic stagnation shifting into renewed inflation, and abrupt funding cuts have driven food insecurity: One in five Afghan children now faces crisis-level hunger, and the World Food Programme (WFP) has suspended all preventive wasting services starting in May 2025 (FSIN and GNAFC 2025; Save the Children 2025; WFP 2025g).

In Pakistan, food security has also deteriorated in recent years, with the country's GHI score remaining *serious* and creeping upward since 2016. Repeated monsoon floods have devastated rural infrastructure and livelihoods, and projections indicated that about 11 million people in flood-affected districts were expected to experience crisis-level food insecurity from November 2024 to March 2025 (FSIN and GNAFC 2025; IFRC 2025). Fiscal constraints are further undermining already underfunded nutrition services. As climate shocks worsen, coverage gaps in treating acute malnutrition threaten to deepen an already critical burden: one in three children is stunted, and wasting levels have again reached *alarming* levels (FSIN and GNAFC 2025).

FIGURE 1.2 **REGIONAL 2000, 2008, 2016, AND 2025 GLOBAL HUNGER INDEX SCORES**



Source: Authors.

Note: See Appendix A for data sources. The regional and global GHI scores are calculated using regional and global aggregates for each indicator and the formula described in Appendix A. The regional and global aggregates for each indicator are calculated as population-weighted averages, using the indicator values reported in Appendix B. For countries lacking undernourishment data, provisional estimates provided by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) were used to calculate aggregates only but are not reported in Appendix B. Appendix D shows which countries are included in each region.

Low: GHI ≤ 9.9 **Moderate:** GHI 10.0–19.9 **Serious:** GHI 20.0–34.9 **Alarming:** GHI 35.0–49.9 **Extremely alarming:** GHI ≥ 50.0

Bangladesh and Nepal have made notable progress in reducing hunger—though risks remain. In Bangladesh, concerted efforts have led to a transition from a *serious* to a *moderate* hunger level since 2000. The country has achieved notable reductions in child stunting and enhanced agricultural production to support its growing population (Ahmed et al. 2024). However, challenges persist. As of April 2025, approximately 15.5 million people experienced high levels of acute food insecurity owing to stubbornly high food prices, frequent cyclones, and the prolonged Rohingya refugee crisis (IPC 2025a). The situation is exacerbated by a decline in international donor support, resulting in cuts in food rations for refugees and reduced assistance for host communities (UN 2025b).

Nepal has not only kept pace but—starting from a far worse baseline—has recently surpassed Bangladesh in its trajectory. Its GHI score has fallen by 5.8 points since 2016, shifting from *alarming* to *moderate,* the steepest drop in the region. Constitutional and legislative guarantees to the right to food, combined with successive Multi-Sectoral Nutrition Plans and improvements in healthcare; water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH); and household assets have contributed to significant gains (Chitekwe et al. 2022; Hanley-Cook et al. 2022; Koirala et al. 2024). Remittances, now a quarter of gross domestic product (GDP), help to stabilize food security but leave households vulnerable to external labor-market shocks (IMF 2023). At the same time, Nepal's growing status as a net food importer increases its exposure to global price volatility, while recurrent earthquakes, landslides, and monsoon floods disrupt rainfed agriculture and rural transport (Adhikari et al. 2021; FSIN and GNAFC 2025). Maintaining progress will require diversified livelihoods, climate-resilient infrastructure, and full financing of the right-to-food framework.

West Asia and North Africa

Countries in West Asia and North Africa have made only limited progress in reducing hunger since 2016. The region's 2025 GHI score stands at 12.5, indicating a *moderate* level of hunger. While this marks an improvement from 16.8 in 2000, the decline from 12.7 in 2016 reflects a notable slowdown in progress. This deceleration is driven largely by a renewed rise in the prevalence of undernourishment, which has offset continued gains in child stunting, wasting, and mortality. After falling through much of the early 2000s, the share of undernourished people in the region began to rise again after 2008, climbing from 8.7 percent in 2000 to a current level of 10.2 percent. This reversal is closely tied to the compounding effects of conflict, economic crisis, and climate stress. Armed violence in Syria, Yemen, and the occupied Palestinian territory has severely disrupted agricultural production and food systems while displacing millions and undermining access to food (FAO 2025g; IPC 2025c; WFP 2025f). At the same time, prolonged drought in parts of the Fertile Crescent—including Iraq and northern Syria—has hindered crop and livestock production and led to repeated harvest failures in some areas (FAO 2025b, 2025f). Many countries in the region remain heavily dependent on imported cereals and agricultural inputs, making them vulnerable to price shocks and supply disruptions (FAO 2025g). Amid these pressures, some countries continue to post low GHI scores, while others have seen sharp deterioration. This divergence underscores the urgent need to stabilize access to food and strengthen the resilience of food systems in the face of persistent and overlapping crises.

The impact of these crises is most severe in countries where conflict, displacement, and economic collapse converge, such as Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon. In Yemen, hunger remains the most severe in the region and has been provisionally classified for 2025 in the *alarming* category—the only country in the region at this level. Due to a lack of reliable data on the number of undernourished people, no GHI score could be calculated. Nearly one child in two is stunted, and wasting rates are among the worst globally. Although a fragile truce has reduced large-scale fighting, economic decline, rising food and fuel costs, and a delayed planting season—further compounded by recurrent and anticipated floods—continue to drive acute food insecurity. In late 2024, four districts were classified as facing an extremely critical nutrition situation, and since then, food insecurity has deepened further in government-controlled areas amid sharp cuts to humanitarian assistance (FSIN and GNAFC 2025; IPC 2025g; WFP 2025a).

In Syria, hunger has also worsened in recent years amid continued conflict and economic decline. The country's GHI score has risen to 30.6 (*serious*), driven by a sharp increase in undernourishment, which now affects 39.0 percent of the population. The 2024 drought, along with unaffordable input costs, currency collapse, and the displacement of 7.4 million people within the country, reduced wheat production to nearly half its precrisis average (FAO 2025b; FSIN and GNAFC 2025). Influxes of returning refugees from Lebanon, Turkey and of Lebanese refugees have strained basic services in the northeast and northwest. Indeed, in the northwest, half of all health facilities were nonfunctional in late 2024, and a lack of funding left nearly 1 million people without essential sanitation improvements. Despite these challenges, national-level child nutrition has gradually improved, though stunting and wasting remain high. Stunting

TABLE 1.1 **GLOBAL HUNGER INDEX SCORES BY 2025 GHI RANK**

Note: Rankings and index scores from this table cannot be accurately compared to rankings and index scores from previous reports (see Appendix A).

Rank[1]	Country	2000	2008	2016	2025	Rank[1]	Country	2000	2008	2016	2025
2025 GHI scores less than 5, collectively ranked 1–25.[2]	Armenia	20.3	10.8	6.7	<5	70	Indonesia	25.0	27.8	18.2	14.6
	Belarus	<5	<5	<5	<5	72	Nepal	37.0	28.5	20.6	14.8
	Bosnia & Herzegovina	9.5	6.1	5.0	<5	73	Cambodia	39.8	24.7	17.7	14.9
	Bulgaria	8.6	8.1	7.3	<5	74	South Africa	17.1	16.4	12.9	15.1
	Chile	<5	<5	<5	<5	75	Myanmar	41.5	28.3	16.8	15.3
	China	13.8	7.3	<5	<5	76	Senegal	32.5	20.9	16.8	15.6
	Costa Rica	5.9	<5	<5	<5	77	Eswatini	23.9	25.8	18.9	15.9
	Croatia	7.1	<5	<5	<5	78	Cameroon	36.8	26.9	20.4	17.1
	Estonia	<5	<5	<5	<5	79	Comoros	35.7	25.7	20.5	17.2
	Georgia	11.8	8.0	5.7	<5	80	Gambia	29.5	23.3	18.8	17.3
	Hungary	<5	<5	<5	<5	80	Togo	37.6	27.7	24.7	17.3
	Kazakhstan	12.0	10.2	5.7	<5	82	Guatemala	29.0	23.8	20.8	18.0
	Kuwait	<5	<5	<5	<5	83	Gabon	19.8	18.4	16.1	18.8
	Latvia	5.3	<5	<5	<5	84	Namibia	26.6	27.1	22.0	18.9
	Lithuania	5.0	<5	<5	<5	85	Bangladesh	34.6	32.5	24.4	19.2
	Montenegro	—	5.8	<5	<5	86	Mauritania	31.3	20.1	21.2	19.9
	North Macedonia	7.4	5.5	<5	<5	*	Lao PDR	—	—	—	10–19.9*
	Romania	8.1	6.0	<5	<5	*	Nicaragua	21.4	17.1	13.1	10–19.9*
	Russian Federation	10.6	6.0	5.5	<5	87	Uganda	36.0	28.6	29.1	20.2
	Serbia	—	5.3	<5	<5	88	Côte d'Ivoire	32.8	33.2	22.3	20.4
	Slovakia	5.3	<5	<5	<5	88	Solomon Islands	18.9	18.8	21.8	20.4
	Türkiye	14.8	6.9	<5	<5	90	Zimbabwe	35.5	29.6	27.2	20.9
	United Arab Emirates	<5	<5	<5	<5	91	Tanzania (United Rep. of)	40.3	29.4	24.7	21.1
	Uruguay	7.9	<5	<5	<5	92	Rwanda	49.7	36.4	28.2	21.7
	Uzbekistan	25.7	12.7	5.7	<5	93	Botswana	29.9	27.2	22.5	21.8
26	Moldova (Rep. of)	18.1	15.0	5.8	5.1	94	Djibouti	44.8	32.8	24.6	21.9
26	Mongolia	29.5	17.3	8.0	5.1	95	Malawi	43.3	28.5	23.1	22.0
28	Paraguay	12.8	8.3	5.2	5.2	96	Mali	40.3	31.3	24.7	22.3
29	Azerbaijan	25.2	14.1	8.1	5.6	97	Congo (Republic of)	35.1	32.2	26.6	22.6
30	Saudi Arabia	10.1	8.5	6.6	5.9	98	Burkina Faso	44.5	34.4	25.4	22.9
31	Mexico	9.8	9.2	7.1	6.0	99	Guinea	36.8	31.9	28.4	23.7
32	Colombia	10.7	10.3	7.1	6.1	100	Ethiopia	53.0	37.5	26.1	24.4
33	Tunisia	9.1	7.6	6.1	6.2	101	Guinea-Bissau	37.6	30.4	26.6	25.4
34	Argentina	6.5	5.2	5.3	6.4	102	India	38.1	34.6	29.3	25.8
34	Brazil	11.6	6.3	5.4	6.4	103	Benin	32.2	25.5	23.8	25.9
34	Dominican Republic	15.2	12.8	8.6	6.4	103	Kenya	35.7	28.7	23.1	25.9
37	Albania	15.3	15.3	6.7	7.0	103	Mozambique	46.8	32.7	36.4	25.9
38	Algeria	14.1	10.8	8.0	7.1	106	Pakistan	36.2	32.3	25.4	26.0
39	Peru	21.1	12.9	8.0	7.2	107	Timor-Leste	—	42.2	30.5	28.0
40	Iran (Islamic Republic of)	12.4	9.5	8.3	7.4	108	Sierra Leone	57.8	41.1	32.4	28.5
41	Panama	17.3	12.3	9.2	7.5	109	Afghanistan	49.6	32.7	28.0	29.0
42	El Salvador	13.6	11.6	8.9	7.6	110	Zambia	51.2	41.4	31.7	29.6
43	Jamaica	8.3	8.3	8.3	8.0	111	Angola	63.8	35.3	25.7	29.7
43	Kyrgyzstan	18.4	12.2	8.9	8.0	112	Liberia	47.7	36.8	32.9	30.0
45	Guyana	17.0	15.3	10.7	8.3	113	Syrian Arab Republic	14.8	17.0	23.7	30.6
46	Lebanon	11.1	8.3	7.1	8.5	114	Papua New Guinea	31.3	32.8	31.9	31.0
47	Morocco	15.6	11.5	8.6	9.3	115	Nigeria	38.2	32.3	29.9	32.8
48	Cabo Verde	16.2	13.1	11.5	9.4	116	Central African Republic	46.8	41.9	36.0	33.4
49	Venezuela (Boliv. Rep. of)	14.3	8.7	14.2	9.6	117	Niger	52.7	39.0	33.3	33.9
50	Thailand	17.5	12.3	10.4	9.7	118	Chad	49.6	43.8	38.5	34.8
50	Turkmenistan	19.9	14.3	10.2	9.7	*	Lesotho	—	—	—	20–34.9*
52	Fiji	9.2	10.2	10.6	9.9	*	Sudan	—	—	27.5	20–34.9*
53	Oman	16.2	10.2	12.0	10.2	*	Korea (DPR)	43.8	30.8	27.6	20–34.9*
54	Jordan	10.2	7.6	7.7	10.3	119	Haiti	40.2	37.2	29.9	35.7
55	Suriname	14.9	10.4	10.8	10.4	120	Madagascar	42.0	36.6	35.0	35.8
55	Ukraine	12.8	10.0	9.7	10.4	121	Dem. Rep. of the Congo	46.1	39.5	36.4	37.5
57	Egypt	16.4	15.5	14.5	10.5	121	South Sudan	—	—	—	37.5
58	Ecuador	19.1	14.6	11.3	10.9	123	Somalia	64.3	60.5	49.4	42.6
59	Trinidad & Tobago	11.2	11.0	9.7	11.0	*	Burundi and Yemen	—	—	—	35–49.9*
60	Viet Nam	25.7	19.7	14.1	11.1						
61	Sri Lanka	22.1	17.6	14.1	11.2						
62	Honduras	21.7	15.9	13.1	12.5						
63	Iraq	22.9	19.2	14.7	12.8						
63	Tajikistan	39.3	26.9	15.3	12.8						
65	Ghana	29.0	21.5	16.5	13.1						
66	Mauritius	15.3	13.2	12.8	13.4						
66	Philippines	23.9	21.4	17.7	13.4						
68	Malaysia	15.1	13.9	13.4	13.6						
69	Libya	11.9	14.8	16.3	13.9						
70	Bolivia (Plurinat. State of)	27.0	20.9	14.0	14.6						

= low = moderate = serious = alarming = extremely alarming

Note: For the 2025 GHI report, data were assessed for 136 countries. Of these, there were sufficient data to calculate 2025 GHI scores for and rank 123 countries (by way of comparison, 127 countries were ranked in the 2024 report).

[1] Ranked according to 2025 GHI scores. Countries that have identical 2025 scores are given the same ranking (for example, Moldova and Mongolia are both ranked 26th).

[2] The 25 countries with 2025 GHI scores of less than 5 are not assigned individual ranks, but rather are collectively ranked 1-25. Differences between their scores are minimal.

— = Data are not available or not presented. Some countries did not exist in their present borders in the given year or reference period.

* For 13 countries, individual scores could not be calculated and ranks could not be determined owing to lack of data. Where possible, these countries were provisionally designated by severity: 2 as *moderate,* 3 as *serious,* and 2 as *alarming.* For 6 countries, provisional designations could not be established (see Table A.3 in Appendix A).

FIGURE 1.3 **2025 GHI SCORES AND PROGRESS SINCE 2000**



Source: Authors.

Note: **This figure illustrates the change in GHI scores since 2000 in absolute values.** It features countries where data are available to calculate 2000 and 2025 GHI scores and where 2025 GHI scores show *moderate, serious, alarming,* or *extremely alarming* hunger levels. Some likely poor performers may not appear due to missing data.

Low: GHI ≤ 9.9 | Moderate: GHI 10.0–19.9 | Serious: GHI 20.0–34.9 | Alarming: GHI 35.0–49.9 | Extremely alarming: GHI ≥ 50.0

has declined to 23.5 percent, and wasting is also decreasing, suggesting that localized recovery efforts and humanitarian access may be helping to protect children from the worst effects—though these gains remain fragile (FSIN and GNAFC 2025).

Lebanon continues to host large numbers of Syrian refugees amid its own deepening economic and political turmoil. While still scoring in the *low* GHI category, Lebanon shows signs of growing risk. Soaring inflation, a collapsed currency, and recent conflict along the southern border have pushed food insecurity to crisis levels for nearly a quarter of the population, and child stunting now falls in the *serious* range (FSIN and GNAFC 2025; IPC 2025d).

At the time of writing, Gaza is experiencing a catastrophic food-security crisis that continues to deteriorate. An IPC Special Snapshot published on August 22 confirms that Famine (IPC Phase 5) is occurring in Gaza Governorate—now reaching famine-related mortality rates—and is projected to expand to Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis by late September. Nearly a third of the population—about 641,000 people—are expected to face Catastrophe (Phase 5), with 1.14 million in Emergency (Phase 4). Since mid-March, nearly 800,000 people have been newly displaced, including about 350,000 following the escalation of hostilities in May, forcing families to abandon remaining resources and deepening humanitarian needs.

Aid and commercial food deliveries were completely halted in March and April and remained critically low through July. While 55,600 metric tonnes of food entered during the first half of August—still short of the estimated 62,000-ton monthly minimum—only 13 percent of assistance reached intended destinations, and 87 percent of UN trucks were reportedly intercepted—underscoring widespread desperation. Reaching food is becoming increasingly dangerous: at least 1,800 people have been killed while trying to access aid. Food prices have surged across Gaza, with wheat flour in Gaza Governorate rising more than 3,400 percent since late February, rendering even limited supplies unaffordable for most households.

Acute malnutrition is worsening rapidly: At least 132,000 children under five are projected to suffer from acute malnutrition through June 2026, including over 41,000 severe cases. Nearly 55,500 pregnant and breastfeeding women also require urgent nutrition support. Local food production has collapsed—more than 98 percent of cropland is damaged, inaccessible, or both—exacerbating the breakdown of health, water, and sanitation services (IPC Special Snapshot 2025). Regardless of how the conflict evolves, destroyed agricultural infrastructure, extensive unexploded ordnance, and crippled water, sanitation, and health systems will prolong recovery and threaten livelihoods and nutrition for years to come (UN OCHA 2024).

Egypt has reduced its GHI score by 4.0 points since 2016, now placing it in the *moderate* and approaching the *low* category. This improvement has resulted from significant reductions in child wasting and stunting, alongside further declines in child mortality. These gains reflect a combination of large-scale public investment in food security, including expanded wheat storage, targeted cash transfer schemes, climate-smart irrigation initiatives, and land reclamation projects (Badr 2023). Yet progress remains uneven. The number of undernourished people has increased from 6.7 million in 2016 to 10.8 million today. Structural pressures—rapid population growth, limited arable land, desertification, and persistent water scarcity—are compounded by heavy reliance on imported food. Egypt imports more than half of its staple cereals, leaving it vulnerable to global price shocks, while domestic buffers such as grain reserves remain limited (Christoforidou et al. 2022).

Latin America and the Caribbean

In Latin America and the Caribbean, as in West Asia and North Africa, the reduction of hunger has slowed significantly. After falling from 13.2 in 2000 to 8.2 in 2016, the region's GHI score has barely moved since and lies at 7.9 in 2025. Undernourishment, which had dipped to 5.6 percent in 2016, now stands at 5.4 percent—equivalent to 34.6 million people. Child stunting—already the region's most stubborn indicator—has risen again: one in eight children is affected, and rates have climbed in one-third of the region's countries since 2016. By contrast, child wasting remains *low*—the lowest among all regions—and largely unchanged, while child mortality remains *moderate.*

This loss of momentum is mirrored by growing diet-related health challenges across the region. Overweight and obesity are accelerating even as undernutrition persists, creating a well-documented double burden of malnutrition (PAHO 2025). These challenges are compounded by the high cost of nutritious food. The average cost of a healthy diet is the highest of any region worldwide, and in the Caribbean subregion—where import dependency is high and climate shocks are frequent—one in two people cannot afford such a diet (FAO et al. 2025a). In parallel, conflict, displacement, and migration are increasingly undermining food security in parts of the region. In Colombia, rising food insecurity—with around 7.8 million people facing high levels of acute food insecurity in 2024—is compounded by internal displacement and the ongoing strain of hosting millions of migrants and refugees, particularly from Venezuela, many of whom face barriers to food access and services (FSIN and GNAFC 2025; UNHCR 2025).

Haiti continues to face the gravest hunger situation in Latin America and the Caribbean. With a 2025 GHI score of 35.7—the only country in the region classified as *alarming*—Haiti has experienced a marked deterioration since 2016. Undernourishment has surged to the highest level in the world, now affecting more than half the population. Child stunting remains stubbornly high, affecting more than one in five children, while child wasting has deteriorated back into the *serious* range. The child mortality rate, though reduced since 2000, remains the highest in the region—and the only one still at a *serious* level. This worsening situation is driven by a series of interconnected crises. Armed violence, economic collapse, and climate-related shocks have converged to erode food access and livelihoods. Haiti imports the vast majority of its staple cereals and has endured six consecutive years of economic contraction, while local food production is increasingly disrupted (FSIN AND GNAFC 2025; UN 2025c). In 2024, gang activity paralyzed markets and tripled displacement to around 1 million people, while food price inflation peaked at 42 percent—the highest in the region (FSIN and GNAFC 2025). The situation worsened in early 2025, when key food assistance and resilience programs were suspended owing to insecurity and a funding shortfall. By mid-2025, 2.1 million people were experiencing emergency levels of acute food insecurity, and more than 8,400 internally displaced persons were facing catastrophe conditions (IPC 2025b).

In Guatemala, chronic undernutrition has persisted even in the absence of widespread conflict. The country continues to grapple with persistently high levels of child undernutrition, particularly stunting. The 2025 GHI score of 18.0 places Guatemala in the *moderate* category, but this figure masks deep social and geographic inequalities. Nearly 45 percent of children under five are affected by stunting—the highest prevalence in the region and virtually unchanged since 2016. But stunting remains deeply unequal, with children from the poorest households significantly more affected than those from the wealthiest—a gap of over 50 percentage points—and rural Indigenous children consistently facing prevalence levels that often exceed 70 percent (Gatica-Dominguez et al. 2019). Wasting has remained *low* and continued to decline, while child mortality and undernourishment have both fallen modestly over the past decade but remain at *moderate* levels. Despite these partial improvements, overall progress remains limited. Nutrition-focused policies—including conditional cash transfers and school feeding programs—have been in place for more than a decade, yet coverage gaps and uneven implementation continue to constrain their impact (FAO et al. 2025a). Climate-related shocks, food-price volatility, widespread poverty, and reliance on informal work and trade, along with recurrent droughts in the Central American Dry Corridor—a drought-prone region stretching from southern Mexico to Panama—further erode household food security (FSIN and GNAFC 2025).

Guyana highlights what sustained economic growth, targeted investment, and regional coordination can achieve. It is one of the few countries in Latin America and the Caribbean to show consistent improvement across all GHI indicators. With a 2025 GHI score of 8.3—down from 10.7 in 2016—Guyana now falls into the *low* hunger category. Undernourishment now lies below 2.5 percent, child stunting has declined steadily to *moderate* levels, and child mortality continues to fall, though it also remains *moderate*. These improvements are underpinned by Guyana's expanding agricultural capacity and nutrition-related policy leadership. The country is the only one worldwide to meet domestic self-sufficiency targets for all seven major food groups recommended in a healthy diet—fruits, vegetables, dairy, fish, meat, legumes, and staples (Stehl et al. 2025). As a key driver of The Caribbean Community's regional food security strategy, Guyana is positioning itself as a production hub for the wider Caribbean, reducing import dependency and building climate-resilient supply chains (CARICOM 2025). Yet progress has not been uniform. The country continues to face high economic inequality, growing exposure to climate risks, and a rapid rise in overweight and obesity (PAHO 2025). Notably, child wasting remains a concern, with Guyana recording the highest rate in the region, classified as *serious*. Nonetheless, Guyana illustrates the potential of leveraging economic gains through targeted, multisectoral action to improve nutrition outcomes—a model that now requires greater focus on addressing acute malnutrition.

East and Southeast Asia

East and Southeast Asia continues to exhibit an overall *low* level of hunger, but the pace of progress has slowed in the past decade. At the same time, disparities between countries remain wide in terms of both GHI scores and component indicators. Four countries—the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPR Korea), Papua New Guinea, Timor-Leste, and Solomon Islands—remain in the *serious* hunger category, while almost half of the region's countries remain at *moderate* hunger levels. China, Fiji, Mongolia, and Thailand have achieved *low* scores. The region's overall classification as *low* is strongly influenced by China's large population and comparatively low GHI score, which mask more severe conditions in smaller countries. Climate-related shocks, volatile food prices, and limited access to diverse and nutritious diets continue to threaten progress across the region (Choiruzzad 2024; Lin et al. 2022).

Low: GHI ≤ 9.9 **Moderate:** GHI 10.0–19.9 **Serious:** GHI 20.0–34.9 **Alarming:** GHI 35.0–49.9 **Extremely alarming:** GHI ≥ 50.0

FIGURE 1.4 **WHERE THE INDICATORS OF HUNGER ARE HIGHEST**



Source: Authors (see Appendix A for data sources).

Among the countries facing severe challenges, Myanmar and DPR Korea stand out. Both are affected by different forms of conflict that drive food insecurity and undermine nutrition gains. Myanmar had achieved substantial reductions in hunger since 2000, but progress has stalled over the past decade. Its 2025 GHI score stands at 15.3, classified as moderate—a stagnation closely tied to mounting political and humanitarian crises. Escalating armed conflict since the February 2021 coup and the March 2025 earthquake have displaced roughly 3 million people and pushed 14.4 million people—25 percent of the population—into crisis or worse levels of food insecurity (FSIN and GNAFC 2025; UN OCHA 2025c; WFP 2025e). Damage to farmland, movement restrictions, and soaring food prices are contributing to rising undernourishment and wasting, even in previously low-risk areas (UN OCHA 2025c).

DPR Korea presents an even more alarming case, with long-standing political isolation as the root of its hunger crisis and recent data gaps limiting the ability to fully assess the severity of the situation. With undernourishment data unavailable since 2018, the country is provisionally classified in the *serious* category. Multiple indicators, including the last estimated undernourishment rate of 47.0 percent in 2018, up one percentage point from 2016—suggest sustained and possibly worsening food insecurity. Child wasting has returned to serious levels, reflecting a reversal in nutritional progress. Chronic input shortages, weather-linked crop losses, and strict trade sanctions continue to erode an already fragile public food distribution system (WFP 2025b). Independent assessments describe widespread ration cuts and limited acceptance of international assistance, leaving an estimated 12 million people chronically hungry (Brachtendorf 2025). DPR Korea is now the only country in the region where hunger is believed to have worsened significantly since 2016, underscoring how protracted isolation can halt—and even reverse—nutritional progress.

Several countries in the region face serious hunger in the context of repeated natural hazards. In Papua New Guinea, El Niño—driven droughts, flash floods, landslides, earthquakes, and tropical storms regularly disrupt subsistence farming, on which much of the population depends (Government of Papua New Guinea et al. 2025). Especially in rural areas, households rely on self-grown food and small-scale purchases to meet their nutritional needs, typically cultivating only a limited range of crops and lacking access to dietary diversity and nutrition education (Schmidt et al. 2024). As a result, undernourishment has risen to an *alarming* 28.7 percent, and child stunting remains at an *extremely alarming* level. Timor-Leste has faced similar climate-related disruptions in recent years, with droughts, floods, and food price shocks contributing to a renewed rise in undernourishment despite long-term progress (FSIN and GNAFC 2025; FAO 2025e).

Cambodia illustrates how sustained multisector efforts can yield significant improvements in nutrition. The country's GHI score has fallen by 24.9 points since 2000—one of the steepest declines in the region—and the prevalence of undernourishment now stands at just 5.2 percent, among the lowest in East and Southeast Asia. Child stunting has followed a similar trajectory, falling from an *extremely alarming* level in 2000 and now approaching the *serious* threshold, with an almost 30-point decline. Studies attribute this progress to rapid poverty reduction, expanded access to female education, improvements in sanitation and water supply, and increased uptake of nutrition-sensitive health interventions such as breastfeeding promotion, antenatal care, and facility-based deliveries (Zanello et al. 2016). Continued economic growth and social protection programs have supported further gains, though the World Food Programme warns that a large "near-poor" population and recurring floods and droughts could threaten recent progress (WFP 2025h). At the same time, persistent rural poverty, poor water access, and environmental risks continue to drive localized malnutrition (Rahut et al. 2024).

Europe and Central Asia

The region Europe and Central Asia continues to post the world's lowest regional GHI score. With a GHI score declining from 13.8 in 2000 to 5.5 in 2025, the region is on track to reach the *low* category by 2030. Progress has been broad based: undernourishment and child stunting have both more than halved, and child mortality is now just above the *low* threshold. Yet progress remains uneven. Since 2016, undernourishment has increased notably in Albania, Turkmenistan, and Ukraine. Ukraine now accounts for 38.9 percent of the region's undernourished; conflict there left roughly 5 million people in crisis or worse food insecurity in 2024 despite large-scale assistance. The war has also displaced millions: 3.7 million remain internally displaced, and about 6.3 million Ukrainians have sought refuge in countries across Europe and beyond, stretching social services in host countries such as Moldova (FSIN and GNAFC 2025).

Beyond the immediate impacts of the war, underlying structural vulnerabilities continue to shape food security across the region. Even before recent crises, 10–18 percent of people were already experiencing moderate or severe food insecurity—partly because nearly half of rural residents remain outside social protection systems and because rising living costs have reduced the affordability of diets across Europe and Central Asia (FAO 2022; FAO et al. 2023; Jungbluth and Zorya 2023). In many countries, low public spending on the food and farm sector has left productivity and diet quality vulnerable to market shocks and climate extremes (FAO 2023). Central Asia in particular offers scope for longer-term solutions: its vast but largely untapped farmland could help reduce the region's import dependence. Yet in the poorest contexts 18–50 percent of dairy, fruits, and vegetables are imported, leaving people's diets exposed to external price swings (Zhang et al. 2025).

Despite these regional pressures, several countries demonstrate that sustained progress is possible—even under difficult conditions. Tajikistan's progress is the most striking. Once the only country with an *alarming* GHI score, it is now nearing *low*. Three reinforcing factors explain the turnaround. Remittances—still about one-third of GDP—have improved household food access while exposing families to external shocks (World Bank 2024). Agricultural reforms have strengthened land-use rights and expanded the role and number of small-scale and family-led farms, shifting production toward grains and horticulture (Babu and Akramov 2022; Giobov et al. 2025). Targeted programs and external support—from WFP operations funded by the United States Agency for International Development to the THRIVE initiative of the French nongovernmental organization Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development (ACTED) and green energy and livelihood projects led by Welthungerhilfe—have promoted climate-smart livelihoods and social protection. Looking ahead, Tajikistan's Green Transition Plan aims to align renewable-energy exports with climate-resilient farming; success will depend on deeper reforms that create jobs and build long-term resilience. Similar progress in the Kyrgyz Republic—where a mix of remittances, improved access to primary health services, poverty reduction, and land reform drove large stunting declines—shows the broader potential of this approach across Central Asia (Wigle et al. 2020).

The Future We Choose: Reclaiming Progress and Renewing Commitment beyond 2030

The world is drifting further from the goal of Zero Hunger by 2030—not for lack of warning signs, but because of a collective failure to act. Climate extremes, violent conflict, economic fragility, and collapsing aid systems are overlapping and accelerating. Progress in reducing hunger is slowing, data systems are breaking down, and the commitment to end hunger is waning just when it is needed most.

Course correction, however, is possible. We have achieved progress before, even in times of global recession and crises. From 2000 to 2016, global hunger declined significantly—proof that coordinated action can yield real advances. Those gains were not accidental; they were built through sustained investment and political will. Today those same levers remain within reach. Governments can recommit to the kinds of actions that have proved effective in the past—such as expanding school meal programs—while investing in policies that support sustainable food systems in the face of growing shocks. Donors who once championed nutrition can prioritize it again. Together, such efforts must move beyond short-term responses to support long-term resilience and transformation. Ending hunger demands more than funding. It requires solidarity, long-term vision, and a renewed global commitment beyond 2030. The future will be shaped not just by crisis but by whether we choose to act—with urgency, with resolve, and with the conviction that Zero Hunger is still possible.

FIGURE 1.5 **2025 GLOBAL HUNGER INDEX BY SEVERITY**



Source: Authors.

Note: For the 2025 GHI, data on the proportion of undernourished are for 2022–2024; data on child wasting are for the latest year in the period 2020–2024 for which data are available; data on child stunting are for 2024, and data on child mortality are for 2023. GHI scores were not calculated for countries for which data were not available and for countries that did not meet the GHI inclusion criteria; see Appendix A for details. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on these map(s) do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of Welthungerhilfe (WHH), Concern Worldwide, or the Institute for International Law of Peace and Armed Conflict (IFHV) concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city, or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers and boundaries.

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02



In Tumaco, Colombia, 18-year-old cocoa producer Yeana Elimei Quiñones works with a community-led initiative that supports the production, processing and commercialization of Cocoa, with particular emphasis on strengthening the role of young people and women.

TWO DECADES OF POLITICAL PATHWAYS: EVOLVING PRIORITIES AND SHIFTING FOCUS TO END HUNGER

GHI Policy Recommendations in Review

The world is at risk, according to current evidence and actions, of not achieving the goal of ending global hunger by 2030, but the ambition remains vital and achievable in the longer term. To point the way toward overcoming hunger, GHI reports have long recommended policy actions backed by evidence. Now, after 20 years of tracking hunger through the GHI, it is useful to look back at past policy recommendations to see what enduring lessons can offer guidance going forward. The recommendations put forward over the two decades explore a broad range of solutions for ending global hunger, from strengthening governance and accountability to investing in climate resilience and food systems transformation. In all cases, they make it clear that intent must be accompanied by sustained political will, policy change, and action. Our position remains the same: Hunger exists not because we lack the solutions, but because we have yet to fully implement them.

National Policy, Law, and Institutional Governance

The most common policy recommendations included in the GHI relate to national policy, law, and institutional governance. Over the years, the recommendations evolved from an emphasis on trade and market reforms to a deep focus on rights, equity, and accountability, and more recently the integration of conflict sensitivity.

The earlier GHI recommendations focused on stabilizing global markets, liberalizing trade, and reforming biofuel policies that competed with food production. Legal reform, particularly around gender equity, began to enter the discussion, alongside calls to empower local actors and improve food access mechanisms.

Starting in 2012, recommendations shifted attention toward regulatory oversight and pro-poor development. They emphasized increasing transparency in food commodity markets, improving access to local markets, and promoting regional integration. The role of data, early warning systems, and community capacity building became increasingly important, reflecting a move toward institutional preparedness and decentralized solutions.

A major turning point came around 2017, when the governance conversation began to incorporate human rights frameworks and social equity. Governments were urged to protect citizens from harmful business practices, broaden participation in decision-making, and align trade and agricultural policies with environmental sustainability. Conflict sensitivity, land rights, and the needs of displaced populations entered governance priorities, signaling a recognition of food insecurity's political and structural roots.

In the past few years, the recommendations have emphasized the enforceability of the right to food through national law, institutional accountability, and the dismantling of structural inequalities. While conflict and crisis became more central, the humanitarian–development–peace nexus framing called for linking humanitarian assistance with long-term development and peacebuilding. This period underscored inclusive governance, the integration of climate and gender justice, and stronger international legal frameworks. Governments were called on to harmonize efforts across sectors, strengthen local governance, and respond effectively to crises through legal and financial mechanisms tied to hunger early warning systems.

Rural Development and Agricultural Support

Recommendations on rural development and agricultural support progressed from productivity-centered strategies to inclusive, resilience-focused food systems that account for climate, conflict, and equity.

Initial GHI recommendations called for prioritizing rural development, with a focus on building infrastructure, improving access to inputs such as fertilizer and seeds, and increasing productivity. Investments in agricultural research and value chains were framed as key to food security and economic development.

Later recommendations transitioned toward scaling up effective technical solutions. While productivity remained important, there was a growing emphasis on addressing the specific needs of women and youth in agriculture and promoting environmentally sustainable practices.

Coming into 2020, recommendations increasingly called for supporting small-scale producers, improving rural livelihoods, and linking rural and urban markets. Policy recommendations progressively recognized the role of sustainable food systems, nutrition-sensitive agriculture, and climate adaptation. Most recently, recommendations highlighted the need to take account of conflict and fragility when considering rural development. For contexts affected by insecurity or displacement, the recommendations emphasized enhancing the adaptability of local food systems, boosting resilience, and recognizing the role of agriculture in peacebuilding and recovery efforts.

Multisectoral Strategies and Approaches

The earlier editions of the GHI stressed the importance of multisectoral investments, particularly in education, health, and nutrition. The proposed approach focused on strengthening basic services, especially for women and children, and linking these with broader development goals such as food access and agricultural support. From 2012, thinking shifted toward addressing structural drivers of food insecurity, such as resource scarcity, poverty, fragility, and weak governance. The recommendations began to highlight the value of combining food, water, health, education, and governance initiatives into cohesive strategies while emphasizing the need to understand interconnections and invest in resilience at multiple levels.

Building on this thinking, from 2017 to 2020 the GHI advocated for strategies that address additional drivers of food insecurity such as conflict, inequality, and environmental degradation. Recommendations stressed aligning humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding frameworks to break cyclical vulnerability. In the past four years, the GHI further reinforced a systems-based, equity-driven model, asking governments and donors to align investments across sectors through a common food systems lens. This period emphasized institutional coherence and joint planning, especially for vulnerable and crisis-affected populations.

Development Financing and Aid Effectiveness

The evolution of recommendations related to development financing and aid effectiveness reflects a global shift from short-term emergency assistance toward long-term, integrated investments that align with national priorities and address structural causes of food insecurity and malnutrition. Over time, there has been growing recognition that sustainable food and nutrition security requires not just more development assistance but smarter, more accountable, and better-coordinated financing strategies that empower local actors and strengthen resilience.

Early recommendations stressed the need for long-term planning in development programs and encouraged development donors to support national efforts to build agricultural productivity and food access. From 2012, there was a marked transition toward promoting pro-poor insurance schemes and social protection that could withstand shocks. Coordination between donors and national governments was identified as a key priority for ensuring effectiveness. Recommendations also called for aligning development financing with the Sustainable Development Goals. National governments and donors were urged to make inclusive, equity-driven investments in rural development, education, and health systems, particularly for those most at risk of being left behind.

SHIFTS IN GHI POLICY THEMES ACROSS TWO DECADES:
Word Size Reflects Frequency of Recommendation

In more recent years, there has been a sharper focus on shared responsibility and coordination among development actors. Transparent systems for tracking commitments and results also became a prominent recommendation.

Evidence, Data, and Accountability

The importance of investing in research, monitoring, and local data collection systems was a core message from the first GHI report in 2008. Data was framed as essential for identifying food insecurity trends and informing targeted interventions. True to the design of the GHI, recommendations encouraged the use of common indicators, better alignment between agencies, and the incorporation of nutrition data into broader development tracking systems. These recommendations later evolved into calls for greater transparency in reporting food security and nutrition data, including public access to information. Citizen-led accountability efforts were increasingly seen as powerful tools. More recent recommendations stressed that data systems must reflect the needs of the most vulnerable and inform political decision-making that triggers action—especially in crises.

Anticipating Risk and Climate Action and Building Resilience

As the GHI evolved, it increasingly framed anticipatory action and climate resilience as central pillars of food systems transformation. Initial recommendations in response to the impact of extreme weather events and food price volatility emphasized the need for expanded emergency preparedness and humanitarian response, particularly in the face of extreme weather events and food price volatility.

From around 2012, recommendations began incorporating disaster risk reduction as integral to long-term food security. Recommendations from 2017 went on to advocate for designing climate-smart food systems that reduce emissions, promote biodiversity, and support communities—particularly women and smallholders—in adapting to climate change.

More recently, GHI reports have called for tackling interconnected risks—climate, conflict, pandemics, and economic shocks—in a holistic way. Governments were urged to strengthen local resilience and prioritize those most exposed to climate vulnerability. Coordination across sectors and levels of governance became a critical theme.

Inclusive, Equitable, and Locally Led Development

Tackling food insecurity involves not only ensuring equitable access to resources but also empowering communities—especially women, smallholders, and Indigenous groups—to shape food systems.

Up to 2011, the early GHI recommendations laid the groundwork for understanding how to address systemic barriers to progress, with calls to reduce gender disparities, especially in education, health, and food access. These early years highlighted the link between women's empowerment and improved household nutrition. Thinking was later expanded to include structural factors: recommendations urged the removal of discriminatory laws and practices and called for increased participation of women and other excluded groups in decision-making. They also emphasized strengthening local food systems and resilience as key to sustainable food and nutrition outcomes. Local governments were increasingly seen as essential partners in delivering effective, legitimate responses. In the past few years, GHI reports have emphasized the need for strong local leadership, inclusive governance, and meaningful participation across all levels. Communities, civil society, and local actors were positioned as central to building equitable, sustainable food systems, particularly in fragile or conflict-affected settings.

CASE STUDY

Leaving extreme poverty behind in Rwanda

Nadine (age 35) and Theoneste (age 42), who live in rural Rwanda with their three children, have faced struggles similar to those of millions of people living in extreme poverty around the world. Their ability to grow food or earn money from working as farm laborers was dependent on the weather—if there was no rainy season, there was no work or food. Another problem, Nadine said, was their lack of livestock: "It takes manure to produce a good harvest."

Now Nadine and Theoneste are one of the 1,400 vulnerable households participating in Concern Worldwide's Green Graduation Programme in Rwanda.[1] The Graduation approach aims to break the cycle of poverty through a big-push intervention that addresses multiple conditions of poverty simultaneously. Concern's Graduation programs include comprehensive targeting, income support, training in technical and business skills, coaching and mentoring, support for access to financial services, and a capital or asset transfer. Since 2007, Concern has implemented Graduation programs in 11 countries (Bangladesh, Burundi, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Haiti, Malawi, Pakistan, Rwanda, Somalia, and Zambia), reaching 172,846 people.

Through the 2023 Green Graduation Programme in Rwanda, Nadine and Theoneste received training in new climate-smart farming techniques, as well as cash transfers and other program benefits. They report acquiring a pig, whose manure they use to make organic fertilizer, which they apply in their home garden to grow beans, papaya, and mango. Theoneste also rents land to grow additional produce that he sells at the market. They state that with the income, they pay for their children's education, health insurance, and much-needed renovations to their home. They direct any additional income they save into the village savings and loans group, which also supports other families in the community.

Similarly, indications from several of Concern's Graduation programs show that participants have achieved improvements in areas such as asset ownership, food security, spending on basic needs, savings, ability to borrow and repay loans, investment in education, investment in health and preventative health care, and hygiene practices (Concern Worldwide n.d., 2022, 2024; Trinity College Dublin, TIME, and Concern Worldwide 2023). Further research would measure the long-term sustainability of different impacts and the cost-benefit aspects of the program.

Theoneste stands under a fruit tree on his rented farming land. He sells the produce he grows here at the market, generating income to provide for his three daughters.

Theoneste and Nadine stand outside their home in 2023, when the house was in disrepair and lacked a proper kitchen or toilet.

Theoneste in May 2025, outside his home following renovations.

[1] This case study was prepared by Concern Worldwide. The Graduation model was developed by BRAC in Bangladesh in 2002 and subsequently adapted by many organizations, including Concern. Since adopting this approach, Concern has worked with research partners such as Trinity College Dublin and the Centre for Social Protection at the Institute of Development Studies. This research has led to innovative approaches such as the Green Graduation Programme, which includes elements that promote environmental sustainability.

Insights from Experts and Policymakers: Progress Made, Challenges Ahead

For this 20th edition of the Global Hunger Index (GHI), we invited experts and policymakers from a range of backgrounds, organizations, and global regions to share their current perspectives on global food and nutrition insecurity and on the contribution made by the GHI over the past two decades.[2]

Joachim von Braun, Co-Initiator of the Global Hunger Index and Vice Chair of Welthungerhilfe's Board of Directors, former Director of the Center for Development Research (ZEF) at the University of Bonn, Germany, and Distinguished Professor of Economic and Technological Change as well as President of the Pontifical Academy of Sciences in the Vatican and a Member of the Scientific Group of the UN Food Systems Process

By the late 1990s, progress in reducing hunger was insufficient. The 1996 World Food Summit in Rome had aimed to spur action, but global responses were limited. We concluded that hunger reduction had to be tackled country by country, engaging all stakeholders—not just governments. We believed that highlighting both success and failure across countries could inspire action.

The idea of the Global Hunger Index (GHI) was born at the Center for Development Research (ZEF) at Bonn University in 1999. It was first released by the ZEF team in April 2000 as the Global Nutrition Index [Wiesmann, von Braun, and Feldbrügge 2000 a,b] and featured in a 2000 publication by Welthungerhilfe (WHH). The index was initially based on three core indicators: (1) percentage of undernourished, (2) prevalence of underweight in children, and (3) under-five mortality. After I became Director General of the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) in 2002, we transferred the index there, where it was further developed and rebranded as the Global Hunger Index.

A key strength of the GHI lies in its foundation of rigorous research, its clear and multidimensional concept of hunger, its reliance on official data, its global scope, and its ability to be updated annually. Some, however, felt it did not sufficiently capture the complexities of undernutrition and malnutrition. The critics did not consider the trade-offs between index complexity and strength in policy communication. No other such index in the field of hunger and nutrition achieved the reach of the GHI. The GHI's most impactful feature remains its country-by-country comparison, which spurs policy responses.

The GHI serves as a diagnostic tool. To understand the drivers and changes in hunger, deeper analysis is needed—especially as those drivers evolve. Increasingly, hunger is influenced by armed conflict, climate change, refugee movements, public health crises, and economic downturns with widening inequality. And nutrition needs more attention. A complementary index focusing on nutritional well-being, including body mass and diet quality, would be a valuable addition moving forward.

[2] Note: The views expressed in the interviews are those of the interviewees and are not peer-reviewed. They do not necessarily reflect the views of Welthungerhilfe (WHH), Concern Worldwide, or the Institute for International Law of Peace and Armed Conflict (IFHV).

Nitya Rao, Professor of Gender and De-velopment at the University of East Anglia, Essayist in the Global Hunger Index 2024 on Gender Justice and Climate Resilience

Looking at trends in the fight against hunger and malnutrition, there has been little improvement since 2016. A range of overlapping challenges—conflict, climate change, market disruptions, economic downturns, and rising income inequality—continue to hinder progress. While we speak of the right to food, particularly the right to healthy and nutritious food, this remains largely unrealized. Still, the Global Hunger Index offers some hope: GHI scores for Cambodia, Cameroon, Nepal, and Togo, among others, moved from alarming to moderate between 2000 and 2024, showing that positive change is indeed possible.

To make sustained progress beyond 2030, we must learn from past efforts while addressing today's emerging challenges—especially climate change. The 2024 report *The Unjust Climate from the Food and Agriculture Organization* of the United Nations highlights how climate impacts differ across gender and economic lines. In Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, men are increasingly migrating out of agriculture, leaving women to manage farms alone. This has led to growing work burdens and time poverty for women, who must also care for their families. Research shows that time poverty—not just food scarcity—is a major factor behind poor child nutrition outcomes such as stunting and wasting. I've seen this in my own research with Indigenous communities in India, where during peak farming

seasons, women had little time to cook or feed their children, leading to serious health impacts.

Gender equality and justice are critical to achieving transformative change. Justice has three dimensions. First, recognition—acknowledging that different groups have different needs and that one-size-fits-all solutions do not work. Second: redistribution—as global inequality grows, resources remain unevenly distributed. Women are doing more of the farming but rarely own land. According to FAO data, only 10–15 percent of landowners globally are women. Without land, women struggle to access credit, technology, and information, reinforcing unequal power dynamics and undermining food security. Third: representation—women's participation in political and decision-making spaces, especially in food systems governance, is essential for lasting progress.

In countries that have made strides in reducing hunger, we often see elements of a justice-based approach. Women may not have land, but they have gained access to training, technology, and knowledge. They have formed collectives to advocate for their needs. Some of these grassroots efforts have catalyzed change at the community and even state level. Yet large-scale transformation remains elusive. This is partly because efforts have focused too narrowly on households and communities, not paying adequate attention to wider systemic change. While addressing social and cultural norms is important—through education, media, and school curricula—we must also focus on reforming national policies and global markets to achieve broad and lasting progress. Data—and tools like the Global Hunger Index—can be powerful drivers of this change.

Macdonald Metzger, Deputy Chief of Staff for the Administration Office of the Vice President, Republic of Liberia

The Government of Liberia has adopted a range of policies to combat food and nutrition insecurity, from homegrown school feeding programs to multisectoral strategies that address both acute and chronic malnutrition. These efforts are aligned with the National Food and Nutrition Security Strategy and reflect our commitment to a comprehensive, inclusive approach. A central priority is building strong partnerships with local governments, traditional authorities, and community structures to ensure that interventions are grounded in local realities and fully embraced by the people they serve.

Public awareness and community engagement lie at the heart of the government's strategy: we work closely with respected individuals known locally as community mobilizers, town chiefs, and traditional communicators—trusted figures embedded in Liberian communities who act as cultural brokers. These intermediaries play a vital role in translating national policy messages into culturally relevant language, values, and practices. They also serve as bridges between communities and local and national authorities, helping to build trust and ensure programs are context-sensitive and people-centered.

The Global Hunger Index (GHI) has been instrumental in shaping policy dialogue and catalyzing action to reduce hunger and malnutrition in Liberia. Reliable data are essential—without this, policy decisions become speculative. The GHI fills these critical data gaps, enabling us to allocate resources efficiently, prevent duplication, and maximize impact.

We take care to translate GHI findings into formats that resonate with local audiences: infographics, simplified guides in Liberian languages, songs, and community-based storytelling. By using creative, culturally grounded tools, we make data accessible and actionable for citizens at every level. This inclusive approach reinforces accountability, builds ownership, and deepens the impact of our food and nutrition security efforts across Liberia.

Bimala Rai Paudyal, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Member of Nepal's National Planning Commission

Nepal has made good progress in reducing hunger over the past decade. But we still have 22 million people suffering from hunger and malnutrition—around 14 percent of our population. So, there is still much to do, and we are actively working on it.

Nepal is one of the very few countries with a dedicated Right to Food and Food Sovereignty Act. The Right to Food is also enshrined in our constitution, which means people have legally recognized rights they can claim. This has led to the development of various social protection programs and strategies to combat hunger and malnutrition. However, we have yet to fully implement all the elements of the act.

The progress we've made so far can be attributed to several key factors. One is the Safe Motherhood and Child Program, which is integrated into our food and nutrition strategy. Community health workers conduct door-to-door visits to identify pregnant women and lactating mothers. They provide food support and raise awareness about how to prepare nutritious meals using locally available ingredients. This has had a strong impact, even in rural areas.

Another factor is increasing women's access to income. For many women, their priority is to feed their families and children. Over the last decade, we've seen a significant rise in remittances. Men migrate for work—particularly to the Middle East and Gulf countries—and send money home. This has given women more control over household income, which they often spend on food for their families.

A third factor is our multistakeholder nutrition program. Nutrition is a cross-cutting issue, and we've built strong cooperation across ministries—education, health, agriculture, and technology—all working together to improve food and nutrition security.

However, one concern is that our focus has been primarily on remote areas. We've made good progress by empowering women and integrating nutrition and food security into programs. But we also need to focus on urban areas, where poverty is a growing challenge. The urban poor are struggling with rising food prices and increasing income insecurity, compounded by a lack of employment opportunities. While our earlier efforts targeted mostly rural areas, large segments of the urban population have been left behind. This gap urgently needs to be addressed.

Another challenge is the shift in food habits, particularly among young people, who increasingly choose packaged, low-nutrition foods over homemade, nutritious meals. We need to acknowledge that food and nutrition issues are no longer linked solely to poverty. That is why our strategy to reduce food and nutrition insecurity must also include targeted interventions in schools and community awareness campaigns to address food behavior. Access to adequate and safe food must be understood as a collective effort that affects everyone.

CASE STUDY

Cultivating Change: Transforming Seed Systems in the Central African Republic

When 62-year-old Marie-Hélène Yanapou-Poutia joined a local certified seed producer group in Paoua, Central African Republic, in 2019, she was searching for practical solutions to persistent low groundnut yields and limited access to high-quality farming inputs.

With the provision of training, which was supported by Welthungerhilfe[3], Marie-Hélène recalls, she gained access to the knowledge and inputs needed to produce high-quality, locally adapted seeds on her own and sell the certified seeds to local smallholder farmers. Consequently, she notes, since 2019 she has been able to increase her household income up to seven times higher than before, allowing her to invest in her children's education, expand her land, and raise livestock.

Marie-Hélène's reported success is emblematic of a larger transformation. For over two decades, the Central African Republic faced recurring political instability and armed conflict, severely disrupting rural life and state institutions. In 2013 a coup and widespread intercommunal violence triggered a crisis that led to massive displacements, protracted insecurity, and a devastated seed system (World Bank 2022): Research stations were destroyed and genetic material was lost, leaving smallholders without reliable access to seeds.

Since 2014, Welthungerhilfe has supported the restoration of these vital agricultural services. In close partnership with national and international partners, Welthungerhilfe supported the rehabilitation of five research stations and the headquarters of the national research institute, the Institut Centrafricain de la Recherche Agronomique (ICRA). Shifting from emergency response toward long-term systemic transformation, the project strengthened research and extension services, and supported the reintroduction and multiplication of quality certified seed varieties through local seed producer groups across Central African Republic.

Seed producer groups in Central African Republic's food system turn certified groundnut seeds into a foundation for food security and rural recovery.

Farmers like Marie-Hélène now play a key role in this system. They are trained and certified to multiply quality seed stocks for key crops sourced from ICRA's research. In this way, they link scientific innovation with local production and improved market access. The transformation of seed systems in Central African Republic demonstrates how sustained investment in locally driven agriculture can strengthen food security, lay the foundation for long-term structural change, and ensure that small-scale farmers like Marie-Hélène can thrive and build resilient livelihoods.

[3] This case study was prepared by Welthungerhilfe (WHH), funded by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), aims to improve food security and household incomes in rural Central African Republic by enhancing access to quality seeds and technical support. It works closely with national partners—Agence Centrafricaine de Développement Agricole (ACDA), Institut Centrafricain de la Recherche Agronomique (ICRA), and Office National de Semences (ONASEM)—to strengthen institutional capacities through support, infrastructure rehabilitation, training, agricultural tools, seeds for reproduction, and updated crop manuals. These institutions in turn support smallholder farmers in producing and marketing agricultural goods.

Sisay Sinamo Boltena, Senior Programme Manager, Seqota Declaration, and SUN Focal Person at Ethiopia's Ministry of Health

One of Ethiopia's most successful initiatives in the fight against malnutrition is the Seqota Declaration—a high-level commitment by the government of Ethiopia to ending stunting among children under two years old by 2030. The Declaration follows a learning-by-doing approach, and we have seen significant progress since its launch in 2015.

The Seqota Declaration is divided into three phases: the Innovation Phase (2016–2020), the Expansion Phase (2021–2025), and the Scale-up Phase (2026–2030). It prioritizes high-impact, low-cost nutrition interventions that are implemented through the health, agriculture, water, education, women, and social protection sectors and supported by high-level governance and financial investment.

Here is what we have learned so far about the key factors behind its success: First, the government developed a clear 15-year roadmap, guided by a strong and coherent vision of Ethiopian children free from malnutrition. Second, the multistakeholder initiative is led and owned at the highest level of government. At the federal level it is chaired by His Excellency the Deputy Prime Minister, Ato Temesgen Tiruneh, and at the regional level by Excellencies, the Regional Presidents and City Mayors. Third, the government has allocated domestic resources from its treasury, and regional governments match this funding. Technical assistance and investment to operationalize the innovations have been mobilized from development partners. This is crucial. A strong plan alone, without investment, is not enough—and it will not succeed. Fourth, we established a robust accountability framework to track progress and measure results. We use performance scorecards to monitor the work of different sectors and regions. These scorecards are regularly reviewed at multiple levels and help us make timely course corrections.

Our impact study shows that our investment has prevented about 110,000 children from being stunted, with an annual average rate of stunting reduction of around 3 percent.

We have also learned that programming must prioritize community engagement, community ownership, and women's empowerment. The Community Lab and the First 1,000 Days Plus Public Movement innovations are the main tools we use to mobilize the stakeholders at all levels. Gender mainstreaming was one of the success factors for the Seqota Declaration Innovation Phase. Without addressing gender inequality, lasting improvements in food and nutrition security are not possible.

We are sharing these insights with other countries interested in replicating the Seqota Declaration. Our core message is this: A country must have a clear vision and multiyear roadmap for ending stunting. The initiative must be owned by the highest level of political leadership. Domestic investment is essential. And every program must be adapted to the specific national context.

Klaus von Grebmer, Economist and Co-Initiator of the Global Hunger Index, Research Fellow Emeritus and Strategic Adviser at the International Food Policy Research Institute

At the first World Food Conference in 1974, then US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger declared that no child would go to bed hungry within 10 years. That didn't happen. Today—50 years after that statement—millions of children still go to bed hungry every night.

I used to work in the private sector, where a well-known management guru once postulated the guiding principle: "What is not being measured is not being done." When I later joined the International Food Policy Research Institute and we were organizing a conference in 2001 on how to achieve sustainable food for all by 2020, that phrase came back to me. I began to ask: How can we measure hunger and determine on an empirical basis whether progress is being made? This is when we further developed and published the Global Hunger Index.

We know that authority, accountability, and responsibility are key elements of effective management. The same principles apply in the fight against hunger. Significant progress has been made where hunger eradication was treated as a top national priority and when the Prime Minister or President took a personal interest in the issue. When the highest leader regularly asks for progress reports, there is a clear obligation to deliver results. We've seen this in countries like Bangladesh, Ghana, and Thailand. In contrast, when the responsibility for fighting hunger is left solely to the agriculture or health ministry, outcomes are often very different. Agriculture and health are often the lowest-ranking ministries in the cabinet. If no one asks about progress and no one is held accountable, then there is no pressure to act—and no one answers in the event of failure.

The Global Hunger Index is a valuable tool for effective management. It raises awareness of regional and national disparities in hunger and identifies both successes and setbacks in reducing it. By tracking progress over time, it also serves as a motivator—encouraging countries to take action and improve their international standing. Lest we not forget: the hunger of one is the shame of all.

Carolina Trivelli, Independent Expert on Food Security and former Minister of Development and Social Inclusion of Peru

Effectively combating hunger requires several key elements to come together. First, a coordinated strategy with strong governance is essential. This means that institutions across the public and private sectors, as well as civil society, must work in partnership. Second, reliable and timely data are crucial to be able to set priorities, monitor progress, and accurately design the necessary interventions. Third, there must be clear accountability. An institution, a person, or a committee must be tasked with addressing the issue of hunger. Someone needs to be responsible for both the current situation and the actions taken in response.

The Global Hunger Index (GHI) has played a significant role in shaping policy discussions through two main channels. First, it provides recent data that help stakeholders revisit their agendas and commitments. Second, it serves as a powerful alarm bell, garnering attention from external actors such as the media and the academic community.

The GHI becomes especially impactful when viewed over time. While a single year's index offers a snapshot of the current situation, a multiyear perspective allows us to trace the origins of today's outcomes and place them within a broader context. In this way, the GHI transforms from a picture into a movie—showing not just where we are, but where we came from.

Wendy Geza, Food Systems and Policy Researcher at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa, Essayist in the Global Hunger Index 2023 on Youth-led Transformation of Food Systems

Across many countries, we already have strong policies in place to fight hunger—but the biggest challenge lies in implementation. I'm currently researching food environment policies in the Global South, using South Africa, Malaysia, Tanzania, and Ghana as case studies. I examine policy interventions aimed at improving food accessibility and affordability, particularly in urban marginalized populations. In each case, I find that while the policies are well crafted and regularly updated, they are not being properly implemented. And where implementation does occur, the main issue then becomes monitoring and accountability. Rarely is there a process to ensure that what's written is actually carried out, evaluated, and—if it didn't work—reflected upon to draw meaningful lessons.

For me, the key success factor in fighting hunger isn't necessarily developing new policies but ensuring that existing ones are translated into measurable actions—actions that can be monitored, evaluated, and, in successful cases, scaled up.

We need to break down global action plans into local strategies and build partnerships that enable mutual accountability. Often, we move from broad global or international frameworks to regional policies that are slightly more specific, followed by national policies and strategies that go further. But by the time policies reach the local level, they are still too vague—lacking clear direction for on-the-ground implementation. Many local government officials don't fully understand what is expected of them or how to carry them out because the guidance is too abstract.

What's also essential are platforms that foster partnerships and collaboration. We need spaces where stakeholders can clearly communicate roles, responsibilities, and accountability mechanisms—where we can track changes, evaluate progress, and address gaps. When a diverse group of actors works together, it creates opportunities to hold each other accountable when actions don't align with original intentions.

Tom Arnold, Agricultural Economist and Public Policy Advisor, former CEO of Concern Worldwide

After significant progress in reducing hunger since the 1950s, the situation has worsened over the past decade. We must acknowledge this reality and address its root causes: conflict, the COVID-19 pandemic, and, increasingly, climate change.

At the same time, two important developments have shaped the global response: the growing recognition of nutrition and the emergence of food systems as a central concept. Over the past 20 years, greater attention to nutrition has played a key role in the fight against hunger. A major turning point was the 2006 World Bank report *Repositioning Nutrition As Central to Development,* which highlighted the importance of the first 1,000 days of a child's life and backed it with strong scientific evidence. When the global food crisis struck in 2007–2008, food and nutrition security were discussed at the Group of Eight for the first time, leading to increased funding. Two years later, the Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) Movement was launched. Today, 66 countries and four Indian states are part of the movement, and nutrition is firmly on the political agenda.

CASE STUDY

Overcoming Child Wasting in Africa's Mandera Triangle

Map of the Mandera Triangle

Hanaano Program Area of Operation

Child wasting—that is, low weight for height, reflecting acute undernutrition—is the most dangerous form of malnutrition. Affecting 13.7 million children a year worldwide, wasting is responsible for up to 20 percent of deaths of children under the age of five (Osendarp et al. 2025).

Fortunately, much has been learned about the best ways to treat wasting. The widespread rollout of community management of acute malnutrition (CMAM), an approach pioneered by Concern and Valid International in 2001, has revolutionized care by enabling early detection and decentralized treatment using ready-to-use therapeutic foods (WHO et al. 2007). Progress on preventing wasting, however, remains a complex challenge. Stopping child wasting before it can start demands interventions across multiple sectors—including improved maternal health, optimal infant and young child feeding, access to clean water, sanitation, and responsive health systems—yet such integrated approaches are still not systematically implemented or adequately funded at scale.

In 2023, Concern Worldwide and several partners launched the Hanaano program (hanaano means "to nurture" in Somali) to tackle the complex problem of child wasting in the Mandera Triangle, an arid and semiarid region that crosses the borders of Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia.[4] The Mandera Triangle is populated mostly by mobile pastoralists, refugees, seasonal cross-border laborers, undocumented migrants, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and communities hosting refugees and IDPs (Interpeace 2021). It is one of the most challenging contexts in which to sustain livelihoods and has some of the highest levels of food insecurity and malnutrition in the Horn of Africa. At the peak of the 2020–2023 drought, the prevalence of global acute malnutrition, reflecting child malnutrition, in the Mandera Triangle reached 35 percent—more than double the 15 percent emergency threshold established by the World Health Organization (IPC 2022).

Given the complexity of preventing child wasting, the Hanaano program supports communities in the Mandera Triangle in building local capacity across a range of sectors, including health; agriculture; food security; water, sanitation, and hygiene; social protection; and environmental management. Through efforts in these areas, the program aims to improve nutrition and care practices for women and children and to enhance food security through profitable, climate-resilient livelihood strategies, while contributing to the evidence base that informs national and regional strategies.

Shinda attends a mother-to-mother group that includes cooking demonstrations and information on nutrition and healthy eating.

In the first year of Hanaano, preliminary assessments indicate that 1,600 women attended mother-to-mother groups, 800 lead farmers received seeds and agricultural tools, 7,000 people gained access to clean and safe drinking water, 11,500 farmers gained access to livestock veterinary services and drugs, and more than 251,000 were reached through behavior change campaigns.

Shinda (age 33), mother of six, reports that she attended Hanaano cooking demonstrations to complement agricultural training. From these classes, she explains, she now has a better understanding of how to prepare nutritious meals using produce she grows at home. Since the change in their diet, Shinda says her children are "now strong, healthy, and full of energy."

The aim of Hanaano is to prevent wasting among more than 305,000 children living in the most vulnerable communities in the Mandera Triangle over a span of three years. It is also hoped that through active learning, contextual program adaptation, and locally led advocacy, Hanaano will influence and inform more effective local, national, and global wasting prevention strategies.

[4] This case study was prepared by Concern Worldwide. The Hanaano program is supported by Irish Aid, as part of Ireland's support to ending child wasting, a commitment under the Global Action Plan on Child Wasting. It is a joint effort by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Concern Worldwide, local partners (Rural Agency for Community Development and Assistance [RACIDA] in Kenya, Pastoralist Concern in Ethiopia, and Lifeline Gedo in Somalia), and Tufts University. Hanaano aims to contribute to this evidence space while also supporting communities to develop local capacity to prevent and address wasting.

(continuation from interviews)

Since the 2021 UN Food Systems Summit, the conversation has evolved. People now understand that addressing hunger and undernutrition alone is not enough. We must consider malnutrition in all its forms—undernutrition, micronutrient deficiencies, overweight, and obesity—through an integrated lens. This requires a food systems approach. Food systems include all the elements and activities involved in the production, processing, distribution, consumption, and disposal of food, as well as the social, economic, and environmental outcomes they generate. Only by looking at these interdependencies can we effectively improve food and nutrition security for all.

Dan Smith, Director of Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Essayist in the Global Hunger Index 2021 on Food Systems in Conflict Settings

The relationship between violent conflict and food insecurity is a two-way road. The more obvious link is how conflict worsens food insecurity and increases hunger. Violent conflict remains the primary driver of global hunger. Rural areas often become battlegrounds, leading to widespread destruction—sometimes incidental, sometimes deliberate—of farmland, production facilities, storage sites, and transport infrastructure. War injures, kills, and displaces farmworkers like everyone else. It contaminates soil and water. As seen in many conflicts, most recently in Gaza, starvation can be weaponized, even though this violates international law.

Food insecurity can also contribute to the outbreak of violent conflict. While politics—especially the motives and opportunities of key political actors—should be at the forefront of any conflict analysis, deeper structural issues often create fertile ground for violence. These include shortages caused by climate change and other environmental stresses, compounded by deep social inequalities. If governments are unable to address or manage resulting grievances, tensions can escalate into violence. Rising food prices, particularly for staples like wheat, are strongly linked to political unrest. Because food systems are global, climate shocks in one region can trigger price spikes and unrest in another, as occurred during the onset of the Arab Spring in 2010–2011.

The good news is that it is possible to begin breaking the vicious cycle between conflict and hunger, even in the midst of ongoing violence. There are numerous local examples where this has worked. Research by SIPRI's Food, Peace and Security Programme has

identified cases in Colombia, Lebanon, Mali, Nigeria, and South Sudan. These involve externally funded projects supporting food production and local businesses, with strong community engagement. In some cases, international funders had explicit peacebuilding goals; in others, they did not. All suggest the value of applying a peace/conflict lens to food systems interventions—and the need to scale them up.

There are also national initiatives following the same logic. In response to the 2007–2008 global food crisis, Egypt and Morocco launched strategies to boost food security through agricultural development. Egypt's "Strategy for Sustainable Agricultural Development to 2030" and Morocco's "Green Morocco Plan" aimed to modernize production and introduce climate-resilient wheat varieties. By 2021 Morocco was producing three times more wheat than during the drought-stricken year of 2020, with yields 58 percent above the 2016–2020 average. Such initiatives remain promising pathways toward long-term, sustainable food security.

The limitation of all such efforts—local or national—is that they cannot override politics. Even the most effective, peace-oriented food systems development can be derailed by irresponsible or cynical political leadership. Yet such initiatives may help to reduce the likelihood that such leaders gain or maintain power.

Kaosar Afsana, Professor at the BRAC James P Grant School of Public Health, Member of Welthungerhilfe's Board of Directors

Fighting hunger requires a systems approach that goes beyond the food system alone. Fair wages, affordable health care, quality education, and strong social protection in addition to the enforcement of existing nutrition-sensitive policies are all essential to ensure that people can access safe, nutritious, and affordable food and build resilience.

Let me give two examples: the ready-made garments industry and child marriage. In my home country, Bangladesh, the ready-made garments sector plays a major economic role—we export garments to Europe, the United States, and other regions and countries. Yet the returns do not reflect the true cost of production, and workers' wages remain far too low. As a result, many workers, especially females, cannot afford healthy diets. This highlights the urgent need to reform our economic and trade systems to make them more just and sustainable.

Early marriage is another deeply rooted issue. Although child marriage below the age of 18 years is illegal in Bangladesh, far too many girls are still married off before reaching adulthood and thus are often forced to leave school early. While the government ensures free secondary education for girls, social and cultural barriers—such as early marriage—prevent many girls from completing it. Early marriage leads to adolescent pregnancy, worsening undernutrition and contributing to subsequent morbidities and the mortality of mothers and children. Education is thus a key factor in breaking the cycle of hunger and poverty.

True systems thinking must tackle these structural barriers and many others. Only then can we make meaningful progress in the fight against hunger.

Mendy Ndlovu, Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Centre for Transformative Agricultural and Food Systems at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa, Essayist in the Global Hunger Index 2023 on Youth-led Transformation of Food Systems

Starting now and beyond 2030, we must take deliberate climate action and strengthen the climate resilience of the most vulnerable regions to effectively combat hunger. This means advocating for and implementing climate-smart agricultural practices, promoting sustainable natural resource management, and prioritizing ecosystem restoration—for the benefit of both people and the planet. The time to act is now.

We must also promote food sovereignty and integrate Indigenous knowledge systems to reinforce local agrifood systems. Inclusive governance and social protection are essential, particularly for women and youth. This includes intentional efforts to secure their land and water rights, and ensuring their full participation in development and decision-making across all subsectors of agrifood systems.

With the right support, youth can play key roles as educators, innovators, advocates, connectors, and leaders in climate action. They are central to building a resilient and sustainable future for Sub-Saharan Africa and the Global South at large. Strengthening their technological capacity and access is critical. This includes enabling them to engage with platforms like the Global Hunger Index, which can raise awareness of local and regional challenges and help identify needed solutions. Technological capacity also means ensuring young people can understand and act on information shared through tools like early warning systems—when available—and that they are empowered to respond proactively to disasters.

Symbolic handover of the Customary Land Rights Act to the "customary people" during the Peoples' Land Conference in Makeni, Sierra Leone, May 2023.

After fighting for her land rights, Marie Olimbo Sesay, landowner and active member of the Port Loko MAP, educates women on the importance of understanding the Customary Land Rights Act.

CASE STUDY

Shared Voices, Shared Land: Multi-Actor Partnerships in Practice

In Sierra Leone the passage of the Customary Land Rights Act (CLRA) in 2022 marked a milestone for inclusive land governance, securing tenure rights for women and marginalized groups. The reform abolished all forms of discrimination based on gender, tribe, religion, ethnicity, marital status, or social or economic standing, and mandates that women hold at least 30 percent of seats in all land governance bodies, guaranteeing their role in land-related decisions (Sierra Leone 2022).

This landmark legislation was the result of years of grassroots mobilization and sustained public pressure in which a consortium of four civil society organizations called *Land for Life Sierra Leone* played an active role. Established in 2019 with support from Welthungerhilfe's *Land for Life* program,[5] the consortium contributed through community-driven advocacy, capacity development, and the facilitation of local dialogue.

Land is more than an economic asset—it holds social, cultural, and ecological value and is central to food production and livelihoods. When people lack secure tenure, it undermines their ability to produce food, plan for the future, or recover from shocks, making them vulnerable to food insecurity. However, land governance is often highly complex, shaped by overlapping legal systems and entrenched power imbalances that make it difficult for individuals, especially women and marginalized groups, to access, control, or defend their land.

To address these complexities in practice, Welthungerhilfe's *Land for Life* program places multi-actor collaboration at its core. A key element of this approach is the creation of multi-actor partnerships (MAPs)—structured dialogue platforms that bring together stakeholders from across society: traditional leaders, local and national officials, farmers, civil society, and private sector actors. These platforms provide a space for exchange and a mechanism to navigate competing interests, overcome mistrust, and foster local solutions in complex governance environments.

Land for Life Sierra Leone initiated 16 MAPs across the country: 12 at the chiefdom level and 4 at the district level. By facilitating inclusive consultations in the process leading to the CLRA, the MAPs helped to ensure that the new legislation reflected community realities and upheld the rights of those historically left out of decision-making. At the national level *Land for Life Sierra Leone* has also advocated for land rights that are consistent with international human rights standards.

Today, MAPs in Sierra Leone help identify gaps in the implementation of the new land law. With the support of Welthungerhilfe, MAPs help communities strengthen their land rights by providing training, building legal literacy, fostering exchange, and building a culture of dialogue.

For women like Marie Olimbo Sesay, a farmer in Port Loko District, the capacity-building efforts empowered her to fight for her legal land rights: "I was denied access to my father's land because I am a woman. I'm glad I was able to fight in court for my right to own and use the land." After successfully acquiring land, Marie reports that now she cultivates vegetables and tree crops, earns income through local trade, and supports other women in navigating their land rights, turning legal recognition into economic empowerment and community leadership.

To promote the broader adoption of MAPs across different contexts, the *Land for Life* program has developed a practical toolbox to guide their facilitation and operation. Drawing on eight years of experience in Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, the toolbox offers tested methods for building trust, enabling collective leadership, and navigating power dynamics in complex governance contexts (Welthungerhilfe et al. 2025).

[5] This case study was prepared by Welthungerhilfe (WHH). Since 2011 the WHH *Land for Life* initiative works with financial support of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) with local partners in Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Liberia, and Sierra Leone and at the international level to jointly address land governance challenges. WHH, supported by the Civil Society Academy (CSA) and the Network Movement for Justice and Development (NMJD), provides backstopping support, facilitates workshops, and links the country-level partners to relevant actors.

03



In Kenema District, Sierra Leone, villagers gather for their weekly village savings and loan meeting to make decisions on communal savings. Through this community support system, members can access microcredits for food or to invest in household needs.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

To be effective, policy strategies must be designed and implemented with a clear commitment to several foundational principles: the right of all people to adequate food, the urgency of the climate and biodiversity crises, the need to integrate nutrition into broader policy sectors, and the pursuit of localization, equity, diversity, and inclusion. While not every stand-alone recommendation that follows addresses each cross-cutting issue, these priorities are assumed to underpin all actions proposed. Our aim is to highlight catalytic, coherent actions through which all actors can address interconnected challenges in a meaningful and sustainable way.

1 Leave No One Behind: Act Urgently on Hunger and Build Resilient Food Systems

- → **Secure political leadership for sustainable food systems transformation.** Governments at all levels must commit to building inclusive, resilient, sustainable, and peace-oriented food systems that address all forms of malnutrition and involve the full scope of those food systems, from production to disposal, and their social, economic, and environmental impacts. This approach includes legally recognizing the right to food, ensuring accountability, promoting food sovereignty, and ensuring the full participation of women and youth in governance and decision-making.
- → **Promote sustainable, climate-resilient agricultural development as a long-term solution to food insecurity.** This requires investing in food systems that adopt appropriate, innovative technologies, draw on local knowledge, secure land and water rights, and prioritize ecosystem restoration—with active collaboration between governments, civil society, academia, the private sector, and communities to build inclusive and sustainable value chains. Responsible political leadership is essential to ensure these efforts are protected and not undermined.
- → **Ensure adequate, flexible, and accountable financing from diversified sources,** including humanitarian, development, climate finance, domestic mobilization, and private sector sources. Donors must meet existing commitments, reverse assistance cuts, and prioritize the reduction of hunger across all major funding frameworks, including the upcoming European Union Multiannual Financial Framework. From now until 2030, all stakeholders must prioritize financing and operationalizing existing hunger and nutrition strategies, with clear timelines and accountability mechanisms.

2 Strengthen National-Level Political Commitment and Prioritize Localized Implementation

- → **Promote high-level ownership and institutionalize responsibility.** Heads of state and governments must champion initiatives to eradicate hunger and designate specific offices or individuals to be accountable for overseeing hunger policy and reporting on progress. There is already a body of evidence and experience related to the role of high-level leadership and institutional accountability, drawn from the Scaling Up Nutrition Movement and the Committee on World Food Security, which promote clearly mandated, multisectoral coordination mechanisms at global and national level.
- → **Establish inclusive accountability mechanisms.** Policies and plans must be informed by those who depend on them and who will experience their outcomes—positive and negative. Joint planning and review platforms—spaces where government, civil society, and other stakeholders can assess progress, identify gaps, and agree on corrective actions—have proven to be effective. Stakeholders in this joint work must, however, value and rely on data as a foundation for accountability and action. Actions are thus needed to strengthen national and local capacities to collect, analyze, and communicate high-quality, disaggregated data.
- → **Empower local governance.** Local authorities should be equipped with dedicated budgets, tailored operational guidelines, and sustained capacity building on implementing context-specific solutions to hunger. Civil society organizations must be actively and meaningfully engaged as key partners in both elaborating and implementing development strategies.

3 Break the Cycle of Conflict and Hunger

- → **Prevent and mitigate the impact of conflict on hunger.** Conflict remains the primary driver of global hunger. The impacts of conflict on food systems— lost livelihoods, protracted displacement, and destruction of land, food value chains, ecosystems, and communities—last for generations. Governments and humanitarian actors must prioritize and invest in risk-informed, proactive approaches that protect lives and livelihoods before conditions reach catastrophic levels. Stakeholders must engage communities to address the recurring drivers and consequences of conflict that undermine sustainable food security.
- → **Uphold international law and hold perpetrators accountable for using hunger as a weapon of war.** Hunger and starvation are being deliberately weaponized. Recognition of this fact is essential at the highest political levels. Ignoring its use, even in the face of evidence, normalizes it. United Nations member states and relevant intergovernmental bodies must ensure that such crimes are independently investigated and prosecuted and that UN Resolution 2417, condemning the starving of civilians as a method of war, is fully implemented.

APPENDIXES

In Tonkolili District, Sierra Leone, Alouti Kamara joins others in harvesting groundnuts from a communal field. Limited incomes and food insecurity leave families vulnerable to shocks. Community farming initiatives help build stability while promoting more diverse, nutritious diets.

METHODOLOGY

Note: The results within this 2025 Global Hunger Index report supersede all previous GHI results. The 2000, 2008, and 2016 scores and indicator data contained within this report are currently the only data that can be used for valid comparisons of the GHI over time.

The Global Hunger Index (GHI) is a tool designed to comprehensively measure and track hunger at global, regional, and national levels, reflecting multiple dimensions of hunger over time.[1] The GHI is intended to raise awareness and understanding of the struggle against hunger, provide a way to compare levels of hunger between countries and regions, and call attention to those areas of the world where hunger levels are highest and where the need for additional efforts to eliminate hunger is greatest.

How the GHI Is Calculated

Each country's GHI score is calculated based on a formula that combines four indicators that together capture the multidimensional nature of hunger:

Undernourishment: the share of the population whose caloric intake is insufficient;

Child stunting: the share of children under the age of five who have low height for their age, reflecting chronic undernutrition;

Child wasting: the share of children under the age of five who have low weight for their height, reflecting acute undernutrition; and

Child mortality: the share of children who die before their fifth birthday, reflecting in part the fatal mix of inadequate nutrition and unhealthy environments.[2]

Using this combination of indicators to measure hunger offers several advantages (see Table A.1). The indicators included in the GHI formula reflect caloric deficiencies as well as poor nutrition. The undernourishment indicator captures the food access situation of the population as a whole, while the indicators specific to children reflect the nutrition status within a particularly vulnerable subset of the population for whom a lack of dietary energy, protein, and/or micronutrients (essential vitamins and minerals) leads to a high risk of illness, poor physical and cognitive development, and death. The inclusion of both child wasting and child stunting allows the GHI to document both acute and chronic undernutrition.

[1] For further background on the GHI concept, see Wiesmann, von Braun, and Feldbrügge (2000), Wiesmann (2006), and Wiesmann et al. (2015).

[2] According to Black et al. (2013), undernutrition is responsible for 45 percent of deaths among children under the age of five.

BOX A.1 WHAT IS MEANT BY "HUNGER"?

The problem of hunger is complex, and different terms are used to describe its various forms.

Hunger is usually understood to refer to the distress associated with a lack of sufficient calories. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) defines food deprivation, or undernourishment, as the habitual consumption of too few calories to provide the minimum dietary energy an individual requires to live a healthy and productive life, given that person's sex, age, stature, and physical activity level.[3]

Undernutrition goes beyond calories and signifies deficiencies in any or all of the following: energy, protein, and/or essential vitamins and minerals. Undernutrition is the result of inadequate intake of food in terms of either quantity or quality, poor utilization of nutrients in the body due to infections or other illnesses, or a combination of these immediate causes. These, in turn, result from a range of underlying factors, including household food insecurity; inadequate maternal health or childcare practices; or inadequate access to health services, safe water, and sanitation.

Malnutrition refers more broadly to both undernutrition (problems caused by deficiencies) and overnutrition (problems caused by unbalanced diets that involve consuming too many calories in relation to requirements, with or without low intake of micronutrient-rich foods). Overnutrition—resulting in overweight, obesity, and noncommunicable diseases—is increasingly common throughout the world, with implications for human health, government expenditures, and food systems development. While overnutrition is an important concern, the GHI focuses specifically on issues relating to undernutrition.

In this report, "hunger" refers to the index based on the four component indicators (undernourishment, child stunting, child wasting, and child mortality). Taken together, the component indicators reflect deficiencies in calories as well as in micronutrients.

[3] The average minimum dietary energy requirement varies by country—from about 1,647 to 2,025 kilocalories (commonly, albeit incorrectly, referred to as calories) per person per day for all countries with available data for 2024 (FAO 2025a).

TABLE A.1 **HOW THE FOUR INDICATORS UNDERLYING THE GHI CAPTURE THE MULTIDIMENSIONAL NATURE OF HUNGER**

Undernourishment	Child stunting	Child wasting	Child mortality
• Measures inadequate food access, an important indicator of hunger • Refers to the entire population, both children and adults • Is used as a lead indicator for international hunger reduction targets, including Sustainable Development Goal 2 (Zero Hunger)	• Go beyond calorie availability, consider aspects of diet quality and utilization • Reflect children's particular vulnerability to nutritional deficiencies • Are sensitive to uneven distribution of food within the household • Are used as nutrition indicators for SDG 2 (Zero Hunger)		• Reflects that death is the most serious consequence of hunger, and children are the most vulnerable • Improves the GHI's ability to reflect deficiencies of essential vitamins and minerals • Complements stunting and wasting, which only partially capture the mortality risk of undernutrition

By combining multiple indicators, the index minimizes the effects of random measurement errors. These four indicators are all part of the indicator set used to measure progress toward the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

GHI scores are calculated using a three-step process:

Step 1: Values are determined for the four component indicators for each country, drawing on the latest published data available from internationally recognized sources.

Step 2: Each of the four component indicators is given a standardized score based on thresholds set slightly above the highest country-level values observed worldwide for that indicator since 1988.[4] For example, the highest value for undernourishment estimated in this period is 76.5 percent, so the threshold for standardization is set slightly higher, at 80 percent.[5] In a given year, if a country has an undernourishment prevalence of 40 percent, its standardized undernourishment score for that year is 50. In other words, that country is approximately halfway between having no undernourishment and reaching the maximum observed level. Here are the formulas used to standardize each indicator:

$$\frac{\text{Prevalence of undernourishment}}{80} \times 100 = \textbf{standardized undernourishment value}$$

$$\frac{\text{Child stunting rate}}{70} \times 100 = \textbf{standardized child stunting value}$$

$$\frac{\text{Child wasting rate}}{30} \times 100 = \textbf{standardized child wasting value}$$

$$\frac{\text{Child mortality rate}}{35} \times 100 = \textbf{standardized child mortality value}$$

Step 3: The standardized scores are aggregated to calculate the GHI score for each country. Undernourishment and child mortality each contribute one-third of the GHI score, while child stunting and child wasting each contribute one-sixth of the score, as shown in the formula (Figure A.1).

This calculation results in GHI scores on a 100-point scale, where 0 is the best score (no hunger) and 100 is the worst. In practice, neither of these extremes is reached. A value of 100 would signify that a country's undernourishment, child wasting, child stunting, and child mortality levels each exactly meets the thresholds set slightly above the highest levels observed worldwide in recent decades. A value of 0 would mean that a country had no undernourished people in the population, no children younger than five who were wasted or stunted, and no children who died before their fifth birthday.

[4] The thresholds for standardization are set slightly above the highest observed values to allow for the possibility that these values could be exceeded in the future.

[5] The threshold for undernourishment is 80, based on the observed maximum of 76.5 percent; the threshold for child wasting is 30, based on the observed maximum of 26.0 percent; the threshold for child stunting is 70, based on the observed maximum of 68.2 percent; and the threshold for child mortality is 35, based on the observed maximum of 32.6 percent. While the thresholds were originally established based on the maximum values observed between 1988 and 2013, covering 25 years' worth of available data prior to the methodological review process, these values have not been exceeded since then.

FIGURE A.1 **COMPOSITION OF GHI SCORES AND SEVERITY DESIGNATIONS**



Note: All indicator values are standardized.



Where the Indicator Data Come From

Data used in the calculation of GHI scores come from various UN and other multilateral agencies, as shown in Table A.2. The GHI scores reflect the latest revised data available for the four indicators.[6] Where original source data were unavailable, estimates for the GHI component indicators were made based on the most recent available data.

How Hunger Severity Is Determined for Countries with Incomplete Data

In this year's GHI report, 136 countries met the criteria for inclusion in the GHI, but 13 had insufficient data to allow for calculation of a 2025 GHI score. To address this gap and give a preliminary picture of hunger in the countries with missing data, provisional designations of the severity of hunger were determined based on several known factors (Table A.3):

- those GHI indicator values that are available;
- the country's last known GHI severity designation;
- the country's last known prevalence of undernourishment;[7]
- the prevalence of undernourishment for the subregion in which the country is located; and/or
- assessment of the relevant findings of the 2023, 2024, and 2025 editions of the Global Report on Food Crises (FSIN and GNAFC 2023, 2024, 2025).[8]

For some countries, data are missing because of violent conflict or political unrest (FAO et al. 2017; Martin-Shields and Stojetz 2019), which are strong predictors of hunger and undernutrition. The countries with missing data may often be those facing the greatest hunger burdens. Of the two countries provisionally designated as *alarming*—Burundi and Yemen—it is possible that with complete data, one or more of them would fall into the *extremely alarming* category. Similarly, DPR Korea, Lesotho, and Sudan might fall from *serious* to *alarming,* and Lao PDR and Nicaragua from *moderate* to *serious.* However, without sufficient information to confirm that this is the case, we have conservatively categorized these countries as *alarming, serious,* or *moderate.*

In some cases even a provisional severity designation could not be determined, such as if the country had never previously had a prevalence of undernourishment value, GHI score, or GHI designation since the first GHI report was published in 2006.

[6] For previous GHI calculations, see von Grebmer et al. (2023, 2022, 2021, 2020, 2019, 2018, 2017, 2016, 2015, 2014, 2013, 2012, 2011, 2010, 2009, 2008); IFPRI, WHH, and Concern Worldwide (2007); Wiemers et al. (2024) and Wiesmann, Weingärtner, and Schöninger (2006).

[7] Previously published undernourishment values, GHI scores, and GHI severity classifications are not considered valid once superseding reports have been issued, but are used as benchmarks to consider the plausibility of a country falling into a broad range of undernourishment values and GHI scores.

[8] The *Global Reports on Food Crises* report on acute food insecurity, which is different from chronic hunger as measured by the prevalence of undernourishment. However, the 2023, 2024, and 2025 *GRFC*s were used to confirm whether a country experienced extreme hunger crises such as famine, threat of famine, and/or repeated hunger crises in 2022, 2023, and 2024.

TABLE A.2 **DATA SOURCES AND REFERENCE YEARS FOR THE GLOBAL HUNGER INDEX COMPONENT INDICATORS, 2000, 2008, 2016, AND 2025**

Indicator	Data sources	Reference years for indicator data			
		2000 GHI scores (121 countries)	**2008 GHI scores** (124 countries)	**2016 GHI scores** (125 countries)	**2025 GHI scores** (123 countries)
Prevalence of undernourishment	FAO 2025a	2000–2002[a]	2007–2009[a]	2014–2016[a]	2022–2024[a]
Child stunting and wasting[b, c, d, e]	WHO 2025a; UNICEF et al. 2025; UNICEF 2025, 2013 and 2009; MEASURE DHS 2025	2000, 1998–2002[b]	2008, 2006–2010[c]	2016, 2014–2018[d]	2024, 2020–2024[e]
Child mortality	UN IGME 2025a	2000	2008	2016	2023

Note: The number of countries for which sufficient data were available to calculate GHI scores for each year or time span is shown in parentheses.

[a] Three-year average.
[b] Data collected from the years closest to 2000; where data from 1998 and 2002 or 1999 and 2001 were available, an average was used.
[c] Data collected from the years closest to 2008; where data from 2006 and 2010 or 2007 and 2009 were available, an average was used.
[d] Data collected from the years closest to 2016; where data from 2014 and 2018 or 2015 and 2017 were available, an average was used.
[e] The latest data gathered in this period.

TABLE A.3 **EXISTING DATA AND PROVISIONAL SEVERITY DESIGNATIONS FOR COUNTRIES WITH INCOMPLETE DATA**

Country	2025 GHI provisional severity designation	Child stunting 2024 (%)	Child wasting 2020–2024 (%)	Child mortality 2023 (%)	Last GHI categorization	Last prevalence of undernourishment value (%)	Subregional prevalence of undernourishment (%)	Range of prevalence of undernourishment values for provisional designation (%)
Lao People's Democratic Republic	Moderate	29.9	10.7	3.9	Moderate (2024)	5.4 (2024)	2.5	0–7.6
Nicaragua	Moderate	13.1	1.2	1.3	Moderate (2024)	19.6 (2024)	5.4	11.7–35.7
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	Serious	16.6	6.5	1.8	Serious (2024)	53.5 (2024)	2.5	25.6–61.6
Lesotho	Serious	35.0	1.6	5.9	Alarming (2023)	46.0 (2023)	21.8	12.3–48.3
Sudan	Serious	35.4	17.7	5.0	Serious (2024)	11.4 (2024)	21.8	0–28.6
Burundi	Alarming	55.3	7.8	4.9	Extremely alarming (2014)	67.3 (2014)	21.8	30.6–66.6
Yemen	Alarming	47.4	16.8	3.9	Alarming (2024)	39.5 (2024)	10.2	25.4–61.4
Bahrain	Not designated	4.6	0.6	0.9	—	—	10.2	N/A
Bhutan	Not designated	17.9	5.1	2.3	—	—	12.6	N/A
Equatorial Guinea	Not designated	17.1	N/A	7.1	—	—	21.8	N/A
Eritrea	Not designated	48.0	N/A	3.5	Extremely alarming (2014)	61.3 (2014)	21.8	N/A
Maldives	Not designated	14.2	8.6	0.6	—	—	12.6	N/A
Qatar	Not designated	5.4	1.6	0.6	—	—	10.2	N/A

Source: Authors, based on sources listed in Appendix A and previous GHI publications included in the bibliography.

Note: Years in parentheses show when the relevant information was published in the GHI report.
*Authors' estimate. **Designation based on FSIN and GNAFC (2023, 2024, 2025) and expert consultation.
N/A = not applicable; — = not available.

Understanding and Using the Global Hunger Index: FAQs

Which countries are included in the GHI?

Inclusion in the GHI is determined based on prevalence of undernourishment and child mortality data dating back to 2000. Countries with values above the "very low" threshold for one or both of these indicators since 2000 are included in the GHI. Specifically, countries are included if the prevalence of undernourishment was at or above 5.0 percent and/or if the child mortality rate was at or above 1.0 percent for any year since 2000. Data on child stunting and child wasting, the other indicators used in the calculation of GHI scores, are not included in the inclusion criteria because their availability varies widely from country to country, with data especially limited for higher-income countries.[9] Non-independent territories are not included in the GHI, nor are countries with very small populations (under 500,000 inhabitants), owing to limited data availability.

Because data for all four indicators in the GHI formula are not available for every country, GHI scores could not be calculated for some. However, where possible, countries with incomplete data are provisionally categorized according to the GHI Severity of Hunger Scale based on existing data and complementary reports (see Table A.3). Several of these countries are experiencing unrest or violent conflict, which affects the availability of data as well as the food security and nutrition situation in the country. It is possible that one or more of these countries would have a higher GHI score than Somalia—the country with the highest 2025 GHI score—if sufficient data were available.

Why is a certain country's GHI score so high (or so low)?

The key to understanding a country's GHI score lies in that country's indicator values, especially when compared with the indicator values for other countries in the report (see Appendix B for these values).

For some countries, high scores are driven by high rates of undernourishment, reflecting a lack of calories for large swathes of the population. For others, high scores result from high levels of child wasting, reflecting acute undernutrition; child stunting, reflecting chronic undernutrition; and/or child mortality, reflecting children's hunger and nutrition levels, in addition to other extreme challenges facing the population. Broadly speaking, then, a high GHI score can be evidence of a lack of food, a poor-quality diet, inadequate child caregiving practices, an unhealthy environment, or a combination of these factors.

While it is beyond the scope of this report to provide a detailed explanation of the circumstances facing each country with a GHI score, Chapter 1 describes the situation in select countries. Furthermore, this report offers other avenues for examining a country's hunger and nutrition situation: country rankings based on the 2025 GHI scores appear in Table 1.1, GHI scores for selected years for each country appear in Appendix C, and regional comparisons appear in Appendix D. (Case studies of the hunger situation in specific countries appear on the GHI website: www.globalhungerindex.org.)

Does the 2025 GHI reflect the situation in 2025?

The GHI uses the most up-to-date data available for each of the GHI indicators, meaning the scores are only as current as the data. For the calculation of the 2025 GHI scores, undernourishment data are from 2022-2024; child wasting data are from 2020-2024, with the most current data from that range used for each country; child stunting data are from 2024, and child mortality data are from 2023. Any changes that occur in 2025 are not yet reflected in the data or scores in this year's report.

How can I compare GHI results over time?

Each report includes GHI scores and indicator data for three reference years in addition to the focus year. In this report, the 2025 GHI scores can be directly compared with the GHI scores given for three reference years—2000, 2008, and 2016 (Appendix C). The reference years are selected to provide an assessment of progress over time while also ensuring there is no overlap in the range of years from which the data are drawn.

Can I compare the GHI scores and indicator values in this report with results from previous reports?

No—GHI scores are comparable within each year's report, but not between different years' reports. The current and historical data on which the GHI scores are based are continually being revised and improved by the United Nations agencies that compile them, and each year's GHI report reflects these changes. Comparing scores between reports may create the impression that hunger has changed positively or negatively in a specific country from year to year, whereas in some cases the change may partly or fully reflect a data revision.

Moreover, the methodology for calculating GHI scores has been revised in the past and may be revised again in the future. In 2015, for example, the GHI methodology was changed to include data on child stunting and wasting and to standardize the values (see Wiesmann et al. 2015). This change caused a major shift in the GHI scores, and the GHI Severity of Hunger Scale was modified to reflect this shift. In the GHI reports published since 2015, almost all countries have had much higher GHI scores compared with their scores in reports published in 2014 and earlier. This does not necessarily mean their hunger levels rose in 2015—the higher scores merely reflect the revision of the methodology. The 2000, 2008, 2016, and 2025 GHI scores shown in this year's report are all comparable because they all reflect the revised methodology and the latest revisions of data.

Can I compare the GHI rankings in this report to those in previous reports to understand how the situation in a country has changed over time relative to other countries?

No—like the GHI scores and indicator values, GHI rankings cannot be compared between GHI reports, for two main reasons. First, the data and methodology used to calculate GHI scores have been revised over time, as described above. Second, the ranking in each year's report often includes different countries because the set of countries for which sufficient data are available to calculate GHI scores varies from year to year. Thus, if a country's ranking changes from one report to the next, this may be in part because it is being compared with a different group of countries.

[9] Even though food insecurity is a serious concern for segments of the population in certain high-income countries, nationally representative data for child stunting and child wasting are not regularly collected in most high-income countries. In addition, although data on child mortality are usually available for these countries, child mortality does not reflect undernutrition in high-income countries to the same extent it does in low- and middle-income countries.

DATA UNDERLYING THE CALCULATION OF THE 2000, 2008, 2016, AND 2025 GLOBAL HUNGER INDEX SCORES

Guide to the colors shown in Appendix B

The colors shown in the table represent the following categories:

= Very low = Low = Medium = High = Very high

They are based on thresholds for the different indicator values, as follows:

Category	Undernourishment	Child wasting	Child stunting	Child mortality
Very low	<5%	<2.5%	<2.5%	<1%
Low	5–<15%	2.5–<5%	2.5–<10%	1–<4%
Medium	15–<25%	5–<10%	10–<20%	4–<7%
High	25–<35%	10–<15%	20–<30%	7–<10%
Very high	≥35%	≥15%	≥30%	≥10%

Note: Threshold values for the prevalence of undernourishment are adapted from FAO (2015). Threshold values for child stunting and child wasting are from de Onis et al. (2019). Threshold values for child mortality are adapted from those shown in UN IGME (2025b) but condensed into the five categories shown.

DATA UNDERLYING THE CALCULATION OF THE 2000, 2008, 2016, AND 2025 GLOBAL HUNGER INDEX SCORES

Country	Undernourishment (% of population)				Child wasting (% of children under five years old)				Child stunting (% of children under five years old)				Child mortality (% of children under five years old)			
	'00–'02	'07–'09	'15–'17	'22–'24	'98–'02	'06–'10	'14–'18	'20–'24	2000	2008	2016	2024	2000	2008	2016	2023
Afghanistan	45.8	19.7	20.4	28.1	8.6 *	7.1 *	5.1	3.6	55.5	47.8	41.9	42.0	13.2	9.6	7.0	5.6
Albania	4.8	7.3	4.4	5.4	6.4 *	9.6	1.6	3.8 *	29.9	22.8	12.9	7.4	2.7	1.6	0.9	0.9
Algeria	7.3	5.0	2.6	< 2.5	3.1	4.1	3.8 *	3.7 *	22.4	15.1	10.4	8.9	4.2	3.0	2.4	2.2
Angola	67.8	24.4	15.2	22.5	8.9 *	8.2	4.9	5.1 *	47.5	31.7	36.3	47.7	20.3	13.7	8.4	6.4
Argentina	3.0	3.2	3.2	3.4	2.1 *	1.2	1.9 *	2.7	9.3	7.2	7.9	10.7	1.9	1.5	1.1	1.0
Armenia	28.6	5.1	< 2.5	< 2.5	2.5	4.1	4.4	3.2 *	17.1	18.7	10.6	6.2	3.1	2.1	1.4	1.0
Azerbaijan	17.8	< 2.5	< 2.5	< 2.5	9.0	6.8	3.8 *	3.5	24.3	22.2	11.9	6.8	7.4	4.3	2.6	1.9
Bahrain	—	—	—	—	0.8 *	0.7 *	0.6 *	0.6 *	10.8	7.6	5.7	4.6	1.2	0.9	0.8	0.9
Bangladesh	15.5	16.9	14.4	10.4	12.5	17.5	12.8	10.7	54.9	44.4	32.8	25.1	8.5	5.4	3.7	3.1
Belarus	2.7	< 2.5	< 2.5	< 2.5	1.7 *	1.4 *	1.4 *	1.3	5.4	3.5	1.8	1.1	1.3	0.7	0.4	0.2
Benin	14.3	8.2	9.7	14.3	9.0	5.1	4.8	8.3	34.8	35.6	33.7	33.2	13.6	11.3	9.5	7.8
Bhutan	—	—	—	—	2.6	4.5	3.5 *	5.1	44.8	35.8	23.6	17.9	7.8	4.6	3.0	2.3
Bolivia (Plurinat. State of)	26.6	23.0	14.9	21.8	1.6	1.4	2.0	1.4 *	33.0	25.5	15.8	10.7	7.6	4.7	3.0	2.3
Bosnia & Herzegovina	3.6	< 2.5	< 2.5	< 2.5	7.4	4.0	3.4 *	3.1 *	12.5	10.6	8.6	7.9	1.0	0.7	0.7	0.6
Botswana	28.1	26.0	20.9	24.0	5.9	7.3	6.6 *	5.4 *	30.3	27.8	22.7	21.0	8.1	6.0	4.9	4.0
Brazil	10.5	4.0	< 2.5	< 2.5	2.9 *	1.8	2.3 *	3.4	9.9	6.9	7.1	8.9	3.4	2.1	1.7	1.4
Bulgaria	4.9	5.8	4.2	< 2.5	5.1 *	4.7	5.9	4.3 *	8.7	8.3	6.5	5.5	1.8	1.1	0.8	0.6
Burkina Faso	22.4	15.4	14.0	13.1	15.5	11.3	7.5	9.8	40.4	38.0	25.6	19.5	17.8	13.3	9.8	7.7
Burundi	—	—	—	—	8.1	6.0 *	5.1	7.8	63.0	58.5	54.0	55.3	15.4	10.3	6.4	4.9
Cabo Verde	16.2	15.0	16.5	13.5	4.0 *	3.0 *	2.4	2.5 *	15.9	10.6	6.8	5.3	3.6	2.8	1.8	1.2
Cambodia	19.7	12.1	6.8	5.2	17.1	9.1	9.7	9.6	50.6	40.8	27.7	22.0	10.6	5.1	3.0	2.3
Cameroon	24.2	7.3	5.4	4.8	7.3	7.6	5.2	4.0 *	37.4	35.3	30.1	27.2	14.4	11.8	8.6	6.7
Central African Republic	35.9	29.4	26.7	29.8	10.4	12.1	6.3	5.2	43.2	42.1	39.5	38.9	16.6	13.6	12.6	9.2
Chad	34.4	24.7	26.1	32.0	13.9	16.3	13.2	7.8	42.2	40.3	34.8	31.5	18.4	15.5	12.6	10.1
Chile	2.9	3.0	3.3	2.5	0.5	0.3	0.3	0.4 *	2.9	2.1	1.7	1.7	1.1	0.9	0.8	0.7
China	10.0	3.9	< 2.5	< 2.5	2.5	2.6	1.9	1.6 *	20.0	10.4	6.1	4.5	3.7	1.8	1.0	0.6
Colombia	8.6	11.1	4.4	3.9	1.0	0.9	1.6	1.0 *	17.4	14.1	12.1	11.6	2.5	2.0	1.5	1.2
Comoros	24.7	15.4	13.5	15.4	13.3	8.4 *	7.7 *	5.1	43.8	38.0	25.5	17.4	8.0	5.9	4.8	4.0
Congo (Republic of)	26.3	34.9	29.6	26.4	9.6 *	8.0 *	8.2	6.9 *	33.6	27.8	20.3	16.3	11.4	6.9	5.1	4.1
Costa Rica	4.6	3.0	< 2.5	< 2.5	1.8 *	0.7	1.8	1.0 *	7.1	6.3	7.7	10.6	1.3	1.1	0.9	1.0
Côte d'Ivoire	18.9	17.5	11.5	11.1	6.9	14.3	6.1	8.1	32.4	31.5	25.6	20.3	14.1	10.9	8.4	6.7
Croatia	10.6	< 2.5	< 2.5	< 2.5	1.1 *	1.0 *	1.0 *	0.9 *	5.4	3.6	3.4	2.7	0.8	0.6	0.5	0.5
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	26.8	27.7	32.3	38.5	15.9	10.4	7.3	7.2	46.0	44.5	42.5	44.1	15.9	12.2	9.2	7.3
Djibouti	40.8	20.2	12.7	12.9	19.4	17.0	13.1 *	12.1	31.8	30.8	25.1	20.9	9.9	8.0	6.3	5.0
Dominican Republic	19.7	14.7	6.7	3.6	1.5	2.3	1.4 *	1.1 *	10.1	8.6	7.4	5.6	4.0	3.5	3.5	3.1
Ecuador	20.0	11.1	9.5	12.1	2.7	2.1	1.6	0.7	27.2	28.6	21.1	17.7	3.0	2.1	1.5	1.3
Egypt	4.8	5.0	6.6	9.4	6.9	7.9	9.5	3.3	25.9	25.5	18.1	12.9	4.7	3.1	2.2	1.8
El Salvador	6.9	9.7	8.4	6.7	1.5	1.6	2.1	2.9	28.7	19.9	12.3	9.4	3.2	2.0	1.4	1.0
Equatorial Guinea	—	—	—	—	9.2	—	—	—	38.3	30.0	21.3	17.1	15.6	11.9	9.0	7.1
Eritrea	—	—	—	—	15.0	14.6	—	—	43.4	50.1	51.2	48.0	8.5	5.9	4.5	3.5
Estonia	3.6	< 2.5	< 2.5	< 2.5	1.6 *	1.4 *	1.5	1.6 *	2.1	1.5	1.3	1.3	1.1	0.5	0.3	0.2
Eswatini	9.8	19.6	16.3	14.7	1.7	1.1	2.0	1.8	35.7	32.1	24.1	18.9	10.9	9.8	5.5	4.5
Ethiopia	46.1	26.3	13.0	19.7	12.4	11.6 *	10.0	6.0 *	56.9	47.5	38.8	35.5	14.0	9.2	6.2	4.6
Fiji	3.6	6.2	7.5	6.8	7.4 *	6.7 *	7.0	4.6	6.0	7.3	6.6	7.2	2.3	2.3	2.2	2.9
Gabon	10.6	14.3	15.3	25.3	4.2	3.5 *	3.5 *	3.4	25.5	21.0	15.5	13.7	7.4	5.8	4.2	3.3
Gambia	16.9	12.0	12.8	16.8	9.1	8.4	6.1	5.1	27.7	25.4	19.5	14.0	11.3	8.0	5.7	4.4
Georgia	6.6	6.7	6.6	< 2.5	3.1	1.3	0.6	0.6 *	16.2	12.1	7.0	4.7	3.6	1.7	1.0	0.9
Ghana	14.8	8.1	9.5	6.3	9.9	8.7	5.8	5.8	32.8	26.7	19.2	15.6	10.0	7.3	5.0	3.7
Guatemala	22.4	18.1	14.6	11.8	3.7	1.0	1.9	0.8	53.2	50.7	46.4	44.6	5.2	3.8	2.7	2.1
Guinea	18.0	17.7	14.0	11.4	10.3	7.2	8.1	6.4	33.1	35.5	31.2	26.6	16.5	12.7	11.2	9.5
Guinea-Bissau	15.6	20.7	19.8	22.1	11.8	4.8	6.0	5.1 *	33.4	29.6	27.8	28.3	17.4	12.6	8.8	6.9
Guyana	5.7	8.8	3.4	< 2.5	12.1	6.9	6.4	6.5	14.4	17.3	11.3	7.1	4.7	3.9	3.2	2.6
Haiti	48.0	42.2	38.7	54.2	5.5	10.2	3.7	5.0	30.4	25.3	22.0	21.6	10.3	8.3	6.8	5.5
Honduras	21.1	14.9	13.7	14.8	1.3	1.4	1.3 *	1.1 *	36.4	27.0	20.3	17.9	3.7	2.6	2.0	1.6
Hungary	< 2.5	< 2.5	< 2.5	< 2.5	1.0 *	0.9 *	0.8 *	0.8 *	3.4	2.7	2.4	2.1	1.0	0.7	0.5	0.4
India	18.1	15.3	11.6	12.0	17.9	20.0	20.8	18.7	50.0	45.8	37.7	32.9	9.2	6.5	4.1	2.8
Indonesia	18.1	16.5	6.6	6.3	5.5	14.8	10.5	8.4	39.8	38.7	29.8	22.6	5.2	3.6	2.6	2.1
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	4.9	7.9	7.7	6.8	6.1	4.6 *	4.3	4.2 *	14.8	6.9	5.3	4.8	3.6	2.2	1.5	1.2
Iraq	20.1	15.6	16.1	14.9	6.6	5.8	3.0	3.9 *	28.0	25.0	15.2	9.4	4.4	3.7	2.8	2.3
Jamaica	7.2	8.5	7.6	7.7	3.0	2.6	3.3	2.4 *	7.2	6.2	6.4	6.9	2.1	1.9	1.9	1.9
Jordan	9.0	6.6	8.0	14.3	2.5	1.6	1.8 *	2.3	10.8	8.8	7.9	7.7	2.6	2.0	1.6	1.3
Kazakhstan	6.5	4.2	< 2.5	< 2.5	2.5	4.9	3.1	2.6 *	16.1	14.3	8.1	4.4	4.2	2.5	1.1	1.0
Kenya	31.8	26.7	22.2	36.8	7.4	6.9	6.7	4.5	38.6	34.6	24.3	17.9	9.6	5.8	4.6	4.0
Korea (DPR)	35.9	40.5	46.0	—	12.2	5.2	2.5	6.5 *	52.5	33.8	21.4	16.6	10.0	3.1	2.1	1.8
Kuwait	< 2.5	< 2.5	< 2.5	< 2.5	2.1	2.3	2.3	3.5	3.7	4.8	4.9	4.5	1.3	1.1	0.9	0.9
Kyrgyzstan	12.9	8.6	5.9	5.1	2.6 *	1.4	2.4	3.0	28.3	19.6	13.0	11.0	5.1	3.4	2.1	1.7
Lao PDR	—	—	—	—	17.5	7.4	9.4	10.7	48.9	45.1	36.1	29.9	10.8	7.5	5.1	3.9
Latvia	5.2	< 2.5	< 2.5	< 2.5	1.8 *	1.6 *	1.7 *	1.7	3.3	2.4	1.9	1.7	1.4	0.9	0.5	0.3
Lebanon	7.4	4.7	5.7	8.7	2.9 *	2.5 *	2.2 *	1.3	18.8	15.4	9.7	10.1	2.0	1.3	1.3	1.8

DATA UNDERLYING THE CALCULATION OF THE 2000, 2008, 2016, AND 2025 GLOBAL HUNGER INDEX SCORES

Country	Undernourishment (% of population)				Child wasting (% of children under five years old)				Child stunting (% of children under five years old)				Child mortality (% of children under five years old)			
	'00–'02	'07–'09	'15–'17	'22–'24	'98–'02	'06–'10	'14–'18	'20–'24	2000	2008	2016	2024	2000	2008	2016	2023
Lesotho	—	—	—	—	6.0 *	3.8	2.4	1.6	42.1	40.5	34.6	35.0	10.9	10.9	7.2	5.9
Liberia	34.9	34.9	35.1	35.5	7.4	4.3	4.3	3.4	45.0	38.6	31.3	26.9	19.2	11.3	8.8	7.3
Libya	3.7	5.9	11.0	16.5	5.4 *	6.5	10.2	3.5	19.8	29.0	20.4	9.2	2.8	1.9	1.3	3.1
Lithuania	< 2.5	< 2.5	< 2.5	< 2.5	4.7 *	4.3 *	4.2 *	4.0	2.9	2.2	1.7	1.6	1.1	0.7	0.5	0.3
Madagascar	33.4	30.0	35.0	39.5	8.5 *	8.2 *	6.4	7.2	56.1	52.0	44.6	38.4	10.5	7.5	6.6	6.5
Malawi	23.2	15.9	16.7	21.4	6.8	1.9	3.6	2.8	56.1	50.1	37.9	33.2	17.3	9.3	5.4	3.8
Malaysia	2.5	3.6	3.3	< 2.5	15.3	13.2	11.6	11.0	19.3	18.0	20.0	24.3	1.0	0.8	0.8	0.8
Maldives	—	—	—	—	13.4	10.6	9.1	8.6 *	33.8	20.8	15.3	14.2	3.9	1.6	0.9	0.6
Mali	14.2	7.4	4.5	12.3	12.6	12.1	10.6	5.4	40.0	33.4	26.4	23.2	18.8	14.3	11.2	9.1
Mauritania	9.8	7.3	6.7	8.7	15.3	8.1	14.8	13.6	39.2	28.6	23.7	21.5	9.8	6.0	4.7	3.8
Mauritius	5.9	5.4	7.2	8.7	14.6 *	13.2 *	11.7 *	11.6 *	12.4	9.1	8.0	7.8	1.9	1.5	1.5	1.5
Mexico	2.8	3.9	3.7	2.7	2.0	3.5	2.0	1.0	20.3	15.3	12.6	13.1	2.8	2.0	1.6	1.2
Moldova (Republic of)	24.3	22.9	2.5	< 2.5	3.4 *	3.2 *	3.5 *	3.4 *	12.9	8.4	5.7	4.2	3.1	1.8	1.5	1.5
Mongolia	30.1	21.9	8.1	< 2.5	7.1	1.7	1.2	2.7	29.7	18.0	9.5	7.1	6.3	3.1	1.8	1.4
Montenegro	—	< 2.5	< 2.5	< 2.5	—	4.2	2.9 *	2.9 *	—	8.7	8.2	8.0	—	0.8	0.4	0.3
Morocco	5.8	4.8	3.7	7.0	4.0 *	3.4 *	2.6	2.7 *	25.3	18.0	14.6	13.7	5.2	3.5	2.2	1.7
Mozambique	36.4	23.6	41.6	21.8	8.1	4.2	4.4	3.8	48.6	44.8	40.8	37.0	16.3	10.4	7.2	6.2
Myanmar	38.6	14.0	3.8	5.4	10.7	7.9	6.6	6.3 *	45.9	35.5	28.6	24.5	8.9	10.1	4.9	3.9
Namibia	15.7	26.1	20.6	18.1	10.0	7.6	6.1 *	6.4 *	29.7	27.7	20.4	16.4	7.8	5.6	5.4	4.1
Nepal	23.7	13.1	5.9	5.3	11.3	12.7	11.7	7.0	55.9	46.0	34.2	26.0	7.9	5.3	3.6	2.6
Nicaragua	25.8	19.9	16.3	—	2.3	1.5	1.4 *	1.2 *	24.0	23.1	15.9	13.1	3.8	2.6	1.8	1.3
Niger	23.1	15.2	12.0	12.9	16.2	13.4	10.4	10.9	52.1	47.5	44.7	48.3	22.8	14.7	12.5	11.5
Nigeria	8.7	9.6	10.8	19.9	13.0 *	9.8 *	9.1	11.6	41.8	39.3	35.4	33.8	18.2	14.1	12.5	10.5
North Macedonia	6.7	3.0	3.2	< 2.5	1.8	2.4 *	2.3 *	2.1 *	8.6	7.7	4.6	3.8	1.6	1.2	1.1	0.3
Oman	16.3	5.5	7.2	5.9	7.8	7.1	9.3	6.7 *	14.6	11.7	11.8	12.9	1.6	1.2	1.1	1.0
Pakistan	20.4	15.1	11.5	16.5	14.1	11.8 *	7.1	10.0 *	40.3	45.3	40.7	33.6	10.8	9.1	7.3	5.8
Panama	23.2	11.2	6.7	5.7	1.4 *	1.2	1.1 *	1.0 *	18.3	21.6	17.7	14.0	2.6	2.0	1.7	1.3
Papua New Guinea	26.7	27.6	28.2	28.7	8.1 *	7.9 *	7.2 *	6.9 *	37.1	46.4	47.6	47.6	7.2	6.2	5.0	4.0
Paraguay	10.3	3.6	2.6	5.2	1.6	1.5 *	1.0	1.2 *	18.5	13.9	6.3	3.2	3.4	2.8	2.1	1.7
Peru	20.4	11.0	6.2	6.9	1.4	0.8	0.8	0.6	34.4	24.1	14.0	10.6	3.8	2.2	1.7	1.6
Philippines	18.5	16.4	9.7	3.0	8.0	6.6	6.8	5.4	34.5	33.4	30.4	27.7	3.7	3.1	2.8	2.7
Qatar	—	—	—	—	1.7 *	1.4 *	1.3 *	1.6	9.4	7.0	6.2	5.4	1.2	1.0	0.8	0.6
Romania	< 2.5	< 2.5	< 2.5	< 2.5	4.3	3.4 *	3.4 *	3.3 *	13.5	10.6	8.0	7.0	2.2	1.4	0.9	0.7
Russian Federation	4.2	< 2.5	< 2.5	< 2.5	4.9	3.0 *	3.1 *	2.9 *	17.8	11.7	11.1	10.2	1.9	1.1	0.8	0.4
Rwanda	37.6	36.5	33.7	24.4	8.7	5.1	2.2	1.1	48.7	46.8	35.8	29.8	18.5	7.6	4.6	4.0
Saudi Arabia	4.6	3.4	< 2.5	< 2.5	6.2 *	5.1 *	3.4	3.9	11.0	12.5	12.2	11.1	2.2	1.4	0.9	0.6
Senegal	21.1	10.9	8.9	5.1	10.0	8.9 *	7.1	10.2	24.6	19.7	18.1	17.2	12.9	7.0	5.1	3.9
Serbia	—	< 2.5	< 2.5	< 2.5	—	4.0	3.9	3.3 *	—	7.4	5.6	4.6	—	0.8	0.6	0.5
Sierra Leone	50.0	28.1	24.5	24.1	11.6	7.5	5.9	6.3	38.7	36.7	30.2	25.2	22.4	17.3	12.3	9.4
Slovakia	6.2	5.1	5.3	3.1	1.1 *	1.0 *	1.0 *	1.0 *	4.9	3.8	3.5	3.1	1.0	0.7	0.6	0.6
Solomon Islands	11.2	14.1	18.0	20.0	7.1 *	4.3	8.5	5.4 *	31.1	33.2	30.5	29.8	3.1	2.8	2.5	2.1
Somalia	70.0	69.8	60.2	53.2	19.3	14.3	9.9 *	8.8 *	33.6	32.2	27.1	23.9	17.2	16.6	13.0	10.4
South Africa	3.6	3.5	6.4	10.0	4.5	5.4	2.5	3.3 *	26.6	24.5	22.2	24.4	7.1	6.4	3.7	3.5
South Sudan	—	—	—	22.3	—	—	—	21.0 *	39.1	33.7	30.5	30.0	18.3	12.1	26.4	9.9
Sri Lanka	16.8	11.1	4.1	7.4	15.9	13.5	15.1	9.3	19.8	18.2	13.3	10.1	1.6	1.2	0.8	0.6
Sudan	—	—	9.8	—	—	—	16.3	17.7 *	38.3	37.3	35.3	35.4	10.3	7.9	6.3	5.0
Suriname	11.5	7.3	9.3	9.7	7.0	4.9	5.5	5.2 *	13.6	9.8	8.2	8.0	3.1	2.4	2.0	1.6
Syrian Arab Republic	7.5	5.6	14.2	39.0	4.9	10.9	14.7 *	12.2 *	28.3	28.6	27.4	23.5	2.3	1.9	3.2	2.1
Tajikistan	40.0	29.3	13.9	8.4	9.4	5.6	3.5	6.4	41.3	32.0	19.8	13.1	8.0	4.2	2.9	2.7
Tanzania (United Rep. of)	32.8	25.1	21.9	20.2	5.6	2.9	4.5	3.3	47.6	41.8	34.1	29.9	12.8	7.7	5.2	3.9
Thailand	17.3	10.6	7.9	4.6	8.0 *	4.7	5.4	7.2	16.1	15.9	12.8	12.3	2.2	1.5	1.2	0.9
Timor-Leste	54.9	23.2	15.4	18.7	13.7	21.3	12.2	8.3	55.0	56.3	49.1	45.4	11.1	7.7	5.9	5.0
Togo	28.8	20.7	20.6	9.1	12.0	6.0	5.7	4.4 *	31.6	28.5	25.1	23.0	12.0	9.4	7.3	5.8
Trinidad & Tobago	10.3	9.3	7.0	11.2	5.2	5.1 *	4.8 *	4.9 *	5.3	7.9	8.4	7.8	2.9	2.6	2.2	1.9
Tunisia	4.0	3.6	2.8	3.0	2.9	3.4	2.1	2.8 *	12.5	10.0	8.7	8.9	2.9	1.9	1.8	1.3
Türkiye	12.9	3.2	< 2.5	< 2.5	3.0	1.0	1.9	1.3 *	17.4	13.0	7.2	5.5	3.7	2.1	1.3	1.3
Turkmenistan	6.0	4.6	3.4	4.3	8.0	7.2	4.2	4.6 *	26.5	16.7	9.7	6.5	7.0	4.6	4.3	4.0
Uganda	21.2	19.8	35.4	22.0	5.0	5.3	4.6	3.2	44.0	38.3	28.7	23.5	14.6	8.7	5.2	3.9
Ukraine	2.7	< 2.5	< 2.5	6.9	8.2	6.8 *	7.1 *	7.1 *	22.6	19.2	16.5	11.7	1.8	1.3	0.9	0.8
United Arab Emirates	< 2.5	5.3	3.5	< 2.5	1.1 *	1.0 *	1.0 *	1.0 *	1.6	1.3	1.6	1.4	1.1	0.9	0.7	0.5
Uruguay	3.6	< 2.5	< 2.5	< 2.5	1.6	1.4	0.8	1.3 *	16.3	11.1	7.7	6.5	1.7	1.2	0.8	0.7
Uzbekistan	19.0	6.2	< 2.5	< 2.5	9.0	4.4	1.8	2.4	29.0	17.8	10.0	6.7	6.1	3.6	1.8	1.3
Venezuela (Boliv. Rep. of)	14.1	2.6	17.4	5.9	3.9	4.5	3.5 *	3.6 *	17.6	14.7	11.3	11.7	2.2	1.7	2.4	2.4
Viet Nam	19.5	12.5	7.7	5.3	9.0	9.4	6.1	4.4	41.1	29.6	22.8	19.2	3.0	2.4	2.2	2.0
Yemen	—	—	—	—	16.2 *	13.8	12.8 *	16.8	55.3	52.2	46.6	47.4	9.3	6.0	4.8	3.9
Zambia	50.3	45.6	33.4	37.2	5.9	5.6	6.2	3.8 *	52.1	46.4	36.5	32.3	15.3	8.6	5.9	4.5
Zimbabwe	32.8	27.1	32.8	19.7	8.3	2.4	3.3	5.1	33.1	33.9	26.3	23.7	9.8	9.3	5.7	4.4

Note: The colors shown in the table represent the following categories: = Very low = Low = Medium = High = Very high. For more information, see page 43.
— = Data not available or not presented. Some countries did not exist in their present borders in the given year or reference period. *GHI estimates.

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2000, 2008, 2016, AND 2025 GLOBAL HUNGER INDEX SCORES, AND CHANGE SINCE 2016

Country with data from	2000 '98–'02	2008 '06–'10	2016 '14–'18	2025 '20–'24	Absolute change since 2016	% change since 2016
Afghanistan	49.6	32.7	28.0	29.0	1.0	3.4
Albania	15.3	15.3	6.7	7.0	0.3	4.3
Algeria	14.1	10.8	8.0	7.1	-0.9	-12.7
Angola	63.8	35.3	25.7	29.7	4.0	13.5
Argentina	6.5	5.2	5.3	6.4	1.1	17.2
Armenia	20.3	10.8	6.7	<5	—	—
Azerbaijan	25.2	14.1	8.1	5.6	-2.5	-44.6
Bahrain	—	—	—	—	—	—
Bangladesh	34.6	32.5	24.4	19.2	-5.2	-27.1
Belarus	<5	<5	<5	<5	—	—
Benin	32.2	25.5	23.8	25.9	2.1	8.1
Bhutan	—	—	—	—	—	—
Bolivia (Plurinat. State of)	27.0	20.9	14.0	14.6	0.6	4.1
Bosnia & Herzegovina	9.5	6.1	5	<5	—	—
Botswana	29.9	27.2	22.5	21.8	-0.7	-3.2
Brazil	11.6	6.3	5.4	6.4	1.0	15.6
Bulgaria	8.6	8.1	7.3	<5	—	—
Burkina Faso	44.5	34.4	25.4	22.9	-2.5	-10.9
Burundi	—	—	—	—	—	—
Cabo Verde	16.2	13.1	11.5	9.4	-2.1	-22.3
Cambodia	39.8	24.7	17.7	14.9	-2.8	-18.8
Cameroon	36.8	26.9	20.4	17.1	-3.3	-19.3
Central African Republic	46.8	41.9	36.0	33.4	-2.6	-7.8
Chad	49.6	43.8	38.5	34.8	-3.7	-10.6
Chile	<5	<5	<5	<5	—	—
China	13.8	7.3	<5	<5	—	—
Colombia	10.7	10.3	7.1	6.1	-1.0	-16.4
Comoros	35.7	25.7	20.5	17.2	-3.3	-19.2
Congo (Republic of)	35.1	32.2	26.6	22.6	-4.0	-17.7
Costa Rica	5.9	<5	<5	<5	—	—
Côte d'Ivoire	32.8	33.2	22.3	20.4	-1.9	-9.3
Croatia	7.1	<5	<5	<5	—	—
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	46.1	39.5	36.4	37.5	1.1	2.9
Djibouti	44.8	32.8	24.6	21.9	-2.7	-12.3
Dominican Republic	15.2	12.8	8.6	6.4	-2.2	-34.4
Ecuador	19.1	14.6	11.3	10.9	-0.4	-3.7
Egypt	16.4	15.5	14.5	10.5	-4.0	-38.1
El Salvador	13.6	11.6	8.9	7.6	-1.3	-17.1
Equatorial Guinea	—	—	—	—	—	—
Eritrea	—	—	—	—	—	—
Estonia	<5	<5	<5	<5	—	—
Eswatini	23.9	25.8	18.9	15.9	-3.0	-18.9
Ethiopia	53.0	37.5	26.1	24.4	-1.7	-7.0
Fiji	9.2	10.2	10.6	9.9	-0.7	-7.1
Gabon	19.8	18.4	16.1	18.8	2.7	14.4
Gambia	29.5	23.3	18.8	17.3	-1.5	-8.7
Georgia	11.8	8.0	5.7	<5	—	—
Ghana	29.0	21.5	16.5	13.1	-3.4	-26.0
Guatemala	29.0	23.8	20.8	18.0	-2.8	-15.6
Guinea	36.8	31.9	28.4	23.7	-4.7	-19.8
Guinea-Bissau	37.6	30.4	26.6	25.4	-1.2	-4.7
Guyana	17.0	15.3	10.7	8.3	-2.4	-28.9
Haiti	40.2	37.2	29.9	35.7	5.8	16.2
Honduras	21.7	15.9	13.1	12.5	-0.6	-4.8
Hungary	<5	<5	<5	<5	—	—
India	38.1	34.6	29.3	25.8	-3.5	-13.6
Indonesia	25.0	27.8	18.2	14.6	-3.6	-24.7
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	12.4	9.5	8.3	7.4	-0.9	-12.2
Iraq	22.9	19.2	14.7	12.8	-1.9	-14.8
Jamaica	8.3	8.3	8.3	8.0	-0.3	-3.8
Jordan	10.2	7.6	7.7	10.3	2.6	25.2
Kazakhstan	12.0	10.2	5.7	<5	—	—
Kenya	35.7	28.7	23.1	25.9	2.8	10.8
Korea (DPR)	43.8	30.8	27.6	—	—	—
Kuwait	<5	<5	<5	<5	—	—
Kyrgyzstan	18.4	12.2	8.9	8.0	-0.9	-11.3
Lao PDR	—	—	—	—	—	—
Latvia	5.3	<5	<5	<5	—	—
Lebanon	11.1	8.3	7.1	8.5	1.4	16.5
Lesotho	—	—	—	—	—	—
Liberia	47.7	36.8	32.9	30.0	-2.9	-9.7
Libya	11.9	14.8	16.3	13.9	-2.4	-17.3
Lithuania	5	<5	<5	<5	—	—
Madagascar	42.0	36.6	35.0	35.8	0.8	2.2
Malawi	43.3	28.5	23.1	22.0	-1.1	-5.0
Malaysia	15.1	13.9	13.4	13.6	0.2	1.5
Maldives	—	—	—	—	—	—
Mali	40.3	31.3	24.7	22.3	-2.4	-10.8
Mauritania	31.3	20.1	21.2	19.9	-1.3	-6.5
Mauritius	15.3	13.2	12.8	13.4	0.6	4.5
Mexico	9.8	9.2	7.1	6.0	-1.1	-18.3
Moldova (Rep. of)	18.1	15.0	5.8	5.1	-0.7	-13.7
Mongolia	29.5	17.3	8.0	5.1	-2.9	-56.9
Montenegro	—	5.8	<5	<5	—	—
Morocco	15.6	11.5	8.6	9.3	0.7	7.5
Mozambique	46.8	32.7	36.4	25.9	-10.5	-40.5
Myanmar	41.5	28.3	16.8	15.3	-1.5	-9.8
Namibia	26.6	27.1	22.0	18.9	-3.1	-16.4
Nepal	37.0	28.5	20.6	14.8	-5.8	-39.2
Nicaragua	21.4	17.1	13.1	—	—	—
Niger	52.7	39.0	33.3	33.9	0.6	1.8
Nigeria	38.2	32.3	29.9	32.8	2.9	8.8
North Macedonia	7.4	5.5	<5	<5	—	—
Oman	16.2	10.2	12.0	10.2	-1.8	-17.6
Pakistan	36.2	32.3	25.4	26.0	0.6	2.3
Panama	17.3	12.3	9.2	7.5	-1.7	-22.7
Papua New Guinea	31.3	32.8	31.9	31.0	-0.9	-2.9
Paraguay	12.8	8.3	5.2	5.2	0.0	0.0
Peru	21.1	12.9	8.0	7.2	-0.8	-11.1
Philippines	23.9	21.4	17.7	13.4	-4.3	-32.1
Qatar	—	—	—	—	—	—
Romania	8.1	6.0	<5	<5	—	—
Russian Federation	10.6	6.0	5.5	<5	—	—
Rwanda	49.7	36.4	28.2	21.7	-6.5	-30.0
Saudi Arabia	10.1	8.5	6.6	5.9	-0.7	-11.9
Senegal	32.5	20.9	16.8	15.6	-1.2	-7.7
Serbia	—	5.3	<5	<5	—	—
Sierra Leone	57.8	41.1	32.4	28.5	-3.9	-13.7
Slovakia	5.3	<5	<5	<5	—	—
Solomon Islands	18.9	18.8	21.8	20.4	-1.4	-6.9
Somalia	64.3	60.5	49.4	42.6	-6.8	-16.0
South Africa	17.1	16.4	12.9	15.1	2.2	14.6
South Sudan	—	—	—	37.5	—	—
Sri Lanka	22.1	17.6	14.1	11.2	-2.9	-25.9
Sudan	—	—	27.5	—	—	—
Suriname	14.9	10.4	10.8	10.4	-0.4	-3.8
Syrian Arab Republic	14.8	17.0	23.7	30.6	6.9	22.5
Tajikistan	39.3	26.9	15.3	12.8	-2.5	-19.5
Tanzania (United Rep. of)	40.3	29.4	24.7	21.1	-3.6	-17.1
Thailand	17.5	12.3	10.4	9.7	-0.7	-7.2
Timor-Leste	—	42.2	30.5	28.0	-2.5	-8.9
Togo	37.6	27.7	24.7	17.3	-7.4	-42.8
Trinidad & Tobago	11.2	11.0	9.7	11.0	1.3	11.8
Tunisia	9.1	7.6	6.1	6.2	0.1	1.6
Türkiye	14.8	6.9	<5	<5	—	—
Turkmenistan	19.9	14.3	10.2	9.7	-0.5	-5.2
Uganda	36.0	28.6	29.1	20.2	-8.9	-44.1
Ukraine	12.8	10.0	9.7	10.4	0.7	6.7
United Arab Emirates	<5	<5	<5	<5	—	—
Uruguay	7.9	<5	<5	<5	—	—
Uzbekistan	25.7	12.7	5.7	<5	—	—
Venezuela (Boliv. Rep. of)	14.3	8.7	14.2	9.6	-4.6	-47.9
Viet Nam	25.7	19.7	14.1	11.1	-3.0	-27.0
Yemen	—	—	—	—	—	—
Zambia	51.2	41.4	31.7	29.6	-2.1	-7.1
Zimbabwe	35.5	29.6	27.2	20.9	-6.3	-30.1

Note: — = Data are not available or not presented. See Table A.3 for provisional designations of the severity of hunger for some countries with incomplete data. Some countries did not exist in their present borders in the given year or reference period. = low = moderate = serious = alarming = extremely alarming

D

COUNTRIES' 2024 GHI SCORES BY REGION

WEST ASIA AND NORTH AFRICA



Note: Bahrain, Yemen, and Qatar are in the West Asia and North Africa region but are not shown, owing to insufficient data for the calculation of GHI scores. Existing data and provisional indicator values for these countries were included in the calculation of regional and global GHI scores. See Table A.3 regarding provisional designations of hunger severity for countries with incomplete data. Countries with GHI scores less than 5 are presented in alphabetical order.

WEST AFRICA



CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN AFRICA



Note: Equatorial Guinea and Lesotho are in the Central and Southern Africa subregions but are not shown, owing to insufficient data for the calculation of GHI scores. Existing data and provisional indicator values for these countries were included in the calculation of regional and global GHI scores. See Table A.3 regarding provisional designations of hunger severity for countries with incomplete data.

EAST AFRICA



Note: Burundi, Eritrea, and Sudan are in the East Africa subregion but are not shown, owing to insufficient data for the calculation of GHI scores. Existing data and provisional indicator values for these countries were included in the calculation of regional and global GHI scores. See Table A.3 regarding provisional designations of hunger severity for countries with incomplete data.

SOUTH AMERICA



Note: Countries with GHI scores less than 5 are presented in alphabetical order.

CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN



Note: Nicaragua is in the Central America and the Caribbean subregion but is not shown, owing to insufficient data for the calculation of GHI scores. Existing data and provisional indicator values for these countries were included in the calculation of regional and global GHI scores. See Table A.3 regarding provisional designations of hunger severity for countries with incomplete data.

D

SOUTH, EAST, AND SOUTHEAST ASIA



Note: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka are in South Asia for the purposes of Figure 1.3, whereas the remaining countries are in East and Southeast Asia. Bhutan, DPR Korea, Lao PDR, and Maldives are not shown, owing to insufficient data for the calculation of GHI scores. Existing data and provisional indicator values for these countries were included in the calculation of regional and global GHI scores. See Table A.3 regarding provisional designations of hunger severity for countries with incomplete data.

EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA



Note: Countries with GHI scores less than 5 are presented in alphabetical order.

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RESOURCES FOR UNDERSTANDING HUNGER AND MALNUTRITION

The Global Hunger Index (GHI) is a tool for assessing hunger at global, regional, and national levels. Among its strengths are the following:

→ **Measuring and tracking long-term trends.** Because of the nature and availability of its underlying data, the GHI is best suited for measuring hunger and tracking progress over recent years and decades. The 2025 GHI scores are based on the most up-to-date data available for the underlying indicators for each country. This GHI report also includes GHI scores for 2000, 2008, and 2016 to show trends in hunger over time.

→ **Reflecting both the quantity and quality of food and diets.** The four indicators underlying GHI scores—undernourishment, child stunting, child wasting, and child mortality—reflect deficiencies in calories (quantity) as well as in important micronutrients (quality).

→ **Complementing other reports and resources.** The countries where GHI scores are high—indicating that calories are chronically insufficient and/or children's growth and well-being have been hampered by undernutrition—are particularly vulnerable to food crises and stresses, which are reported by other sources.

Other resources offer additional important perspectives on hunger and malnutrition. The following is a selection and brief description of those resources.

Resources on Food Crises and Early Warning Systems

→ **Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET)**
FEWS NET, the Famine Early Warning Systems Network, provides real-time assessments and short-term projections of acute food insecurity around the world. It issues monthly reports and maps detailing current and projected food insecurity as well as alerts on emerging or likely crises. FEWS NET was founded by the Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in 1985.
https://fews.net/

→ **Global Information and Early Warning System (GIEWS)**
The Global Information and Early Warning System on Food and Agriculture (GIEWS) continuously monitors food supply and demand and other key indicators for assessing the overall food security situation in all countries of the world. An initiative of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), it issues regular reports on prevailing conditions and provides early warnings of impending food crises at the country or regional level.
https://www.fao.org/giews/en/

→ **Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC)**
The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) is an initiative led by 15 international development agencies to improve analysis and decision-making on food security and nutrition. It provides a common scale for classifying the severity and magnitude of food insecurity and acute malnutrition. The IPC acute food insecurity scale has five classifications: minimal/none, stressed, crisis, emergency, and catastrophe/famine. There are also IPC scales for acute malnutrition and chronic food insecurity.
https://www.ipcinfo.org/

→ **Global Report on Food Crises (GRFC)**
This annual report produced by the Global Network against Food Crises—an international alliance working to address the root causes of extreme hunger—gives an overview and country-by-country update on acute, crisis-level food insecurity. Based on the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) assessments, it triangulates recent available food security assessments, even if they are partial and from different sources.
https://www.fsinplatform.org/report/global-report-food-crises-2025

Resources on Food and Nutrition Security

→ **The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World (SOFI)**
This flagship annual report is jointly prepared by FAO, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the World Food Programme (WFP), and the World Health Organization (WHO). It is designed to chart progress toward ending hunger, achieving food security, and improving nutrition, and to provide an in-depth analysis of key challenges for achieving this goal in the context of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.
https://www.fao.org/publications/sofi

→ **Global Nutrition Report (GNR)**
The *Global Nutrition Report*—published by a multistakeholder initiative—reports on countries' progress toward meeting global nutrition targets, evaluates the impact of poor diets on human health and the planet, assesses the nutrition financing landscape, and provides a comprehensive overview of reporting on past Nutrition for Growth (N4G) commitments.
https://globalnutritionreport.org

→ **Voices of the Hungry Project**
This project of FAO uses the Food Insecurity Experience Scale (FIES), an experience-based measure of household or individual food security. The FIES relies on eight survey questions included in the Gallup World Poll, which covers 90% of the world's population. The project provides up-to-date, internationally comparable information about food insecurity that is policy-relevant and actionable. A suite of resources and research based on the FIES is available.
https://www.fao.org/in-action/voices-of-the-hungry/resources/research/en/

Resources on Structural Drivers of Hunger

→ **World Risk Report and World Risk Index**
The World Risk Report is an annual technical report and index ranking on global disaster risks, published jointly by the Institute for International Law of Peace and Armed Conflict (IFHV) at Ruhr University Bochum and Bündnis Entwicklung Hilft. It highlights the complex interactions between extreme natural events, the negative impacts of climate change, societal inequalities, and disaster risk reduction. Central to the report is the World Risk Index, which assesses disaster risk in over 193 countries. The report draws attention to the structural factors that increase risk, including weak infrastructure, poverty, and fragile food systems—key drivers of food insecurity and hunger.
https://weltrisikobericht.de/worldriskreport/

PARTNERS

Who we are

Welthungerhilfe is one of the largest private aid organizations in Germany and has no political or religious affiliations. It was founded in 1962 as the German section of the Freedom from Hunger Campaign, one of the first global initiatives to fight hunger, initiated by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO).

What we do

From rapid disaster relief through to reconstruction and long-term development cooperation projects with national and local partners, we provide help from a single source. With 649 international projects, we were able to support 18.7 million people in 37 countries in 2024.

How we work

We support people in realizing their rights and improving their living conditions sustainably. We aim to strengthen structures from the bottom up and work together with local partner organizations to ensure the long-term success of our work. We also raise public awareness and advocate with national and international policymakers addressing the root causes of hunger and poverty.

Our vision

A world in which all people can exercise their right to a self-determined life in dignity and justice, free from hunger and poverty.

Who we are

Concern Worldwide is a nongovernmental, international, humanitarian organization that strives for a world free from poverty, fear and oppression. We deliver life-saving and life-changing interventions to the world's poorest and most vulnerable people. From rapid emergency response to innovative development programming, we go to the hardest-to-reach places to make sure that no one is left behind.

What we do

Our mission is to help people living in extreme poverty achieve major improvements in their lives that last and spread without ongoing support from Concern.

How we work

To achieve our mission, we engage in long-term development work, build resilience, respond to emergency situations, and seek to address the root causes of poverty through our development education and advocacy work.

Our vision

We believe in a world where no one lives in poverty, fear, or oppression; where all have access to a decent standard of living and the opportunities and choices essential to a long, healthy, and creative life; and where everyone is treated with dignity and respect.

Who we are

The Institute for International Law of Peace and Armed Conflict (IFHV) is one of Europe's leading academic institutions on humanitarian crises. Rooted in international humanitarian and human rights law, we combine interdisciplinary expertise from law, social sciences, geosciences, and public health.

What we do

We study the causes and consequences of humanitarian crises, their legal dimensions, and the responses of states, international organizations, and NGOs. Promoting humanitarian law and principles is central to our mission.

How we work

Our team of professors as well as doctoral and postdoctoral researchers leads national and international projects, shares findings widely, and provides expert commentary on current crises.

Our vision

We strengthen humanitarian education through the NOHA Master in Humanitarian Action and the Academy for Humanitarian Action (aha), preparing and training the next generation of committed humanitarian professionals.

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