



Evaluation of Concern Worldwide's Emergency Programme Masisi, North Kivu, DRC

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About the author

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Photo August 2016 outside of the Concern Guesthouse in Masisi.

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The views expressed in this report are the author's alone and the author accepts sole responsibility for any factual inaccuracies.

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
Chiffres clés

 678 000 personnes déplacées.

 185 000 personnes retournées les 18 derniers mois.

 49 000 personnes déplacées du deuxième trimestre 2016.

 0 personne retournée du deuxième trimestre 2016.



Source; OCHA, Update on Internally displaced people and returnees in June 2016.

List of Acronyms

ABACUS	A data management tool specifically designed for OFDA
ALNAP	Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance
APCLS	Alliance of Patriots for a Free and Sovereign Congo
ARCC	Alternative Responses for Communities in Crisis
CCCM	Camp coordination and camp management cluster
CRM	Complaint response mechanism
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DRR	Disaster risk reduction
ECHO	European Commission's Humanitarian Aid Office
FARDC	Congolese Armed Forces (Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo)
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FIM	Food Income and Markets
FSL	Food Security and Livelihoods
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HH	Household
HPP	Humanitarian Programme Plan
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IGA	Income Generation Activities
IOM	International Organisation of Migration
KAP	Knowledge Attitude and Practice
Lt/p/d	Litres per person per day (water consumption)
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MFS	Médecins Sans Frontières
NDC-Cheka	Nduma Defense Congo – Cheka (leader)
NDC-Guidon	Nduma Defense Congo – Guidon (leader)
NFI	Non-Food Item
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance
OFDA	Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance
PDM	Post distribution monitoring
RRMP	Rapid Response to Population Movement (Reponse Rapide pour le Mouvement des Populations)
UNHCR	Norwegian Refugee Council
UNICEF	United Nations Children’s Fund
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WFP	World Food Program

Executive Summary

This evaluation has looked at the programming of the DRC Concern Worldwide, North Kivu program. The evaluation includes a 3 year funding cycle from OFDA amounting to 3.530.915 \$ and a one year co-funded ECHO/ Irish Aid program amounting to 1.074.980 €. This intervention is supporting displaced, returnee and vulnerable households with access to NFIs, shelter materials and training, cash, hygiene kits, seeds and tools, a soft WASH component, and also has a component of road and bridge rehabilitation to enable access for humanitarian actors to isolated villages. This programme is implemented in partnership with a local NGO, PACODEVI, in North Kivu. The context in North Kivu is extremely complex and volatile, due to the presence of a myriad of armed groups and frequent clashes between and within groups, making it a highly challenging environment for NGOs to operate in.

The results of the evaluation are based on a desk review and key informant interviews with Concern staff and external partners such as NGOs and UN agencies during a 2 week field visit to North Kivu in August 2016. Due to security developments during the field visit, the beneficiary consultation had to be cancelled and hence the evaluation could not be fully conducted as intended. No verification activities have taken place and no communication has been had with beneficiaries in regards to their own experience of the program.

Main conclusions

The main conclusion of the evaluation is that segments of the North Kivu program have been successfully implemented while there are components in need of improvement. The Masisi team have experienced a set of circumstances which have left them without the required capacity and with too little time to ensure sufficient quality-control throughout the program, and as a consequence certain program aspects have slipped. The team has been in a state of catch up and firefighting, at times lacking the required time for proper planning and without an overview of where they stand on the total program inputs and outputs. Despite these challenges however, most of the stated activities have been implemented.

The major strength of the program are the NFI and Multi sectoral fairs and the Livelihoods component. Together these represent the majority of the funding and time-consumption of the whole program and in view of that, the program has delivered on the majority of its donor commitments. The flaws in the program are mainly expressed in the smaller soft-components of the program. The program aspects which need to be improved is primarily the timeliness, the monitoring and to a certain extent accountability aspects such as the CRM. With increased timeliness there should also be an increased quality in the activities.

The insecurity has had a huge impact on the implementation of the activities, in particular the staff kidnapping in 2015 which led to a 3 month suspension and had a significant impact on the timeliness and the target achievement of the whole program. The psychological impact of such an event is not to be underestimated, affecting the confidence and functioning of the team. The program has also struggled with a high management turnover in the last 3 years which has impacted the managerial overview and control of the program.

The way forward

The positive news is that on the whole, the program aspects which need to be improved, can be. The team needs to get in some additional surge capacity, finish up the existing programs in the best manner possible, and have a frank discussion with the respective donors on the challenges encountered. With that completed, a thorough review needs to take place of the program cycle, the

accountability aspects and the team communication and planning. Responsibilities need to be delegated so management has a reasonable workload.

The times ahead will by all accounts be challenging for the people in North Kivu, for humanitarian organisations that means that each program component will need to have a back-up plan or two and for that some serious planning and flexibility is needed. With the extensive experience and presence Concern has built up in the Masisi territory, the organisation should be in a good position to provide the population with lifesaving and quality of life increasing assistance. In addition, Concern has in place a committed and hard -working team, both national and expat who do their utmost to meet the needs of the communities. With that as a foundation, a few tweaks in the structure of the program and they should be on the right track to successful new programs.

While doing program information collection in country the evaluator briefly examined some current issues facing the humanitarian community in North Kivu. The result of that aspect is presented in the report as strategy input and the presentation of the included topics are meant for discussion rather than recommendations. The main issues discussed in the [Strategy Input](#) is the expected severe impact of the upcoming elections or the lack thereof, on the humanitarian needs in North Kivu and the need to construct a staged scenario development for the program to identify back-up plans. Concern is encouraged to look at their current coverage in North Kivu and determine where the organisation wants to position itself geographically. Donors are generally reducing their funding and while so doing prioritising organisations with a broad geographic coverage. Concern has a strong advantage in Masisi, which is an area with great humanitarian needs and a centre for recurrent displacement, is that platform sufficient? Lastly, camp closures are in progress, at the minimum there will most likely be a number of camp mergers as many of the camps are already considered too small to mobilise assistance. Beyond operationally adapting to the new/ merged camps and cooperating with other organisations on assisting returnees in Concern’s operational areas, there is not much else for Concern to do in this regard.

The recommendations are summed up statements extracted from the results of the evaluation, each statement has its justification within the results presented in the respective sections and can be examined there. The full set of a total of 15 recommendations divided into *Program Management*, *Program Implementation* and *HR recommendations* can be read in in the section [Conclusion and Recommendations](#). The highlighted recommendations are;

Main recommendations

1.	Efforts should be made to improve programme planning and time management, ensuring sufficient flexibility to adapt to delays incurred by external factors (e.g. security/logistical challenges). Better planning will help to reduce the “firefighting” and to ensure a “beneficiary first” approach, rather than focusing on expediency of activity implementation to deliver results within agreed timeframes.
3.	Soft-WASH stand-alone program should primarily not be considered without a Hard-WASH component. Future WASH programming should be developed and implemented with the involvement of the WASH cluster as the cluster has a clear standards and divisions which all actors must adhere to.
4.	Efforts should be made to investigate possible options to transfer completely the NFI/ Livelihoods programming to cash and a second option is to allow vouchers to be changed into cash during the fairs. A beneficiary consultation should take place with camp dwellers to gauge their opinion on their preference of being provided with NFI kits or if they prefer being

	provided with cash/ vouchers. Donors are encouraged to evaluate their approach to cash and facilitate this operational modality if the program deems it to be the best option.
5.	Programming supporting food security is highly suitable for this context and an expansion of this program option should be explored.
6.	Ensure a mechanism within the system which sustains and transfers institutional memory, both in a digital format and within staff. Consider long term contracts for a few national program staff, the contracts could include the possibility of relocation should the program not get funding and the contract termination would be an issue.
7.	Strengthen the teams M&E capacity to ensure timely and accurate data collection and analysis throughout the programme cycle and ensure that learning is incorporated in future programme implementation. Donors are encouraged to ensure adequate support cost in order for Concern to fulfil its accountability commitments.
8.	Concern needs to find innovative ways of recruiting women in the program implementation and community consultation component to truly ensure gender sensitive programming and a female led CRM channel option.

1. Introduction

Concern has been operational in North Kivu, DRC since 1994 implementing emergency response and resilience programmes. Concern is currently implementing a multi-sectorial humanitarian programme, with funding from ECHO, Irish Aid and OFDA, in Masisi Territory. This intervention is supporting displaced, returnee and vulnerable households with access to NFIs, shelter materials and training, cash, hygiene kits and seeds and tools, a soft WASH component, and also has a component of road and bridge rehabilitation to enable access for humanitarian actors to isolated villages and protection. Voucher fairs (closed and opened) and direct distributions (of cash/assets) have been widely used to deliver the assistance to the targeted households. Concern interventions combine activities that target IDPs living in camps and IDPs and returnees living in host villages.

1.1 Context

The North Kivu Province of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is a complex environment, comprised of a broad diversity of actors and influences, and a history intertwined with those of neighbouring countries. The situation in North Kivu has been characterized for decades by the presence of dozens of armed groups (ranging from self-protection community militias, organized-crime/bandits to large-scale armies with political aspirations), complex regional relationships, and limited state function. Civilians experience recurrent and chronic human rights abuses, multiple forced displacements, impoverishment, and increased vulnerability. Over the years the civilian population has reacted to such recurring shocks with diverse survival strategies, including displacement, diversification of livelihoods, and maintaining a low economic profile.

Humanitarian aid has been delivered in the DRC on a massive scale since 1994, but the international community continues to face difficulties in responding to a complex and changing environment to protect civilians and deliver appropriate humanitarian relief and recovery interventions. The crisis persists and shows little to no signs of abating, and repeated shocks and ongoing armed conflict have resulted in the perception of the constant deterioration of the security situation.

In North Kivu armed groups, including the *Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda* (FDLR), and several other groups such as, NDC Cheka, NDC Guidon, APCLS and Raia Mutomboki, *Allied Democratic Forces* (ADF) amongst others, carry out brutal attacks against civilians. Fighting between armed groups and between armed groups and the FARDC continues to generate mass population displacement. There continues to be a trend of fragmentation, data from 2008 puts the number of groups in the Kivus at around 20, estimates today is that there are around 70 armed groups operating in the Kivus¹. The sustained presence of armed groups has resulted in serious protection violations with civilians facing harassment and abuse, including sexual and gender-based violence, within their communities as well as when travelling to markets and fields.

OCHA estimates that 3.000 people are being displaced every day². However, reliable data regarding displacement in DRC is challenging to access. Piecemeal data collection and a lack of consolidated information management are resulting in “guesstimates” in regard of number, location and status of displaced populations. By attempting to verify figures, OCHA brought down the total caseload of IDPs in September 2015 from supposed 2.8 million persons down to 1.4 million persons, now growing

¹ <http://congoresearchgroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/The-Landscape-of-Armed-Groups-in-Eastern-Congo1.pdf> Page 5.

² Interview OCHA 08/2016

again to 1.6 as OCHA is proceeding ahead with its verifications³. Data from June 2016 states the number of IDPs in the Masisi territory to be 142.457 individuals and returnees in 2016 to be approximately 40.000⁴.

Following the closure of the Mokoto IDP camp in January, another three IDP camps in North Kivu province were forcibly dismantled by the government, after obscure reports suggested that the camps were infiltrated by armed groups. The dismantling of the camps, with a total registered population of 35,000, led to new displacement towards the surrounding localities. Currently there are plans in process to close a further 8 camps, 3 of which Concern is supporting in the Masisi locality. Although only 20-30% of IDPs in the DRC live in camps or sites, and the majority live with host families, the government strategy to close all the camps, called Durable Solutions, will have a heavy impact on the operational procedures of humanitarian agencies, not to mention the human suffering at risk if the closures fail to adhere to humanitarian law and polices.

The continuous state of humanitarian crisis is also leading to a donor fatigue and questions on whether the long term humanitarian support in North Kivu is feeding a war economy. The community based structure of the armed actors makes it difficult to avoid a transfer of assets from the civilian community to their armed representatives. There is a high number of humanitarian actors in DRC, reportedly there are 260 organisations currently operational. According to SIDA the high number of actors *“diverts into unnecessary administrative and overhead costs what could be delivered to more beneficiaries through fewer actors and more coherent joint operations. The competition for resources is high among actors. The ambition of some INGOs to stay in the country may blur evidence-based programming.”*⁵ In view of recent donor trends, there seems to be an increased preference towards organisations with a large-scale coverage capacity or consortia where organisations partner up.


The current major uncertainty and challenge facing DRC and as such, the humanitarian community, is the delay of the 2016 elections. DRC's voter registry will not be complete until July 2017 and DRC's highest court ruled in May that Kabila could remain in office if no election was held by November. The government has said it prefers to hold local and provincial elections before the presidential poll, and some political analysts say that suggests the DRC will not go to the polls to choose Kabila's successor until 2018 or 2019⁶. The analysis expressed by many is that politicians of various affiliations will mobilise and utilise the armed elements in North Kivu to further their cause and that the current fragmentation and renewal of a number of armed groups is an expression of that development. An indication of this can be the increased number of displacement alerts received by the RRMP in 2015 and 2016, the numbers are going down in other provinces of unrest, compared to quite an increase in North Kivu.

³ <http://www.sida.se/globalassets/sida/sve/sa-arbetar-vi/humanitart-bistand/drc-humanitarian-crisis-analysis-2016.pdf> Page 2.

⁴ http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/rdc_factsheet_mouvement_de_population_du_deuxieme_trimestre_2016.pdf

⁵ <http://www.sida.se/globalassets/sida/sve/sa-arbetar-vi/humanitart-bistand/drc-humanitarian-crisis-analysis-2016.pdf> page 4

⁶ <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/08/dr-congo-opposition-rejects-talks-election-160821050327293.html>



The opposition is not expected to quietly stand by and await a potential new date for the elections, come December Kabila's election mandate expires by which time the floodgates of dissent may possibly open. Many Congolese have expressed the expectation of a full blown war should the country not be allowed to vote as scheduled. Regardless of the outcome, DRC has 24 trillion dollars of untapped mineral resources vital to global industries, that's more than the GDP of the UK and US combined. It contains the world's second-largest rainforest teeming with life, an estimated population of 79 million people and the potential to power much of Africa. The outcome of the election, once they do happen, will reverberate throughout the world⁸.

1.2 The Masisi Emergency Program

Concern DRC has had programmes based in and around Masisi since 2004. Since 2008, the Masisi programme has remained relatively similar and has received repeated cycles of funding from humanitarian donors. The interventions have included shelter and NFI support and FIM programming including Cash-for-Work road and bridge rehabilitation and agriculture. The livelihood and food security assistance is provided in the form of multi-sector voucher and food fairs, cash transfers, seed and tool distributions with agricultural training and cash-for-work road rehabilitation. Through cash-for-work Concern aims to open and maintain humanitarian access by means of road and bridge maintenance and rehabilitation.

The programs covered by this evaluation are the 3 year OFDA funding stretching from 2013 to 2016 and the co-funded ECHO/ Irish Aid program implemented from May 2015 to July 2016. The OFDA program funds new arrival NFI kits, quarterly renewal hygiene kits, NFI voucher fairs and to some extent protection activities in a total of 10 camps, with some beneficiary and activity variations during the 3 annual program phases. The ECHO/ Irish Aid program has focused on displaced beneficiaries residing among host populations and the program activities have been similar to the OFDA program, with the addition of a livelihoods component, hygiene promotion and road rehabilitation.

The program is implemented in a highly volatile area, Masisi is rumoured to be the most difficult implementation area in North Kivu due to the high levels of inter- and intra-ethnic conflict and subsequent violence. The implementation requires a constant level of adaptation and review in order

⁷ Chart from UNICEF, through the ARCC interview.

⁸

to be fulfilled due to the frequent eruptions of violence in the target communities. The program has had three visits from the HQ Security Adviser during the evaluation timeframe to support the team with this adaptation⁹.

For the ECHO/ Irish Aid program there were initially plans to expand the area of operations to the neighbouring territory of Walikale. However, on October 30th, an armed group ambushed Concern's convoy while travelling in Walikale, the staff in the two cars were physically harmed and robbed and two staff were taken hostage. The 2 hostages were set free in the night between the 30th and 31st, unharmed. Despite having initiated activities in the area, Concern was after this incident unable to harness sufficient assurance for safe humanitarian access for their staff in Walikale and subsequently suspended its activities for 3 months in both the Walikale and Masisi Territories while a review of the incident and a security and risk assessment was conducted. As a result of that analysis the ECHO/ Irish Aid co-funded program received a no cost extension from May to July 2016 and moved all operations to the Masisi territory. The OFDA grant has been implemented within the initial timeframe.

1.3 Purpose and scope of evaluation

The intention of the evaluation is to assess to what degree the program and methodology have been successful in achieving the established results and objectives as laid out in the programme proposal and to identify future programme options to provide sustainable assistance to IDPs and returnees. Information gained will be used in order to establish better practice and help formulate new interventions in the Masisi area. Specifically the evaluation is being undertaken to;

-Assess progress made towards the achievement of *objectives, indicators and targets* and appropriateness of the targeting strategy used in this context. Compare approaches to targeting by Concern Worldwide and other agencies and to what extent there is coherence across the sector in approaches.

-Support the organisation's commitments to accountability to donors, government, public, and beneficiaries through publication of the evaluation report to inform the decisions and actions resulting from findings.

-Using the DAC criteria, assess the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability of the project.

-Identify lessons learned and provide practical and innovative programme options for assisting IDPs/returnees in a sustainable manner based on integration and/or relocation.

The results of the evaluation should give an answer to the following questions:

1. The level of community involvement in the programme from design through to implementation
2. Concern's adherence to key standards including The Red Cross Code of Conduct, Sphere Standards and People in Aid as well as compliance with Cluster guidelines.
3. Whether the objectives were met within the stated timeframe.

⁹ Peter Crichton, Security Advisor (September 2014, May 2015, July 2016)

4. Evaluate the relevance, efficiency and impact of implementation (in terms of approach chosen and resources available and used, including choice of cash, voucher markets etc.).
5. Assess the appropriateness of targeting methodologies used for each programme component, in terms of reaching the most vulnerable and conflict affected households, and assess the degree to which intervention was successful in targeting and having a positive impact on women.
6. Assess whether Concern's actions added value in a cost efficient manner to the broader humanitarian response.
7. Examine the appropriateness of such a response for the current and future interventions.

1.4 Methodology

The evaluation has been based on a multi-faceted methodology and has taken place in three stages.

Desk Review

A home based desk review consisting of relevant program documentation and contextual information has been conducted. A list of the documentation reviewed at the stage of the inception report can be found in Annex 1. During the desk review an inception report detailing the implementation plan for the evaluation was completed. The material for the desk review has expanded during the evaluation as new material has become available.

The Field methodology

The evaluator travelled to Goma/ Masisi to conduct the field research, 17 of the total 27 working days were spent travelling or in the field. An overview of the timeframe can be seen in Annex 2. The methodology consisted of a combination of structured interviews, semi-structured interviews, open discussions, observation and documentation review. A great flaw in the evaluation is that due to security developments, **no beneficiary consultations were conducted**. The initial plan was to spend 4 to 5 days amongst the Concern beneficiaries and there conduct various focus group discussions, household visits and various verification activities, the respective questionnaires had been developed and subsequently translated by Ulua Popol, the Masisi M&E officer designated to accompany the evaluator. Unfortunately, once in Masisi, Youth groups decided to demonstrate and while doing so required that no NGOs would move by vehicle nor foot in the area. Hence, the Masisi field visit was shortened from 10 days to 6. The full 6 days were spent hibernating in the Concern guesthouse where Key informant interviews were held with the Concern Masisi staff.

Hence, the entire evaluation is based on a desk review, key informant interviews with Concern staff and external partners such as NGOs and UN agencies. No verification has been done of distribution records, tally sheets for trainings, PDMs, visual observation of completed activities as there was no access to the Concern office in Masisi. No communication has been had with beneficiaries in regards to their own experience of the program such as involvement in design, targeting, delivery of assistance, follow-up, complaints response mechanism.

Instead, an increased amount of key informant interviews were held, a total of 12 interviews with Concern staff and 18 interviews with external actors in both Goma and Masisi. For the Concern staff, anonymity was offered, they were free to express their honest opinions without being quoted or identified through the information provided. Notes from each meeting are kept with the evaluator but will not be made public. A full list of the external interviews can be found in Annex 3.

Post- field analysis

The compilation of the report has been home based, a total of 6 days were allocated for the consultant to analyse and review data collected and prepare a draft and subsequently a final report. The program has been assessed by viewing the targets set in the program documents with the achievements reported in the program reports to the various donors.

The information collection and analysis of the information has been done in an impartial manner, even though the evaluator has previously worked with Concern in 2011/ 2012, every effort has been made to ensure that the data-gathering and analysis approach uses procedures that would not intentionally or inadvertently result in biased or misleading findings. However, the results should be viewed with a healthy scepticism as there are important components missing in the methodology, such as visual verification, beneficiary interaction and potential lack of program documentation and information.

1.4.1 Structure of report

Section 1 contains an introduction to the program and frames the context and the methodology used. Section 2 will focus on the results of the program evaluation. The third section looks at potential strategy options and a discussion on current program/ humanitarian challenges. Lastly, the fourth section summaries the conclusions and the recommendations.

As stated in the Terms of Reference, the DAC criteria of relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability will be used to structure the report. In humanitarian evaluations it is also common to include connectedness, coherence and coverage. However, as both OECD/DAC and ALNAP have repeatedly expressed, their whole lists of criteria should not be mechanically used in every evaluation¹⁰.

The main focus of this program evaluation will be on the **Effectiveness** of the program, as there we will go through the achievement or non-achievement of the program objectives and the potential reasons for their success or failures. Secondly we will examine the **Relevance/ Appropriateness** of the program and also look very briefly at the **Sustainability**. Unfortunately, there is not enough results to look at the **Impact** of the program; the questions to ask while examining Impact are; what has happened as a result of the programme or project? What real difference has the activity made to the beneficiaries? As there has been no beneficiary interaction and no field verification during this evaluation, this cannot be answered. In addition the **Efficiency** aspect which measures the outputs – qualitative and quantitative – achieved as a result of the inputs will not be addressed. This generally requires comparing alternative approaches to achieving an output, to see whether the most efficient approach has been used. As it is not within the scope of this evaluation to find and analyse comparison data, then this will have to be left out.

In regards to crosscutting issues there are eight cross-cutting themes which should be considered when using the DAC criteria: local context; human resources; protection; participation of primary stakeholders coping strategies and resilience; gender equality; HIV/AIDS; and the environment.

¹⁰ http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/evaluation/2007/humanitarian_guide.pdf

Again, not all crosscutting issues need to be addressed in each evaluation, the focus for this evaluation will be on Protection/ Gender and Accountability.

2. Evaluation findings

2.1 Effectiveness

In order to examine the effectiveness of the Masisi program and to assess to which extent the objectives have been achieved or are likely to be achieved, the objectives will need to be separated by donor and duration.

2.1.1 Emergency program OFDA 2013-2016

The OFDA funding for this timeframe is separated into 3 different proposals, one per annum and named Phase I, II and III by Concern. The OFDA program funds primarily new arrival NFI kits, quarterly renewal hygiene kits, NFI voucher fairs and to some extent protection activities in a total of 10 camps, with some beneficiary and activity variations during the 3 annual program phases. This analysis is based on the proposal for each phase, the respective final reports for Phase I and Phase II and for Phase III; the first 2 quarterly reports for 2016 and key informant interviews with the staff.

A challenge in evaluating the first 2 phases of the funding is that hardly any of the staff remain the same, expat and national. In addition, files are missing from computers which leaves further gaps in assessing the results of the objectives. Furthermore, the complex reporting sequence has made it challenging to extrapolate the achievements per phase. The annual reporting has followed the OFDA reporting cycle and not the funding cycle which means that the Phases overlap in the reporting. The results reported in the annual report for the first phase are for 15 months and not for 12, including activities from September 2013 throughout November 2014. This is done even though the second funding phase started in September 2014. This has repercussions for the results of the set objectives for all 3 phases of funding as the reporting period for Phase II has been December 2014 until November 2015 and as the program was suspended for November and December of 2015, in effect the Phase II annual reporting has covered activities until January of 2016. This impacts the Phase III program, as technically it only leaves the Phase III 8 months of implementation time. Hence, getting a clear picture as to if the objectives have been met and have been met in time, is challenging.

2.1.1.1 Phase I

Phase I; September 2013 to August 2014, Budget; 1,215,556 \$

OFDA Grants 2013-2014 Results								
	Number of people assisted through economic asset restoration activities.	Number of people employed through Cash-for-Work (CFW) activities	Kilometres of roads rehabilitated through Cash-for-Work (CFW) activities	Total number of NFIs, new arrival kits distributed	Quarterly renewal kits	\$30 vouchers for annual renewal	Number of people trained in protection	Number of communities with Community Protection Action Plans in place and number of aspects implemented:
Target	4.050	1.800	36	1.800	25.000	6.000	120	10
Achieved	5.143	1.861	41,9	1.094	15.415	5.359	32	4
% achieve	127%	101%	117%	61%	61%	89%	27%	40%

The results for Phase I are well within an acceptable level, it needs to be kept in mind though, as was mentioned above, that these results represents a 15 month implementation period and not 12. It is primarily the new arrival kits and the quarterly renewal kits which are not meeting the target. The main reason for that was a reduction in camp arrivals and registered names being put forward for assistance by UNHCR. There is also the issues of the Protection committees, due to reported security developments the activity has been left until the end of the implementation period and was only started at a time where the Phase II implementation period had commenced. By September 2014, 4 out of the intended 10 villages had been identified to participate in this activity and it was then merged with the Phase II objective.

2.1.1.2 Phase II

Phase II September 2014 to August 2015, Budget; 1,151,682 \$

OFDA Grants 2014-2015 Results								
	Number of HH assisted through livelihood restoration activities	Number of people employed through Cash-for-Work (CFW) activities	Kilometres of roads rehabilitated through Cash-for-Work (CFW) activities	New arrival kits	Quarterly renewal kits	\$30 vouchers for annual renewal	Number of people trained in Early Warning Systems/Protection	Number of communities with Early Warning Systems/ protection plans in place
Target	3.500	1.800	36	1.896	21.792	5.000	120	10
Achieved	2.558	2.223	41,9 reported. Same as Phase 1. Many bridge and rehabilitation projects done.	1.101	26.415	0	207	10
% achieve	73%	124%		58%	121%	0%	172%	100%

The results for Phase II are slightly puzzling. Despite the funding period of 09/14-08/15, the reporting is for 12/15-01/16 and included in the reporting are activities which technically would fall within the Phase III implementation and reporting period. The issue which stands out the most for the Phase II implementation would be the lack of the 30\$ annual voucher fair for 5.000 HH, it did not take place during the reporting period. The annual report claims that it will be implemented in May 2016, something which has not been done. The reason for this is an accumulative underfunding for a voucher fair to take place in each of the three phases. The confusing structure between an annual proposal for each year, an accumulative budget and accumulative reporting means that the underfunding was discovered too late by the team in order to correct the situation and implement three voucher fairs. The voucher fair implemented in 2016 was done so as an activity in the Phase III program meaning that only two of the intended three voucher fairs have taken place.

The number of people employed in CASH for work also have conflicting reporting, in the annual report it states that 229 beneficiaries and several hundred daily and skilled labourers received cash for work assistance, while the ABACUS reporting list 2.223. This evaluation does not have the necessary information to determine which report is correct.

The Road Rehabilitation is a confusing report with the exact same figure reported for Phase I and Phase II, 41,9 km. In fact, the annual report for both years is identical which leads to the assumption that no additional kilometres of road have been rehabilitated in Phase II. There is an important distinction though which needs to be made for the road rehabilitation activity, there might not have been many km of road rehabilitated in Phase II, and the reported achievement seems to be accumulated with the phase 1 result. Yet, the program had a visit from the HQ infrastructure adviser during the implementation period and the team has reported to have rehabilitated 15 bridges and

crossings which were not specified in the proposal document¹¹. With that in mind the funds within the activity seems to have been well spent during Phase II.



Photo Concern 2015

The livelihoods restoration activities are slightly under target at 73% and like in Phase I, the new arrival kits are significantly under target with a 58% result. This again is due to the over estimation of beneficiaries identified by UNHCR. Lastly, the Protection objective has reached its target, it needs to be kept in mind there that the Phase II result also includes the Phase I results as this activity had barely started in the Phase I implementation timeframe and the due to security constraints as outlined above.


2.1.1.3 Phase III

Phase III September 2015 to August 2016, Budget; 1,163,677 \$

¹¹ Tom Dobbin, Infrastructure Advisor (August 2014, June 2015)

	New arrival kits	HH to participate in annual 35\$ voucher renewal fair	Quarterly renewal kits	Number of HH given Shelter construction training
Target	1.400	9.629	9.629	800
Achieved	964	August 2016 implementation	7.093	August 2016 implementation
% achieved	69%		74%	

The Phase III component of the OFDA funded program was at the time of this evaluation still in progress and in its last month of implementation. As previously mentioned, the Phase II project reports a full 4 months into the Phase III component, leaving a short implementation time for Phase III. Despite this, the Phase III component includes fewer activities compared to the previous years. Due to the staff kidnapping in October 2015 the program was suspended for 3 months, with no activity in November and December of 2015, and January of 2016. The program did not have the possibility to apply for a no cost extension for the OFDA program, this was possible for the ECHO/ Irish Aid project. The program has been implemented in a total of 10 IDP camps on the road from Masisi to Nyabiondo in the Masisi territory.



The completed activities at the time of writing is the quarterly renewal kits which were distributed in 2 double distributions, one in February and one in May. The first double distribution was done to make up for the initial delay during the suspension and the second double distribution was due to time management. It has not been gauged if the two double distributions within such a short

timeframe has impacted the beneficiary ability to store the items, no complaints have been received on the issue and no PDM was undertaken.

The estimation of the new arrival kits is targeted above the result, this time reaching 69%. With the possibility of some additional kits being distributed in August. The international procurement for the kit contents was 5 months delayed, both due to the suspension of the program and administrative challenges leading to a delay in distributing kits during the former part of the implementation period, close to 500 kits are still in storage.

The Shelter objective

The Phase III proposal contains a second objective; Shelter and settlements. This objective contains a shelter training activity which is linked to the NFI renewal fair. The structure of the objective is based on OFDA requirements to be a standalone objective due to the inclusion of plastic sheeting in the first objective, Logistics support/ Relief commodities. The structure of the proposal in this manner is confusing, both for the team and external observers, as it initially appears that the program is running a shelter component in addition to the NFI support and the plastic sheeting is included both as an NFI activity and a Shelter activity. OFDA should consider revising their requirements in this area to facilitate a simplified program overview.

Regarding the shelter objective and the NFI fair, these activities have been delayed and are being implemented within the last days of the program period. For the shelter training the plan seems to be to train 400HH before the fair and 400HH after the fair. As the purpose of the training is to encourage beneficiaries to buy shelter materials during the fair, holding such trainings after the fair defeats the purpose. In addition, the sheer number of households scheduled for each training is not in accordance with good practice in order to facilitate absorption of the matters being thought. However, there is a secondary value in increasing the general shelter construction awareness among the community which was also part of the objective of the training.

2.1.1.4 Monitoring of all three phases of the OFDA funding

Due to the security circumstances during the evaluation field visit no verification was possible of any program documentation, PDMs, tally sheets, visual observation of completed activities such as road rehabilitation etc. In addition, the field staff were tasked to identify former beneficiaries who had been targeted during the first 2 phases of the OFDA funding. Unfortunately this was impossible to achieve during the hibernation.

For the first two Phases of the program, the only information to base this evaluation on comes from the respective annual reports. A challenge the program faces is also the frequent staff turnover and the lack of good information management. Various documents are missing and most likely there is a higher level of monitoring which has been done but where the proof is lacking in the format of documents. Hence the monitoring of most indicators cannot be verified, such as;

-Percentage of beneficiaries reporting their livelihoods restored within three to six months after receiving support

For the Phase I program it has been entered in the ABACUS reporting that 93% of beneficiaries have reported that their livelihoods had been restored. There is no monitoring document available to confirm this information at this stage other than the reporting entry. For Phase II and III there is no

responding data for this indicator. On a side note, the sheer inclusion of this indicator could be questioned, OFDA requires this indicator to be included. The assumption that that emergency response interventions in a protracted conflict with repeated displacement should and could restore people's livelihoods is unlikely and the inclusion of this indicator in future emergency programming should be revised.

Each of the three funding cycle states within the proposal;

- At the beginning of the program cycle a baseline survey of 10% of the beneficiary population will be carried out that will establish the overall situation of beneficiary households with regard to household assets, security, food security, income generation and access to land. This survey will be complemented by a post-fair evaluation and an end term survey at the end of the program to monitor longer-term impacts.

A baseline was done for the 2014 Phase I program cycle and some PDMs were conducted during this time as well, these are only accessible in raw data format. There is the possibility of PDM reports and an endline to exist. The program is not able to locate documents. For Phase II and Phase III there are no baselines available and no endline for Phase I and II. The North Kivu program has a baseline for the ECHO/ Irish Aid funded component of the program, it does not include information from camp based populations which are the OFDA program target.

Post distribution exit interviews during the Voucher Fairs has been implemented in all stages. Each funding cycle has had one large voucher fair and to some extent, smaller fairs relating to the livelihoods objective. No PDM has taken place for the new arrival kits distributions and the Quarterly renewal kit distribution. That is not to say that beneficiaries have not been informed and sensitised in regards to these activities, but we have no way of knowing their opinion on the activities, if they have been supportive, appropriate, of high quality and meet the needs of the beneficiaries.

In the Phase II annual report it states in regards to the Protection activity that; *"In total, 10 focus groups were carried out. Overall, 100% of FGDs suggested that protection activities had overall had a positive impact in their communities, with the majority highlighting the positive impact of referral mechanisms put in place, in addition to an overall increase in awareness, and crucially, respect for human rights amongst various groups and actors within target communities."*¹²No monitoring documents can be found by the team confirming this information, which does not mean it does not exist, it simply cannot be located after staff turnover.

The result of this evaluation shows that the Concern Masisi program needs to do a review of how activities are monitored and who is in charge of conducting them. While discussing this situation with the team, it is clear that there has been a progressive falling behind in monitoring during the last year. Focus has been on implementing activities to the greatest extent possible. The M&E officer has been fully incorporated into activity implementation.

It also shows that there is a need to review information management systems and ensure that program computers are regularly backed up and that documents do not disappear with the staff.

¹² Concern Masisi Final report OFDA Phase II, page 10.

2.1.2 Emergency Program ECHO/ Irish Aid co-funded 2015-2016

The co-funded ECHO and Irish Aid program has focused on targeting displaced beneficiaries residing among host populations and the program activities have been a multi-sectoral fair with the addition of a livelihoods component, hygiene promotion and road rehabilitation. Though the project is co-funded there are slight differences in the respective log-frames and a results table will be presented for both donors, with linkages between co-funded activities. The implementation period for the project has been May 2015-April 2016, however a 3 month no cost extension was approved, extending the ECHO funded program until the 24th of July 2016 and the HPP component to the 31st of August 2016.

2.1.2.1 The Walikale program


The ECHO/ Irish Aid program is the program which has been most significantly affected by the kidnapping in Walikale and the subsequent closure of activities in that territory. Although the initial proposal indicated programming to be implemented in both Masisi and Walikale territories, the initial assessments indicated a higher level of need in Walikale and the Concern team decided to put all of its efforts into Walikale. Activities were not started until July, at which time the first assessment teams were sent to Walikale, the reasons given for this delay has been that the team was tied up with implementing other projects. Questions have been raised by ECHO as to what the team has been doing during the first 6 months of the implementation period. The following is what the team has reported through their monthly reports;

May	N/A
June	Logistics and security assessment in Walikale territory
July	-Development of targeting methodology paper. -Village targeting assessment and program evaluation in Walikale. -Recruitment of the team continues.
August	-Identification of a potential sub-base in Kibua. -Targeting paper finalized and shared with ECHO Kivu. -Focus group discussions and visits to individual agricultural plots in order to finalize agricultural programme strategy for the 2015-2016 programme cycle.
September	-Population count in 9 villages on the Walikale-Kibua axis; 1,276 people were counted against the 3,000 targeted; -Identification of demonstration fields in the 9 abovementioned villages (Walikale-Kibua axis); -Market analysis in Kibua and in the surroundings to identify IGA activities to be implemented and the capacity of existing businessmen to provide supplies during the NFI fares; -Evaluation of WASH needs on the Kibua axis through Focus Group Discussions; -Development of a WASH strategy with the support of the WASH IAPF team from Katanga; -MoU drafted between Concern and ZdS; -Finalization of 2 bridges in Shoa and Kazinga, and handover to committees to ensure their maintenance.
October	-Targeting and count of beneficiaries in 5 villages in Walikale. Beneficiaries' lists published. -Complaints collected after the publication of the beneficiaries' lists and tokens distributed in 9 villages in Walikale. -13 plant nurseries created in 13 demo-gardens. Tools and seeds were distributed and 13 Village Development Committees were formed to monitor and follow up agricultural activities. -Monitoring visit from ECHO during the last week of October in Walikale.

The common thread in all of the activities above is preparation, the Concern team had not operated in the Walikale area before and were starting from scratch with every aspect of the program. With the kidnapping of the Concern staff in by the end of October and the subsequent program suspension in November and December, come February 2016, the Concern team was anew starting from the beginning with this program, except now with the implementation taking place in Masisi. New assessments, new beneficiaries, new targeting and new sensitisation.

In January 2016 Concern presented an excellent baseline study and analysis, looking at communities in both Walikale and Masisi. This must have been in process of being produced in the preceding months as it is a quite comprehensive study and a good basis for the subsequent programming in Masisi. However, in view of the development and in regards to results, the period from May to February is mostly lost within the project framework as no progress has been made towards the targets in this period.

2.1.2.2. The Masisi Program



The Masisi activities have been implemented in the Boabo-Banyungu and Nyabiondo-Lukweti axes where a total of 17 villages are targeted. Due to the small size of the villages they do not appear on maps, the map above gives an estimation as to where the beneficiaries are located. Although the project is co-funded between ECHO and Irish Aid, the results against the objectives will be displayed by donor as there is a slight variation between the proposals. A major challenge in the program has been the short implementation period. Despite a no cost extension of 3 months, there were no changes in the results of the program which has been challenging for the team and which has had programmatic quality consequences.

2.1.2.3 The ECHO funded Masisi program

The program has a budget 624.980,00 € and is divided into 3 results consisting of a Multisectoral fair, a livelihoods program and improved hygiene practices. This program is still operational, final monitoring is taking place and a final report will be presented in October 2016. The reporting which has been done toward these targets are in the midterm report and the results in the data below come from the key informant interviews with the program management and have yet to be verified.

Result 1

Result 1; Improved access of conflict-affected households to non-productive assets through NFI/shelter assistance	Activity 1; Household targeting	Activity 2; Market survey	Activity 3; Consultations on protection risks and protective strategies	Activity 4: Trader selection	Activity 5; Voucher fairs, closed fair model	Activity 6; Training for local tradesmen and vulnerable families on improved construction practices
Target	2600 HH	Implemented in Walikale, light touch in Masisi	2600HH		2600 HH + 800 HH Irish Aid	400 HH before the fair
Achieved		Walikae	Not done as a separate activity, included in the regular sensitization activities.		3434 HH	400 HH
% achieved	100%	50% + Masisi		100%	101%	100%

Activity 1- The targeting within this objective is an issue which has raised controversy, the targeting level was 94% of the community. This issue is discussed in detail in the section, [2.2.3 The Targeting Modality](#), in this document.

Activity 2- A market survey was planned to guide the activity to ensure that monetary influx would have a positive impact on the market. As this was initially done in Walikale where the activity was ultimately not implemented, it is difficult to measure the output of this activity. Although, a light touch market analysis was apparently done in Masisi. The team did FGDs on both axes to analyse viable livelihood options, analyse prices etc. The formulation of the findings were not initially entered into a formal document although, according to the team, they were used to guide the activity. The findings are now available in a document.

Activity 3-The specific activity on protection consultations were included as a part of the general community consultation/ sensitisation process According to the team, deliberate protection strategies have been implemented, such as the provision of transportation for the most vulnerable groups, and community members deciding to travel to and from the fair site in mixed sex groups. The fair was implemented on a regular market day so that the beneficiaries could blend in with other regular shoppers. The team has now compiled a report on the approach.

Activity 4- This has been done. No complaints have been received from traders in regards to the selection, they can complain by phone or through their syndicate should they not be satisfied with the selection.

Activity 5- As the progression towards results only began in February 2016 after the suspension and after the changes of operational area, the implementation of the activities have taken place relatively late in the program cycle, the fair was held in June/ July 2016. However, in regards to reaching the target, indeed a Multisectoral fair has been implemented and has been perceived by the Concern staff to have been very successful. As no beneficiary consultation took place during this evaluation and as no Post Distribution Monitoring had been completed during the evaluation, it remains to be seen what the beneficiary satisfaction level is. The Concern Masisi team, in general, are very proud of the results towards this objective and perceived it to be one of their most successful activities during the year.

One issue that needs to be elaborated on in the final report though is the change from a closed fair to an open fair. The proposal states; *“Concern adopted an open market approach in both 2013 and*

2014 but found that this model produced mixed results and therefore returned to the closed fair model in the second half of 2014.local traders appeared to have analysed the process and collaborated to control the products available - offering fewer items than originally agreed to use up old stock or only selling those items which offered them the most profitable mark up. It became clear during the course of the market that a small cartel of traders, organized by the Chef du Marche were influencing the procurement and sales during the fair. Given this experience, Concern decided to revert to a closed fair approach for subsequent fairs.”¹³ Concern ultimately decided to implement an open fair, it would be interesting to document what actions have been taken in order to reduce the risk for manipulation by the traders. During this evaluation the issue was not discussed sufficiently and conclusions cannot be made.

Activity 6- This activity was implemented as planned, the training took place in both Lukweti and Banyungo axes before the fair. A training was held with 4-5 beneficiaries from each target village (17) in Masisi Centre along with Concern staff. The training was conducted by a shelter expert from the Concern Manono program, 400 people were trained in total. No monitoring was done after this activity so there is no way to evaluate the quality or the usefulness of the training. As the PDM from the fair is not completed at this stage, we cannot evaluate if the training has influenced the purchase of shelter materials at the fair.

Result 2

Result 2; Improved livelihoods of conflict-affected households through livelihood assistance (asset building and capacity building)	Activity 1; Market (including labour market) analysis	Activity 2; Consumption support and training (agricultural/ non-agricultural)	Activity 3; Cash/asset transfers in support of HH productive strategies	Activity 4; Post-distribution monitoring
Target		2080 HH ECHO, 800 HH added from HPP	520HH ECHO, 340 HH HPP	
Achieved	0	3084	364 HH	Partially done
% achieved	0%	107%	70%	

Activity 1-This activity refers to Activity 2 under Result 1. Various efforts were undertaken although not formally documented initially. At the time of this evaluation the data was not initially available although the report has now been compiled. The question remains to what extent the analysis has guided the design of the intervention, according to the team the understanding of the situation was in place despite it not having been inserted into a document.

Activity 2 and 3- This activity has been implemented and the targets have been met. Beneficiaries without access to land were not given seeds and tools as assets, but rather the equivalent amount in voucher form for an Income Generation Activity Fair (separate from the NFI fair) to support “productive strategy” – IGA training was attached to this, as best practices training through demonstration plots was connected to the seeds and tools distribution.

¹³ Concern ECHO proposal page 12.

In addition a Seeds and Tools distribution took place in April, for the beneficiaries with access to land. The timing of the distribution was quite late in relation to the planting season, yet according to the PDM conducted in the Banyungo axis, 80% of the beneficiaries claimed that they got the seeds in time for planting. Issues have been raised in regards to the location of the distributions, beneficiaries have had to walk for up to 5 hours to reach the Concern office in Masisi where the distribution took place. According to the PDM conducted after this distribution, there was no shade and no water provided while waiting. As the PDM has not been done for the Nyabiondo-Lukweti axis, this cannot be evaluated further, an analysis of this should be a part of the final report.

The targets for the Special Protection transfers to HH without land and access to labour differ in the ECHO and the HPP logframes, a total of 364 HH were provided with this transfer. The Masisi staff expressed satisfaction with the implementation of this activity and that the results have been an added value to the community. It was mentioned by the staff, that beneficiaries were not happy with the decision to divide the payments, rather than a 20\$ pay out, they twice got 10\$ etc. An amount they felt too small to use in any real form of investment. As there has not been any beneficiary interaction in this evaluation this has not been confirmed by the beneficiaries. The reason for this division was based on security for both staff and beneficiaries as the team felt the total amount of money carried was too high.

Activity 4- The monitoring will be discussed separately below.

Result 3

Results 3: Improved good hygiene knowledge and practices amongst vulnerable IDPs and host families in conflict-affected communities in Masisi and Walikale	Activity 1; Barrier analysis	Activity 2; Distribution of key household hygiene items to households with children under 5. hygiene NFI kits (<u>water containers, hand washing soap, mosquito bed nets and basic materials for hand washing station</u>)	Activity 3: Hygiene promotion	<i>Activity 3 addition:</i> Hygiene promotion, Two Knowledge, Attitude and Practise Studies done during baseline and endline.
Target		2000HH	4500HH	2
Achieve		1953 HH, no mosquitonets, no handwashing station.	3825HH	1 KAP done during baseline, 1 planned for the endline.
% achieved	0%	97%	85%	

Activity 1- As far as can be determined, there is no documentation on the barrier analysis, neither in Walikale nor Masisi. However, it is confirmed that a staff member from Concern’s WASH team in Manono, Tanganyika province came to conduct the analysis, however the document with the potential analysis has not been located. As there is no document one can assume that the analysis would not have been used to design the WASH intervention although findings may have been communicated verbally.

Activity 2- The activity has been partially implemented. The targeting criteria were changed to only include households with 2 children under 5 as keeping to 1 would have meant supporting 2600HH and the budget only allowed for a maximum of 2000. Due to a government blanket distribution of mosquito nets, and the request for other actors to not distribute nets during this time, these have not been distributed. They have been purchased and are kept in storage. For reasons not clarified, the handwashing station material has neither been purchased nor distributed. Looking at the activity, the changing of the targeting criteria, in view of the outstanding materials in the kit, might not be justified.

Activity 3- In terms of numbers this activity is close to being fulfilled with an 85% results rate. The initial activity, before the NCE, included a hard-WASH component such as building demonstration latrines but this was taken out. The activity has been implemented by staff training people in villages on the importance of hand washing, usage of a latrine, safe drinking water etc. The major challenge with this activity has been that this is being done in areas where, according to the Concern baseline, people do not have access to safe water, and they have no soap and a limited access to latrines. Out of all the Concern Masisi activities this is the one expressed by all staff to be the least successful. As previously mentioned, no beneficiary interaction was possible during this evaluation so the staff perspective is the only indication, there is no beneficiary perspective with which we can determine the value of this activity.

Activity 4- This is in the process of being implemented, a first KAP study was done as a part of the baseline. A second KAP study will be done as a part of the endline.

2.1.2.4 The Irish Aid funded Masisi program

The ECHO and Irish Aid program is co-funded with the Irish aid contribution to budget being 450,000 €. There are very little differences between their logframes. In order to give the full overview the Results table for Irish Aid is shown below, only the activities not already covered in the ECHO overview will be discussed.

HPP 2015-2016			
1 Improved access of conflict-affected households to non-productive assets through NFI/shelter assistance	3,400 HH have access to culturally appropriate NFIs through voucher fairs	400 HH receive training in improved shelter construction techniques	400 displaced households in host communities and unofficial camps receive emergency NFI support
Target	800 HH in addition to the 2600 HH in ECHO	Same as ECHO	1800 KITS IN TOTAL TOGETHER WITH OFDA, 900 DISTRIBUTED, 400 IN STORE, 500 NOT PURCHASED
Achieve	3.434	400HH	0
% achieved	101%	100%	0%
2 Improved livelihoods of conflict-affected households through livelihood assistance (asset and capacity building)	3060 HHs receive training on agricultural or non-agricultural best practices to develop productive strategies	3060 HHs receive an asset transfer/voucher to support productive strategy	340 HHs most vulnerable receive two "social protection" cash transfers
Target	Same as ECHO	Same as ECHO	340, 520 in ECHO
Achieve			
% achieved	100%	100%	100%

Results 1- The main issue to address in this result is that no kits have been provided to displaced households in host communities. The result has a budget for 400 kits, they have been purchased but not distributed at the time of this evaluation. The plan is to complete the activity before the end of the program.

Results 2-All activities have been implemented and are elaborated on in the ECHO section.

3 Improved hygiene and sanitation in conflict-affected communities through improved household water and sanitation management	2000 HH take part in community hygiene promotion activities	Distribution of key household hygiene items to 2000 HH with children under 5
Target	Included in the ECHO 4500 HH	2.000
Achieve		1.953
% achieved	100%	97%

Results 3- This is the same activity as in Results 3 in the ECHO program and has been completed.

4 Improved access for humanitarian agencies to remote areas through emergency road rehabilitation interventions	10km of roads rehabilitated	10 emergency road rehabilitation activities carried out	500 beneficiaries take part in CFW activities
Target	10		
Achieve	18	N/A	N/A
% achieved	180%		

Results 4- Irish Aid is the only donor for the continuous road rehabilitations and the cash for work component. The data is not yet in for the number of emergency rehabilitations nor the number of beneficiaries employed. The final report will have to determine the success of this. The emergency repairs are much appreciated by other organisations moving in the area, the road repairs by nature of the approach have a very short viability. A complaint which has been raised by the staff is that it is difficult to achieve substantial results by having vulnerable beneficiaries implementing the road rehabilitation, such as pregnant women and older people. Without having the data for the number of beneficiaries involved and a segregation of gender etc. it is impossible to draw any conclusion from this and this would be an issue for the team to look into. This issue has been raised in previous evaluations, there has to be a different targeting system for the cash for work component then the regular extreme vulnerability criteria. It is possible to structure the activity into a different format, targeting youth as an example within a protection framework to prevent them from joining armed groups.

2.1.2.5 Monitoring of the ECHO and Irish Aid program

Like previously mentioned, due to the security circumstances during the evaluation field visit no visual verification was possible of any program documentation, PDMs, tally sheets, visual observation of completed activities such as road rehabilitation etc. and no interaction was had with beneficiaries. As the ECHO/ Irish Aid program is still in implementation in regards to the monitoring, a final

conclusion cannot be made as to the extent and quality of the monitoring. However, what is evident is that the monitoring has not been executed as planned and as regular throughout the program. It is the same situation as with the OFDA program, the team has focused all its efforts on implementing the activities and as a consequence the quality aspect of the program has suffered. The sequencing of grants has proved challenging, the team struggles to complete one grant within their timeframe, which can then cause delays in other grants and the sequence continues.

On the positive note, the program does have a good quality baseline to measure up against while performing the scheduled endline. Two PDMs have been completed as of yet, one for the Boabo-Banyungu axis Seeds and Tools distribution and one for the Banyungo Axis Special Protection Cash distribution which was implemented simultaneously with the seeds distribution. These distributions were completed in April. The PDMs have not been executed in the Nyabiondo-Lukweti axis for the same distributions. The reason given for this is insecurity and difficulty accessing the area. When security temporarily improved, the team prioritised to implement the fair with hopes that the opportunity would arise for the PDMs at a later stage. The PDMs for the Multisectoral fair is in process in all the implementation areas.

The KAP studies are a part of the baseline and the endline. The hygiene promotion aspect has been followed up by community volunteers who visit 15 families each which would give the opportunity to get the beneficiary perspective on the hygiene promotion. The proposals does not contain any requirements for documented follow up monitoring of the various trainings nor for the Cash for work, road rehabilitation component which is monitored by a Programme Assistant and a Road Engineer to ensure high quality.

There is a possibility for the team to complete the required monitoring before the end of the project. Security considerations will have the final say in that regard. Like already discussed in the OFDA program section, monitoring is an activity which has not been given full attention. Focus has been on implementing activities to the greatest extent possible while other obligations have been allowed to slip. The M&E officer has been fully incorporated into activity implementation. There is a need for improvement in this area, the designated M&E staff need to be allowed to carry out their duties and if there is lack of capacity in the program in general, this will need to be covered in another manner.

The result of this evaluation clearly shows that the Concern Masisi program needs to do a review of how activities are monitored and who is in charge of conducting them.

2.1.3 The major factors influencing the achievement or non-achievement of the objectives

2.1.3.1 *Achieving the objectives*

It is in the nature of an evaluation to look for the non-achievement of the objectives. The natural progression of a well-functioning program is that all set objectives are achieved and that is not something to highlight or address further. If we take a holistic look at the Concern Masisi program, the strength of the program is to implement fairs. The community mobilisation, the logistical planning and the engagement of the right actors consistently lead to successful fairs. The current result is in accordance with former evaluations who view the Concern approach to voucher/ cash distributions to be very effective and highly appreciated by the community.

The major factors which support the high achievement in the sphere of fairs is the long term fair implementation in the area, the institutional memory on behalf of the traders and the potential awareness of the beneficiaries as this type of activity has been taking place since 2004. The established logistical set-up with the Goma office and the services of Handicap International very much facilitates a repeatable logistical operation. The significant collection of assessments, evaluations and research done throughout the years in the Masisi area have equipped the team with a wealth of knowledge and experience available to all new staff.

2.1.3.2 Non-achievement of the objectives

The non-achievement aspect, although it can be experienced as critical, contains learning for the organisation and is important to include, looking at the reasons for the objectives not being achieved as they were set out to do. The Masisi program has faced a number of challenges which have had implications for the implementation of the programs.

-First and foremost is the security aspect. Repeated insecurities reduce the access to beneficiaries, and repeated small incidents can have a serious impact on an activity. Missing a day or 3 here and there can lead to significant delays and the need to keep re-planning and re-organising, not only the planned activity in question but ultimately the entire schedule, which quickly impacts the whole program. On the other hand, that is the nature of running humanitarian programs in a conflict zone and it might be argued that after 12 years of operating in the same environment, Concern would be good at phasing the programs in order to adapt to this reality. The kidnapping in Walikale did however have a major impact on the team and on the programs for the last year. This is the first time Concern has had to deal with such an incident and it has had a huge psychological impact on the team and in practical terms it has been challenging for the team to regain control of the program once operational again.

-Infrastructure, both in terms of transportation of people and materials on atrocious roads which are near to impassable large parts of the year and limited cellular communications affecting the function of mobiles and computers, significantly impacts the program in a negative manner and has a large effect on the timeliness of the program.

-Staff turnover. This is in my perspective the major factor in the various non-achievements of both the OFDA and the ECHO/ Irish Aid program. Since 2013 until the time of this evaluation, there has been either as contracted staff or temporary surge positions;

- 3 Emergency Program Managers
- 6 Area Coordinators
- 4 Program Directors
- 3 Systems Directors (same person twice with time in between, and no one for a while)
- 5 Country Directors

Although one could hope that there would be the institutional memory of the national staff participating in the implementation, the reality is that very few of the staff have been with the Concern Masisi team longer than the current funding cycle. Staff are primarily hired on a fixed term contracts which means that the institutional memory is seldom retained. The time lost in this process of staff turnover is significant and the management overview of how things are progressing will suffer. The arrival of the new Area Manager coincided with the Walikale kidnapping and a new Emergency Program Manager came into the Masisi program in February 2016, just in time to

relaunch full operations. The pressure put on these staff was massive and a very difficult challenge for them to take on. This would be the main reason that qualitative aspects of the program have not been of the standard Concern is used to operate on.

-Firefighting; the team estimates that they started to fall behind in program implementation in 2014. Since then there seems to be a continuous spiral of reacting to what the day and the situation brings rather than planning in advance and being prepared with options when things do not go according to plan. Sadly, the team did feel that they were back on track in the fall of 2015 before the kidnapping, having later on to redo the first 6 months of the ECHO/ Irish Aid had a significant impact on the entire remaining schedule for both programs. The falling behind aspect has had a continuous momentum affecting all programs and implementations. It affects the endline of one project which eats into the time for doing the baseline of the new project and the new activities to implement eat into the time of the monitoring of the already completed activities and so it goes on. The new staff are thrown into the thick of things, trying to get ahead, failing to absorb the wealth of knowledge left behind in various reports, evaluations and assessments and recreating the wheel each and every time. During the time of this evaluation this was the first time in years a full team has been in place, yet each and every one is battling time and working 16 hour days 7 days a week to try to catch up. The focus has been on the large activities, the voucher fairs and the livelihoods component, that is where the major budget lines are and smaller soft-component activities have been de-prioritised.

2.2. Relevance/ Appropriateness

Appropriateness and relevance refer to the extent to which the programme was in line with local needs. The discussion here also considers the appropriateness of the operational approach chosen and the targeting.

2.2.1 The humanitarian needs in North Kivu

When dealing with a protracted conflict, of continuous repeated displacement, year after year, within the same population group, the needs tend to stay the same. After each round of displacement, households who are forced to flee, escape with minimal belongings, and return to find homes looted, where household items are either damaged, pillaged, or lost; leaving both IDPs arriving in host communities and IDP camps, and households returning home extremely vulnerable.

The areas of WASH, Food, Health, NFIs and Shelter are the core services needed to ensure life-saving and life-sustaining assistance. Education, although important, sits slightly on the side, not being considered as indispensable for the life-saving aspect. While meeting representatives of the various clusters based in Goma, they each were asked what the priority needs are within the North Kivu area. As can be expected, they each considered the priority need to be within their own area of expertise. The WASH cluster considers WASH needs to be the most urgent, the Shelter/ NFI cluster – shelter and NFIs and so onwards. What all do agree on is that there is only gaps in North Kivu, huge gaps with the services provided being far from what is needed, in all the sectors. Hence, the old saying that you can drop a pin and find a need for humanitarian programming is very suitable for the context.

Looking at the Concern baseline for 2015/ 2016 and the data contained therein, the following is expressed¹⁴;

1. All areas exhibited poor NFI scores, with the average above 3.5 – the response threshold designated by the NFI cluster. Some villages in Masisi are showing severe acute vulnerability – with average scores of over 4. Displaced households tended to show the poorest scores, followed by returnees, residents, and host families. Qualitative interviews with individuals and focus groups in Masisi and Walikale suggested that greatest NFI needs were related to food and water storage and preparation materials and sleeping materials, in addition to agricultural tools.
2. Based upon the food consumption scorecard, which measures frequency of different food groups consumed throughout the course of a week to indicate dietary intake and diversity, scores of >35 are considered acceptable, with 21.5-34.5 borderline, and 0-21 poor. In Walikale, the baseline highlighted an average food consumption scorecard (FCS) of 22.9 (low borderline); whilst data collected from a sample on the Lukweti axis showed an average FCS of 17.8 (poor). Over 53% of households on the Walikale axis, and over 59% of households across the two axes in Masisi are exhibiting “poor” levels of food consumption.
3. Water and Sanitation: Over 80% of households were reporting that one or more members of the family had been ill in the two weeks preceding the survey, with the majority of cases amongst under-fives and women. “Fever” was noted as the primary cause of illness, followed by malaria and diarrhoea. Access to clean water was poor, with households surveyed in Masisi between 6 and 8 litres per person per day, less than half the 15lt SPHERE standard, and those in Walikale accessing just 6lt/p/d, and many families were sourcing water from rivers and other unprotected sources. Water treatment was close to zero across all communities.

The results of the Concern assessments in the area all clearly justify the program as the results of the data indicate an emergency situation requiring lifesaving interventions.

2.2.2 The operational modalities

The main operational areas of the Concern Masisi operations within the timeframe of this evaluation is NFIs, Livelihoods and WASH. The question asked in this section is whether the operational approach to each of these appropriate in relation to the local humanitarian needs.

NFIs

Concern has chosen to provide NFIs in two manners, either represented by a voucher to be used by the beneficiary to purchase their materials based on their own preference or as a complete NFI kit for the beneficiaries arriving in camps. Both approaches can be considered appropriate within the context, giving beneficiaries the opportunity to decide for themselves what their priority needs are in a highly accountable way to program.

Voucher versus cash

¹⁴ Information in the 3 points are taken from the Concern 2015/ 2016 baseline done for the ECHO/ HPP program.

It might still be argued that even the mere structure of providing a voucher only valid for certain items and in a specific market is intrusive for the beneficiary and a cash option should be opted for from the perspective of the dignity and respect of the beneficiary. As previously mentioned, security prevented the inclusion of the beneficiary perspective in this evaluation. Each of the Concern staff and the representatives of the external organisations received the same question; if the beneficiary would have the power to choose the modality of the assistance provided, what type of assistance would they choose? Out of the 30 people interviewed, 29 answered without hesitation- CASH. One person answered food. It is no big secret that beneficiaries prefer cash, an unlimited option as to where to spend the money and what to spend it on.

Even though the UNICEF funded ARCC project, implemented by the Concern Masisi team in 2013 to 2015, is not part of this evaluation, the learning of that program is highly relevant for evaluating the operational modalities. The ARCC program had a large cash distribution component during a 3 year program, implemented to various degrees by Concern, Mercy Corps and Solidarities. According to the ARCC results; *“The ARCC cash transfer program has had a **significantly positive impact** from the perspective of all the performance indicators of various sectors targeted through the assistance: Food Security, Essential Household and Personal Non-Food Items (NFI), Livestock, Financial Situation, Children’s Access to Health Education and general household resilience.^{15”}*

The fact that the optional operational modality in the NFI and the Livelihoods aspect of the program is cash, has been confirmed in every evaluation, strategy and analysis document looking at the Masisi program, produced to date. The challenge is ensuring a safe way of distributing cash in the Concern operational areas. While safe programming of cash is not an option, the voucher/ fair option is the second best. Sarah Baily has a very good point though when she in her 2013 evaluation says; *“It is important to not assume that the discreetness of cash makes it inherently less risky in the Masisi context as the findings show that risk is strongly linked to visibility. Vouchers resulted in the highest visibility because people were carrying items like mattresses, clothing, saucepans and metal sheeting.^{16”}*

Efforts should be made to investigate all possible options to transfer the NFI/ Livelihoods programming to cash. Cash is generally expected to be the future modality of humanitarian assistance. Some studies claim that administrative savings would be so great that 30% more people could be assisted for the same amount of money¹⁷. The ARCC program has not had any security incidents in the last 2 Phases of operation, the third phase being implemented North Kivu wide, all cash, by Mercy Corps. NRC have transformed all the IDP support in Goma and its vicinity to cash. Approaches can be solicited from them for best practice. With that said, there is full respect and understanding in relation to the security challenges in Masisi, there is no simple and easy solution, and a multitude of aspects need to be considered such as the capacity of local markets, the quality of products available and first and foremost, the security of the Concern staff and the targeted communities.

A second option is to allow vouchers to be changed into cash during the fairs. In the 2013 evaluation conducted by Sarah Baily, she specifically recommended that; *“Where vouchers are provided, Concern should not discourage the exchange of vouchers for cash. The exchange rates are not exorbitant and at the end of the day it is up to beneficiaries to decide whether exchanging money is*

¹⁵ UNICEF DRC_UK Aid_ARCCII_Final Report_PPMK_ge_CLEAN_FINAL.docx Page 1.

¹⁶ Baily, Concern Masisi Evaluation 2013. Page 36.

¹⁷ <http://qz.com/750020/the-deceptively-simple-economic-case-for-giving-refugees-cash-not-stuff/>

worth it. Concern could try bringing order to the process by working with specific traders and designating exchange rates.¹⁸ This recommendation has not been absorbed in the Masisi program where no money is allowed to change hands and should a trader exchange a voucher for money, he is automatically disqualified from future participation. Rather, a close monitoring on exchange rates and an open competition on exchange rates should take place. In NRCs experience even when distributing cash through mobile phone systems or even banks, a minimum 5% cost is added. They did try it once with Traders and they requested a 30% charge which is preposterous. This option was of course not used, but negotiations can be made.

The CASH/ Voucher issue is an important issue for donors to consider, they determine the operational modalities to be used and for an organisation such as Concern, an independent choice in this matter is not possible.

Camps versus host communities

The operational modality for NFIs in the camps are complete kits and renewal voucher fairs where beneficiaries themselves get to choose what to purchase. One can question why there is a different approach for the camp and the host IDP. The value of the new arrival kit per household is 103\$, with an additional 35\$ in a renewal voucher, the host residing IDP household gets a 55\$ NFI voucher and subsequent livelihoods support. The question to raise in relation to local needs, is if provision of the NFI kit is the optional modality? This evaluation does not have an answer to this question but suggests that it should be discussed. The RRMP approach is to organise quick closed fairs for newly displaced people, with the optimal turnaround time of 2 weeks from identification to the implementation of the fair. Considering the Concern timeliness of the approach, UNHCR or IOM will go through a verification exercise, the list of newly arrivals will be provided to Concern who then will proceed to distribute the kit. An unclear factor in this is how long this process takes, it is already clear that during 2015 there was initially an issue regarding the verification which stopped the distribution for several months, by the time the issue was resolved, Concern has a security incident suspending the program, by the time that was resolved Concern had a significant delay in the international procurement delaying the distributions even further. From June/ July of 2015 until April of 2016, not many kits were distributed, they who had qualified previously did eventually get their kits.

The question is, why is not a fair approach, open or closed, used to support camp IDPs? As there has been no monitoring done by Concern, during the timeframe of the evaluation, of the beneficiary perspective in relation to the kits, their contents and their suitability and the timeliness of the delivery-the beneficiary preference is not known. The appropriateness and relevance of this program modality should be examined further. Especially in view of the difficult roads and of the fact that Handicap International now have begun with a cost recovery component of their logistical support. The transport of the kit contents will become more difficult.

In addition, the NFI camp kits have not met target in the 3 implementation years being evaluated, the appropriateness of the activity could be questioned on that basis, particularly why there would not have been put in place a back-up plan on how to further assist this vulnerable population, since the funds are already there. The value of the undistributed new arrival kits to IDPs residing in camps is almost 200.000 \$ in the last 3 years. Granted, there are 500 undistributed OFDA funded kits in store which would put a dent in this, still, they are not much use to an extremely vulnerable population being kept in store and should be quickly distributed. According to the NFI and Shelter cluster, there

¹⁸ Baily, Concern Masisi Evaluation 2013. Page 36.

are an additional 47 camps in North Kivu who have no NFI support and while interviewed UNHCR expressed that they have requested from Concern to support more camps. I assume that UNHCR and IOM, who do the verification in these camps, could quickly identify a suitable camp population for the outstanding kits.

OFDA New Arrival kits 2013-2015						
	Phase I	Phase II	Phase III	Total	Value 103\$	Difference
Target	1.800	1.896	1.400	5.096	524.888	
Achieved	1.094	1.101	964	3.159	325.377	-199.511
	61%	58%	69%	62%	199.511	-38%

Add on to this the 400 kits in the Irish Aid budget 2015/ 2016, which have recently been purchased, and the figure of undistributed kits is even higher.

The modality of the livelihoods component

There is an obstacle in assessing the appropriateness in relation to local needs for the livelihoods component. The initial Market/ Labour analysis, which intended to inform the training needs and asset transfer modalities, was done in Walikale but ultimately the whole livelihoods component was implemented in Masisi, with some additional light touch research taking place there before the implementation.

A general assumption would be to expect that during the community consultations and the beneficiary targeting, the appropriate livelihoods program option has been offered to the respective beneficiaries. There were 3 options available, for people with access to land, without access to land and extremely vulnerable. The staff perspective on this program is that it is successful despite a delay in the implementation and that the activity is meeting the needs of the beneficiaries. A few staff members expressed a sense of an increased nutritional value among the targeted population, although no data exists as of yet to back that up. It would be useful for the team to look closely at this in order to have guidance in future programming.

In the larger context, a food production program is highly suitable. According to sources, the authorities are highly reluctant (strongly against) approving direct food distributions, which is why only an expected 6 to 7 % of the displaced population in Eastern DRC is receiving any form of food aid. That is an incredibly low figure in a displacement setting and considering the low food scores in the baseline, this type of programming is highly needed in the area and if possible, should be expanded. For information, in view of these figures WFP, RRMP actors and MFS have been asked about potential levels of adult malnutrition which would indicate starvation levels, the RRMP actors have come across populations who display adult malnutrition in the field, not to an alarming level though. Child malnutrition is to be expected in such a setting, more related to disease than the lack of food.

The operational modality of WASH

As was mentioned in the Effectiveness section, the programmatic approach to WASH during this program period has been questioned by both staff and externals, in regards to if the intervention meets the documented needs. The baseline for the intervention shows a great need for; access to safe drinking water, an increased access to water for household consumption, need for water purification materials- containers, chlorination, filters, and access to sanitation such as soap, the need for latrines and mosquito nets.

The needs analysis is both appropriate and relevant, however, as the response only contains hygiene awareness and soap to households with 2 children under the age of 5, then it cannot be considered to meet the needs. Theoretical hygiene training sessions with communities without providing any hardware components will not improve the WASH related humanitarian needs. Concern initially intended to do demonstration latrines in the original proposal but due to the reduced timeframe for implementation after the suspension this was considered to be no longer feasible.

WASH is a difficult operational sector in North Kivu, after 25 years of massive humanitarian programs once could expect a higher awareness level than demonstrated in the Concern baseline. Almost 70% of the respondents are not aware of the linkage between safe versus unsafe water and most water borne diseases. The Barrier Analysis would perhaps have given an answer to why there is so little awareness. It was expressed in the interview conducted with UNICEF that they have been conducting a test project in a few villages in North Kivu with a full package hard/ soft WASH intervention and the results relating to behaviour change were too bad to be shared, apparently there are significant barriers amongst the population to fully absorb the WASH assistance offered. The second KAP will show if the Concern hygiene promotion has been effective and if the activity has had a positive impact on the community.

The WASH cluster does not encourage standalone soft-WASH activities in emergency situations as hard-WASH activities have a more direct result. The cluster has not been aware of the Concern WASH activities in North Kivu and encourages Concern to coordinate with the cluster on future WASH activities.

2.2.3 The Targeting modality

The ToR for this evaluation specifically requested that the appropriateness of targeting methodologies used would be assessed. The Masisi program has throughout the years struggled with the targeting requirement of donors, such as ECHOs request to keep at a level of 60 to 70%, focusing on the most vulnerable segments of the population.

Previous recommendations

In the previous evaluation done in 2013 of the Masisi programs the conclusion was that; *“The most significant weakness of the intervention was targeting. Given the pervasive poverty and negative repercussions of targeting, Concern should help more people in the villages and camps even if that means giving less. There was nothing inherently wrong with either Concern’s decision to continue operating in the same area or use a points-based system; the main problem was that the end result of the targeting process appears to have excluded a substantial number of people who were no less or only marginally less poor than those included.”*¹⁹ This recommendation from the last evaluation has been followed by Concern even if it has meant that Concern is not complying with the requirements

¹⁹ Sarah Baily, Evaluation of Concern Worldwide’s Emergency Response in Masisi, North Kivu, DRC (2012-2013), pages 6 and 7.

of the donor, hence today Concern is on the opposite end of the issue receiving criticism for being too inclusive in the communities targeted.

The Masisi territory is populated by various ethnicities with a high level of inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic conflict, both within and between villages. The selection of which villages to intervene in and the selection of beneficiaries within these villages is a very dangerous exercise and can potentially serve as a conflict enhancer for the population, in addition being a risk for the staff. A Do No Harm approach is elementary in a community which experiences such significant levels of conflict. The assistance provided by Concern is a highly valuable and attractive package which can easily become a source of tension within the community. The need to have an ethnic balance between the villages and beneficiaries, meaning that all need to be served equally while having limited resources, is a huge challenge and a very delicate undertaking. Organisations operating in the area agree that it is very dangerous for an organisation to have their neutrality and impartiality questioned and the need for vulnerability criteria must sometimes give way to ensure an equal distribution between, as an example Hunde and Hutu beneficiaries.

There have been numerous iterations and types of targeting used by Concern in Masisi since 2008, from registering only households that met certain criteria to a community-led vulnerability targeting (similar to a wealth-ranking) that was only successful in about half the villages where it was implemented. In recent years, thanks to the use of Digital Data Gathering (DDG) devices for targeting, a new type of targeting is being used: a village census is conducted, door-to-door, collecting information about the household. The results are then scored and beneficiaries above a certain score are targeted. In other cases, the score has been combined with specific 'status' categories, such as displaced or recently returned.

The community has displayed a strong reaction against targeting and against identifying vulnerabilities. Even at a level of 94% targeting, as has been the result in the recent ECHO/ HPP program, demonstrations were organised, threats were made, staff were intimidated and an unreasonable amount of time went into getting the community to accept that this would not be a blanket inclusion. The Concern Humanitarian Protection Adviser, Laura Cometta, did an assessment in the Masisi area in 2013 and had this to say about targeting in the communities; *"To my surprise, there seems to be a considerable lack of cohesion and support at community level and sometimes also at household level. There is a sense that everybody tends to look at his/her own interest rather than at the household's interest and priorities. In such a context people will never agree on the vulnerability criteria and targeting will always be challenging."*²⁰

Targeting levels and criteria

The recent programs have had the following levels of targeting when it comes to the various NFI and Cash distributions; OFDA, as the program targets IDPs in camps, the targeting level is 100%. The ECHO and HPP program in host communities has a target level of 94%. The UNICEF funded ARCC program implemented in 2013 and 2014 had a targeting level of 90%. The UNICEF ARCC program is the only program where we can compare the targeting methodology with other organisations as Mercy Corps and Solidarities were implementing the same program with the same methodology. Their targeting levels were at 10-20% compared to Concerns targeting at 90%. UNICEF states though that the areas that Mercy Corps and Solidarities were operating within were more urbanised areas

²⁰ Country Report: support visit to DRC – Masisi, Humanitarian Protection Advisor, Laura Cometta, Emergency Unit Dublin, 7 - 20 April 2013. Page 15

with a lower level of displacement compared to the host villages in Masisi territory which were covered by Concern. Yet, the significant difference in targeting data does raise questions on how adherent Concern has been to the vulnerability criteria.

The high level of repeated displacement, looting and burning down of villages in the Masisi territory has left the population so called horizontally poor. Although there are differences in poverty levels, such as the potential ownership of land or access to labour within the family, the reality of displacement or during early returns, the consequences of the looting and the burning down of the village is the same for all. They are left without possessions. The fact that a household owns land does not immediately supply them with a jerry can, clothes, tools or seeds upon return to their land.

When discussing the targeting challenge in North Kivu with other organisations operational within the area it is quickly evident that there is no magic bullet to solve the situation. Targeting levels are generally high, the RRMP usually does not go below 85% and the situation can require a blanket distribution as well. However, all organisations work according to a vulnerability matrix and invest serious time in sensitising the community to accept the criteria. The same goes for Concern, the current targeting criteria used by the program is the following;

- All displaced households (in Phase II it was all displaced since 2013);
- All returnee households (in Phase II it was all returnees arrived since 2014);
- All resident household if one of the following was true:
 - The head of family (either the woman or the man) were elderly or a child or;
 - If there were 3 or more children under 5 in the household or;
 - If the household was hosting a displaced family or;
 - If the head of the household (either the woman or man) was disable or has a chronic illness or;
 - If the head of the household was an unmarried widow (single parent – either man or woman) or;
 - If the household didn't own their own house on their own land or;
 - If they had an NFI/shelter score of 17 or more.

The challenge has been that a high level of households within the operational area meet the criteria, hence the targeting level also becomes unreasonably high.

The way forward

There is no clear cut solution or recommendation that can be made in this evaluation on whether Concern should tighten up the vulnerability criteria to reach fewer beneficiaries within in each location and consequently then have an expanded geographical coverage. As targeting in this case is so closely related to the safety of the staff, a certain amount of flexibility needs to be kept in place depending on the area of future interventions. There simply is no best practise which can be universally used in the area, no standard criteria which works perfectly each time. Solidarities do a quick conflict analysis for each location, if the conflict analysis turns out to be complicated they do a protection analysis as well. If the protection analysis shows too high a conflict possibility, the best

option is sometimes to stop and do nothing and move on or do a blanket distribution. This also means that the option of blanket targeting needs to be a part of the tool box. The key is that each community requires its own analysis before targeting strategy is decided upon.

I would also emphasise that in a situation where the targeting level is 94%, rather than investing so much time in getting community acceptance and risking fuelling conflict amongst the population, go for a blanket 100% inclusion. The extra funds spent are marginal compared to the time and effort saved.

The main recommendation to improve targeting practises in Concern is to hire Handicap International in Goma to do an inclusion targeting training with the staff. This comes highly recommended by RRMP partners NRC and Solidarité who have both had their teams participate in this training with very good results. In the 2013 evaluation of the RRMP the following was stated *“Handicap International’s involvement has been widely welcomed by RRMP as it provides clear criteria and guidance for identifying and mainstreaming assistance for a particular vulnerable group. It is one area where RRMP can point to and say with a reasonable level of confidence that the most vulnerable are being targeted and supported in an appropriate way.”*²¹ Handicap used to provide this training for free but due to a reduction in funding they now need to conduct it on a cost recovery basis. The training takes close to 2 months, starts with a workshop and then 4 inclusion trainers go with the Concern teams in the field to help them with the beneficiary selection. The objective of the training is to ensure the inclusion of the extremely vulnerable HH and individuals within communities and support the teams in doing community targeting acceptance.

The estimated cost of the training is 5.000 to 10.000 USD depending on the number of teams to train and my recommendation would be to enlist the support of Handicap to coincide with the start of the new programs in September 2016, Handicap have been consulted and would be available at this time. As time is of the essence here, the team has been informed of this recommendation and are in the process of examining the feasibility of implementation.

2.2.4 The coordination modality

Through its various donor agreements, Concern commits to participating in coordination mechanisms relating to the humanitarian situation in North Kivu. This section looks at the appropriateness of that involvement and of the relevance of the participation.

The primary venue for participation in coordination mechanisms is in Goma and participation is conducted by the Goma office. In Masisi there is a monthly OCHA coordination meeting, led by Save the Children. Concern participates to some extent, yet they have missed a number of meetings. Other than that, the primary coordination taking place in Masisi is taking place in an unofficial manner, between staff of various organisations. Beyond the humanitarian coordination, there is the interaction with local authorities, representatives of non-state actors, civil society groups and such that needs to be maintained. This aspect of the program is the responsibility of the Masisi Base-manager and while he is in post this seems to be functioning well. A result of the interviews show that there is a need to also include the Emergency program manager in the full network of communications to ensure a consistent presence and contact during times of absence.

There is a multitude of various coordination meetings taking place in Goma. As a consequence of the frequent staff turnover and the high workload of the staff, the participation in the necessary coordination structures has not been what it should have been. The effects of that is that the wider

²¹ http://www.unicef.org/evaldatabase/files/DR Congo_2013-001_RRMP_Final_Report.pdf Page 37.

humanitarian community is not aware of what Concern does and to what extent. The clusters provide quarterly and annual reports to the national level, covering the outputs of the cluster partners and the activities of Concern and consequently Concerns donor are not represented there. It also means that Concern loses the opportunity to access various cluster funding if and when such occasions arise.

To ensure the necessary attendance Concerns needs to look at the capacity of the Goma office. Looking at current and future operational areas Concern should be participating in; NFI and Shelter cluster, the Food Security cluster, the WASH cluster and the Protection cluster. In addition to potential NGO coordination for a, Inter-cluster meetings should Concern take an active representative role, UN led security meetings, INSO security meetings and various occasional thematic meetings on behalf of partner agencies or donors. It is primarily the Area Coordinator representing Concern in these for a, in addition to running the North Kivu operations. Time wise, it is very challenging to successfully achieve all these tasks and some form of delegation and prioritization needs to take place.

This is an area where Concern needs to improve to ensure its position in the relevant settings and to provide the communities, in which Concern operates, a voice. There is full awareness of this need for improvement among the Goma staff and an intention to address the matter.

2.3 Sustainability

The nature of Emergency relief is fast-paced, reactive, short-term, focused on meeting immediate basic needs and preventing morbidity and mortality. The Concern Masisi program is a program focused on consumables in a complex conflict situation with repeated displacement. Hence the sustainability factor is none, which is as it should be considering the program activities. Sustainability as a word is not mentioned once in neither the ECHO/ Irish Aid proposals nor in the OFDA programs. For a level of sustainability to be achieved, a requirement would be a population remaining in the same place long enough to be able to absorb skills or build material resources ensuring the facilitation of future livelihoods. This is not the past, present nor the immediate future situation in North Kivu.

The Concern program has produced a North Kivu 2015/ 2016 strategy which identifies potential operational areas where a more long-term, sustainable form or program could be launched. The analysis divides the program into Emergency, Recovery and Resilience phases. Yet, there is much debate on what a Resilience programme in Masisi could look like and how such an approach would be designed. The major reasons for this debate is that Masisi has seen cyclical violence for a long time, and it unclear whether it will truly stabilise. Given this context, various HQ advisers as well as senior management have strongly questioned whether any long-term programming is possible and nothing is being planned at this stage²².

²² The Concern North Kivu strategy 2015/ 2016 page 10.

2.4 Protection and Gender

2.4.1 The Protection context

In North Kivu, endemic cycles of conflict and repeated displacement have resulted in serious threats and protection issues for the local population. Lootings in villages, ambushes and kidnappings operated by armed groups are often accompanied by severe violence such as torture, rape, and sexual assault, whilst children as young as 6 are continuously recruited into armed groups across North Kivu. Pre-existing gender inequalities in North Kivu have been further exacerbated by the longstanding cycles of conflict, violence and consequent breakdown of inter and intra-community relationships and linkages. Well documented chronic sexual violence against women and girls, particularly in conflict contexts-but also in communities, has become the norm. The effects of which are in turn worsened by poor access to appropriate referral services for medical, judicial, and psychosocial support. Household survey data indicated that up to 60% in Lukweti, and 33% in Buabo had been affected by security incidents in their village in December 2015; whilst up to 90% in Lukweti had experienced security problems whilst travelling on roads. The majority of incidents were related to theft, pillaging and looting; however more serious instances of rape, torture, physical assault and arbitrary detention were also noted. Overall, existing indigenous protection strategies are overwhelmed in the face of continual violence from armed groups and bandits, and protection by MONUSCO, PNC, and FARDC are not providing adequate barriers to protection violations²³.

2.4.2 The Community Protection Committees

The Masisi program implemented a Protection component in the OFDA funded Phase I and II. An international Protection Advisor was hired as a consultant to assist the team to start-up activities and the team has been visited by the HQ Protection Adviser²⁴. Activities included the mapping of service providers and referral pathways for medical, legal and psychosocial services, and establishing 10 Community Protection Committees and monitoring displacements of less than 250 households.

There was no continued funding for this activity in the Phase III program and the community protection committees were in place and supported for a very short time as the full implementation of this activity only took place towards the end of the Phase II grant. As previously mentioned there should be some monitoring information which was collected but it has not been located by the current team. An aim of this evaluation was to meet with a few of these committees to discuss their experience of the activity, due to security developments this was not possible. Hence, we have no information to base any impact estimation on.

The Concern HQ Humanitarian Protection Advisor visited the program in 2013 and left the following recommendation; *“It is the recommendation of the that the North Kivu team engage in robust protection work, including the possibility of continuing a stand-alone protection programme, in all future programmes. It is also essential that protection and gender, including basic protection activities (incorporating protection analysis and actions in all on-going and planned activities and ensuring staff are aware of referral pathways and mechanisms) are mainstreamed into all*

²³ Extraction from the Masisi 2015/ 2016 baseline survey, page 28

²⁴ Laura Cometta Protection Advisor (January 2014) and Annie Reykov, Protection Consultant (August 2014)

programme activities in every sector. A team of dedicated protection staff working on protection activities could then also support the mainstreaming of protection and gender into other sectors.”²⁵

The report and the recommendations therein are still very valid and should continue to guide the program design today. Rather than repeating them here, I fully refer to the document. As in other areas, the staff turnover becomes an issue here as well. The Masisi team participated in a 4-day humanitarian protection workshop and were trained and sensitised on CRM, how to implement protection assessments, mainstreaming protection –including provided with the Concern Protection Integration Guideline. The advisor looked at targeting and led the Concern North Kivu team in a protection risk analysis process of their program. Granted, that the outcome of this visit resulted the protection component of the Phase I and II of the OFDA program. Yet, the interesting aspect is that not a single one of the participants in this training is still working with the Concern Masisi team. A copy of the report did not exist in the current team’s computer, in fact none of them was aware of its existence, nor were they aware of the existence of the Concern Protection Integration Guideline or other support materials the program can utilise.

2.4.3 Gender

Considering the vile amount of abuse and exploitation women are exposed to in this conflict, a clear gender based programming is a very important component. The Masisi team certainly aims to register primarily women as the beneficiaries and as heads of households and in their perspective this has a positive impact on the role of women. The ARCC project has the following experience in relation to this; **“Gender of the registered beneficiary seems to have no significant impact on the observed indicators (purchasing patterns, family well-being), with the unexpected exception of women’s decision-making roles which appear to have actually reduced in families where the women were registered as the primary beneficiary. Leaving households free to choose whether to register a man or a woman for assistance seems to be the best solution²⁶.”** Concern has not as of yet assessed this aspect but in view of the ARRC data the team plans to monitor this component. It should make for an interesting and necessary comparison.

Concern aims to ensure gender sensitivity in implementing all activities through regular consultation with women and men regarding specific needs, strategies to mitigate against protection risks and timing of activities to avoid overburdening and with consideration for the reproductive roles of women in this context. As women are the primary beneficiary registered for the household, the data naturally shows that women are the majority recipients of the Concern assistance. As mentioned above, wheatear this is conducive or not for their situation is not clear. There is a clear gap in the gender aware aspect of the Concern program, namely, the lack of female staff.

The Concern Masisi team currently has 1 woman working on the program side, in the Goma office there is one Congolese woman working in the HR department. The partner, Pacodevi, have a few more women among their staff, particularly as community liaison staff or animators. The male staff of Concern are in full agreement that the women in the community would not address any of their gender related concerns with them, such as potential violations and abuse which they experience. Hence the program priority of ensuring regular consultation with women will be lopsided if there are no women working for Concern, who will be able to reach a more informed status on the situation women in the communities face. This might by some be considered simply an HR issue, but this is

²⁵ Laura Cometta, Protection visit report 2013, page 8

²⁶ UNICEF, ARCC Phase II Final report, Page 11

very much both a protection and a gender awareness issue. Concern needs to take deliberate action to recruit more women even if this means including measures for positive discrimination.

2.4.4 The new Protection Program

The grants starting in September 2016 apparently do have a protection component, the contents of which is not within the scope of this evaluation as the grant has just been signed. Hopefully in that process the team can continue to build on the experience already achieved with the Protection committees. The team aims to become partners in the Protection cluster, something which has not been done during the previous protection program. Unfortunately the Protection cluster did not have time for an interview or answering questions through email during this evaluation and hence their perspective on the current situation and priority needs is missing.

2.4.5 The Concern Programme Participant Protection Policy

The P4 is a very important policy for Concern and although not directly within the scope of this evaluation, its implementation and upholding is relevant both to protection and accountability aspects. The policy protects the rights of programme participants not to be abused and exploited and clarifies the responsibilities of the staff and anyone associated with the programs to ensure that they do not abuse their power and influence to exploit and harm others.

It is very positive to report that the awareness levels of the staff in regards to the policy and its implementation was very high amongst the interviewed staff. Each staff member, even new staff, have been trained, the same goes for partner staff and the policy is automatically included and upheld in relation to traders and suppliers. As stated, there was no beneficiary participation during this evaluation, hence their awareness and perspective on the existence of the policy cannot be measured. However, all the staff were asked if targeted communities are trained on the P4 before implementation and the collective answer is that there is not a separate training but the policy is a part of the community sensitisation and the communities know that Concern staff will not and cannot abuse their position or attempt to exploit the community. The best comment on the subject came from a national staff member; *The P4 is for Concern what the 10 commandments are for the Bible.*

2.5 Accountability

The primary issues here to be looked at are the adherence to humanitarian standards, beneficiary involvement and the function of the Concern Masisi Complaint Response Mechanism.

2.5.1 Adherence to humanitarian standards

In general the adherence to key standards seem to be good. The Red Cross Code of Conduct, Sphere Standards and People in Aid as well as compliance with Cluster guidelines all seems to be codes which are included and incorporated into programming. The main lack of compliance would be with Principle 9 in the Red Cross Code of conduct, the strict adherence to monitoring, yet that is due to a temporary capacity constraint rather than to disregard for the importance of monitoring.

Concern does a good job in trying to maintain a neutral and impartial position amongst communities in the Masisi area according to the key informants, both external and internal. With the high levels of

inter- and intra-conflict, this is not an easy task. At the time of the field visit there were rumours floating that Concern has been ethnically biased in hiring daily labours, and hence lopsided in its neutrality. This is an issue which the team is looking at in order to ensure full impartiality, within such a contentious context it would be impossible to be perceived as perfect at any and all stages.

2.5.2 Beneficiary involvement in program design

Concern includes a high level of various community consultations into program implementation, even at the level where management questions if it is too much, as this is an emergency situation and speed is of the essence. There needs to be a distinction made between the level of community involvement in program design and community consultations.

Concern conducts extensive assessments before programs where the community perspective is solicited. Yet, before the design of the program, the writing of the proposal, the finalisation of the funding- the intended operational area and hence beneficiary selection has not taken place. This all happens when the set program is already being implemented and the activities are set. This is where the perspective comes in from the management, as the program and its activities are not expected to change, why the extensive consultation so late in the process.

Hence, the answer to the question is that the actual beneficiaries have no direct participation or input into the program design. They participate at the targeting stage where they are consulted and sensitised, but by this time the program will not be altered based on their feedback.

The question which we should be discussing in this regard though is; is it possible to engage the actual beneficiaries who will be targeted in the program in the program design level, when the program is responding to repeated displacement and returns in a highly volatile context. The answer would be NO, there is no guarantee that the population consulted pre-proposal level would still be in the same area and would be the ones ultimately benefitting from the program. Hence, this accountability objective is impossible to fulfil and the best way to be accountable in this regard is to work in accordance to sector standards such as Sphere and Cluster guidelines, developed and adapted for standardised emergency response.

There is an inherent contradiction in the North Kivu context in relation to modern humanitarian programming, the current emphasis on accountability, protection and various cross cutting issues which, although important, do undeniably slow down a humanitarian response yet is considered today an integral part of responsible programming. At the same time, the program with the far highest funding levels in North Kivu, and the expressed preference of several donors due to its speed and reach, is the Rapid Response to Population Movements, (RRMP) which in essence is a stripped down lifesaving intervention with a limited inclusion of the above mentioned.

The result here is that Concern exerts a great effort in ensuring community involvement of the program to the extent it is programmatically possible within the context.

2.5.3 CRM

The Concern Masisi program has had a CRM in place since 2009 and was one of the first Concern country program to pilot a CRM. Hence, there should be a significant institutional memory of running a CRM in the program for 7 years. The information below is based on interview with staff in Masisi who are involved in the CRM and a review of the complaints received and contained during 2016.

Both the OFDA and the ECHO/ HPPP projects state the importance of a rigorous CRM. The program has a CRM database, established in March 2016 where they have registered 92 complaints. If the Concern CRM guidelines are to be followed, only **one** of these 92 complaints is a valid complaint according to the Concern CRM guideline. This was a complaint regarding a beneficiary not receiving his identification card. The other 91 recorded complaints are people primarily losing their cards. For a complaint to be valid it has to be about an issue that Concern is responsible for and in a position to change, Concern is not responsible for people losing their cards, hence there is no need to record and process such a remark in the complaints committee. Such issues are a standard part of distributions and should be dealt with accordingly, not necessarily within the CRM format. There needs to be a way for beneficiaries to communicate with Concern on distribution issues that is not in the format of a complaint, as this is a relatively cumbersome way of addressing issues such as a lost card.

The Masisi CRM has three main ways of receiving complaints;

1. Directly to staff during field visits
2. CRM desk during distributions
3. Phone number printed on the beneficiary card

For option 1, the procedure seems to have been for staff to receive complaints, deal with them directly but not record them. So no records can be found of any complaints being made directly to staff during field visits. For option 2, of the 92 complaints which have been listed during distributions, since March 2016, 1 is a valid complaint. There are no physical or digital CRM records to be found before March 2016. There were changes in staff and no files have been handed over or found. The program did provide an annual CRM report to the HQ for 2015, with a total of 70, apparently valid and completed complaints, while also commenting on the need to re-establish the function, so apparently a CRM to some extent was in place in 2015 as well. For the third option, the telephone has never rung. At the time of the evaluation the phone was broken and in the possession of the Emergency Program Manager, a new phone had been ordered but was not yet in place. According to the current manager no complaints have been recorded through the phone since his arrival. The primary reason for the lack of phone activity is that there is limited connection in the operational area and the beneficiaries have no phones.

The Masisi team needs to address the lacking function of the CRM. For the Masisi staff, it is evident through the interviews that the CRM is seen as a necessary security measure in ensuring that the P4 is upheld. The knowledge on how to run a CRM is there, the "**Masisi Guide pour le Mécanisme de Traitement des Plaintes**" from 2012 has now been resent to the team and they should quickly be able to re-establish a high quality CRM. The visit from the HQ Humanitarian Protection Adviser also included a complete review of the CRM in 2013 and a set of recommendations to ensure its proper function. This document should be re-consulted.

However, it is imperative that an analysis is done on what the main risks are that the communities are facing, in regards to the assistance provided. The CRM should be a security measure to prevent abuse and exploitation of beneficiaries and to ensure a way to both listen and respond to beneficiary complaints on the program. Looking at the extreme level of sexual abuse in DRC there is without a doubt a risk that women and children within the program could be in an exposed position. All it takes is that one staff member, partner or trader threatens to ensure that a beneficiary will be taken off the list. The successful implementation and upholding of the P4 reduces this risk, yet, the communication lines of the CRM need to be designed with the risks in mind, how would a women or

a child raise a complaint? The current options are through a male staff member in the field or through a male staff member at a counter during the distribution or through a phone number when she most likely does not have access to a phone.

The CRM should also be able to capture the complaints of staff, partners, traders, suppliers etc. This is an aspect which also needs to be addressed

3. Strategy inputs

A part of the objectives of this evaluation was to use the opportunity and the information collected to provide some input into the team's strategy analysis. This section is based on the answers of the key informant interviews with both Concern staff and external partners. A few key issues are dominating the agenda at the moment and the operational strategy input will be structured according to them.

3.1 Elections and operational space

As discussed in the context analysis the coming Elections/ not Elections period brings with it great uncertainty. When external actors were asked about their expectations the outlook is very negative, regarding plans for the coming year organisations are taking a "wait and see" approach. Expectations are an increased level of violence and as a consequence, increased displacement. Of course, increased violence also usually means decreased operational space. The Concern Masisi program has significant experience of having to alter operations and activities due to insecurity and all too much experience of falling behind in targets due to lack of access.

In this regard, ambitions need to be tempered in the coming time, programs streamlined as much as possible and focused on hard components with a lifesaving objective. A visit from the HQ Security Adviser was in process earlier in the year and once this is rescheduled, a staged scenario development will be very helpful for the program to identify back-up plans. The absolute strength in the Masisi program has been the voucher/ cash distributions, this is where the team feels most comfortable and although there are many unmet needs which would need to be addressed in the North Kivu area, in times of uncertainty it is best to program according to strength and experience.

3.2 Humanitarian Coverage

One of the primary issues which has been discussed during this evaluation has been the RRMP, the donor's preference for funding it, the rapid results, the reach and the geographical coverage achieved by the RRMP partners. In short, the RRMP is jointly managed by UNICEF and OCHA and is currently implemented by five INGOs. They work in 4 provinces, primarily in the area of NFIs, WASH and Health and targeting newly displaced populations, host populations and returns. The RRMP is very generously funded by ECHO, the Pooled Fund, DFID, USAID, Japan, SIDA and Korea²⁷.

Coverage is something that Concern struggles with, the effort to expand to Walikale failed and Concern has long had a comfortable position in Masisi where the needs level is constant. Concerns lack of coverage was mentioned by every external organisation spoken to during this evaluation. Both the wish that Concern could have more coverage and the observation was made more than once, that the perception of Concern is identical to the Masisi area. Concern is also operating in a relatively small area of Masisi, with a maximum range of 30-40 km out of Masisi town. As Concern has been working in Masisi for 12 years by now, perhaps the geographical range has been wider in the past than it currently is.

The issue remains though, this geographical niching is potentially hampering the funding accessibility and response reliability of Concern. For the ARCC program, which Concern was a part of for the first 2 phases, Concern lost the bid in the third phase. This is despite being, by far, perceived to be the

²⁷ RRMP Booklet

highest quality partner by UNICEF and it was with regret that Concern was not a continued part of the program. However, UNICEF needed a partner with province wide coverage. Concern only put in a bid for Masisi.

The question is, what are the organisations with a better reach than Concern doing differently? What comes to mind is primarily communication in relation to security and logistical capacity. As, at least in terms of transport, the services of Handicap International is available to all and they are the primary logistical partner of the RRMP partners, perhaps it is the security networking aspect that stands out the most. The network to expand the coverage is not in place, which was evident in the Walikale intervention, yet establishing such a network in areas where Concern is yet operational is not feasible. The answer to this conundrum is out of the scope of this program evaluation, but one which should be investigated and answered by Concern. Any potential to partner up or piggy-back on the networks of other organisations should be explored where relevant.

In 2017, ARCC and the RRMP will be merged, which means the RRMP will have a specific cash distribution component. There will be a bid for new partners, for the first time since 2009 there is a possibility for new actors to become a part of the RRMP mechanism. Concern is encouraged to bid as others, with the preamble of having a North Kivu reach and coverage. This is an opportunity to be considered although it would call for a massive change in operational style.

In view of the coverage aspect, it must also be said that to implement high quality, consistent support in a stable manner in a geographically contained area, has its advantages as well. Masisi has been one of the main areas of displacement and just considering the needs within the Masisi territory, they are not within the capacity of Concern to respond to.

Considering the recommendation above, that in times of uncertainty one should program according to one's strength and not make too much changes; taking on a whole new province might not be in line with that. It is always good to consider options though and at least take them into consideration.

3.3 Durable solutions and the closing of camps

The Durable Solutions approach to displacement is being put forth by the government, and supported by UNHCR (while advocating against forced returns). Considering the recent announcement by the CCCM /Emergency division of IOM to close a further 8 camps this year, it certainly seems to be in motion. External actors spoken to have differing opinions on both the feasibility of the effort and on whether it will ever take place or not. There have been those who have expressed being absolutely against such an initiative, others, primarily the clusters are cooperating and instructing their partners accordingly.

The sum of the parts of the initiative is to close the estimated 57 IDP camps in North Kivu, containing somewhere around 300,000 people. No clear figures exist for the exact amount. The IDPs get 3 options, either support to go home, go to a "new village"-something which will be created, or be identified as a refugee and hence the sole responsibility of UNHCR. There is also the option that if you are an IDP camp resident and a part of an armed group, you can be absorbed into FARDC. The closures so far, before this current initiative, have been forced and this option has not been given to people previously. Currently, this identification procedure is in process in 8 camps selected by the

CCCM /Emergency division of IOM²⁸. Apparently the selection has not been consulted with the other clusters and there is dissatisfaction with the lack of communication in the procedure.

Out of these 8 camps, 3 are currently being supported by Concern and Concern will need to pay close attention to the developments. It has not been clarified, despite the identification procedure and the closure only being planned to take a maximum of 3 months, who should be providing the departing IDPs with the resources they need in their new locations. The RRMP does have the mandate to support returns but only with one month's worth of supplies and they do not have funds to respond to such a large need.

There is a high level of unpredictability of how this will proceed. In many cases people have no land to return to. Luisa Ryan and Dominic Keyzer have presented a study on IDPs and access to land in North Kivu; *"Their land in their home village had often been re-allocated to those with kinship ties to the village elite, meaning they had nothing to return to, and – without traditional or kinship ties to the ruling family of their new village – they did not qualify for a plot to farm where they were... Traditional leaders appeared to have control of land regulation and some villagers reported their leaders selling their farmland without consultation."*²⁹ The probability is low that people have land to return to, the probability is even lower that land will be identified/ purchased to establish new villages. The perception of some is that IDPs in the closing camps will just scatter throughout and end up needing assistance somewhere else.

A possible explanation to the sudden rush to close these camps has been said to be landowners of the current camps want their land back for other use, UNHCR apparently recently received a 2. Million Congolese Franc bill for a month's rent for one of the camps. The rumour mill is in full forces in regards to this issue, what is clear though is that there is no clear plan in place in regards to an organisational division and the funding required to move and equip the people of the camps. At the minimum, there will most likely be a number of camp mergers as many of the camps area already considered too small to mobilise assistance. In the North Kivu 2015/ 2016 strategy there is already a suggested strategy on durable solutions program options and should the initiative take off then the strategy can be revisited and consulted.

²⁸ Whole set of communication in this regard sent to AC and EPM and available from them.

²⁹ Everyone for themselves' in DRC's North Kivu, by Luisa Ryan and Dominic Keyzer
<http://www.fmreview.org/fragilestates/ryan-keyzer.html>

4. Conclusions and recommendations

As this evaluation has shown, the Concern programs in Masisi have struggled with time and capacity in the recent years. Although it must not be overlooked- most of the stated activities have been implemented. There are examples of activities where the quality has not been as intended and there are also potential successes such as the fairs who according to the staff have been much appreciated by the community. The conclusion is that the Masisi team have experienced a set of circumstances which have left them without the required capacity and with too little time to ensure a good quality control throughout the entire program, and as a consequence certain program aspects have slipped. There was a conscious decision made in the last year to focus on the larger activities; the fairs and the distributions were to get done, while the team hoped that there would be time left to do the soft program activities and the monitoring. This risk did not pay off as security challenges even further reduced the time available. Hence, the team has been in a state of catch up and firefighting on a daily basis, with not enough time for proper planning and without an overview of where they stand on the total program inputs and outputs.

The team needs to get in some additional surge capacity, finish up the existing programs in the best manner possible, and have frank discussions with the respective donors on the issues that were not up to par. With that completed, a thorough review needs to take place of the program cycle, the accountability aspects and the team communication and planning. A system needs to be put in place where this cycle of catching up is broken and replaced with a clear work plan, which the whole team is aware of and included in, and which is updated on a regular basis. A sound and robust M&E system needs to be structured and upheld with designated staff in place to carry out the monitoring. This goes further into the various responsibilities of the staff, empowering the national staff and ensuring some form of institutional memory to be kept in place, as DRC is not known for its expat staff longevity. Responsibilities need to be delegated so management has a reasonable workload. Quick daily team morning meetings need to be put in place, or at least weekly. Small changes/ tweaks in these structures should go a long way to get the team on the same page and to be collectively accountable for the program being successful.

With the extensive experience Concern has built up in the Masisi territory the organisation should be in a good position to provide the population with continued lifesaving and quality of life increasing assistance. In addition Concern has in place a committed and hard -working team, both national and expat who do their utmost to meet the needs of the communities. With that as a foundation, a few tweaks in the structure of the program and they should be on the right track to successful new programs.

4.1 Recommendations

The recommendations are summed up statements extracted from the results of the evaluation, each statement has its justification within the results presented in the respective sections and can be examined there. The recommendations exclude the section on Strategy Input as the topics there are meant for discussion rather than recommendations.

4.1.1 Program management recommendations

1. Ensure that no activities move to the implementation phase without the required preparations have been ticked off a check list. Such as potential baselines, various research or analysis which might be scheduled to guide the implementation.
2. Ensure a “beneficiary first” approach in implementation, when designing or executing an activity, make sure that the approach is with the best interest of the beneficiary in mind rather than the expediency of the organisation. That goes for distribution locations and for distribution frequency etc.
3. Simplify proposals and logframes in order to be clear about inputs and outputs. This will facilitate the team understanding of the task at hand.
4. If the implementation of an activity has fallen so much behind that it needs to be rushed as an unprepared tick the box activity, such as with some of the trainings in the program, one should rather take the responsible decision to cancel or postpone the activity and make that justification to the donor.
5. Future WASH activities should always include a Hard-WASH component and no Soft-WASH stand-alone program should be implemented. Any future WASH programming should be developed and implemented with the involvement of the WASH cluster as the cluster has a clear standards and divisions which all actors must adhere to.
6. The program needs to review its Accountability commitments in regards to beneficiary inclusion in program design and the functioning of the Complaint Response Mechanism. This needs to be looked into in two ways; do the current various community consultations facilitate a speedy humanitarian delivery, if speed is one of the priority modalities? Or should the intended beneficiary communities be a part of program design, before a proposal/ log-frame is final? Implicitly, that would mean that the program would focus on more sedentary populations. These are two different program and accountability approaches, although the CRM aspect is not necessarily affected, and have an impact on the accountability objectives one wishes to achieve.

4.1.2 Program implementation recommendations

7. Efforts should be made to investigate all possible options to transfer the NFI/ Livelihoods programming to cash and a second option is to allow vouchers to be changed into cash during the fairs. A beneficiary consultation should take place with camp dwellers to gauge their opinion on their preference of being provided with kits or being provided with cash/ vouchers.
8. Programming supporting food security is highly suitable for this context and an expansion of this program option should be explored.
9. Concern should hire Handicap International in Goma to do an inclusion targeting training with the staff, this training should be timed to coincide with the beneficiary targeting of the new programs about to start.
10. There needs to be a different set of targeting criteria for the Cash for Work component which is not based on extreme vulnerability. Rather than having pregnant women, the elderly and the disabled repairing roads, a different focus should be on the program. It can be framed as a protection program targeting young men who are at risk of being recruited into armed groups. It certainly is a justified need, young men are currently excluded from most types of assistance and it would serve the nature of the activity well to have able bodied men do this

type of work. Funding should be sought for this type of program as there currently is no road repair component in the coming program and having one is essential for accessing remote communities.

11. In regards to the future protection programming the team needs to review the 2013 visit report from the Concern Humanitarian Protection Adviser. The recommendations there are still fully valid and gives good direction for this programming area.

4.1.3 HR recommendations

12. Ensure a minimum obligatory reading pack for new management of the lessons learnt so far in the program, such as recent evaluations, final reports, assessments and various specialist visits reports. Could be kept up to date by the Desk Officer.
13. Ensure a mechanism within the system which links the institutional memory, both digital and through staff. Consider having one or two national program staff with long term contracts, the contracts could include the possibility of relocation should the program not get funding and the contract termination would be an issue.
14. There needs to be put in place a clear division of roles for the staff implementing the monitoring and implementing the program. The current M&E officer is a highly valued staff member with a 3 year experience in the program and he is exceedingly useful for the team in other activities then monitoring, which explains why so little monitoring has been done recently. His position should perhaps be evaluated, if he is even more useful in a program implementation position and someone else is in charge of the monitoring.
15. Concern needs to find innovative ways of recruiting women in the program implementation and community consultation component to truly ensure gender sensitive programming and a female led CRM channel option.

Annex 1: Documents reviewed

CONCERN DOCUMENTS	
1	-Concern - ECHO North Kivu MR Proposal 18.02.16 -ECHO North Kivu Interim Report - 24.05.16 -Concern DRC Monthly reports 2015 and 2016
2	Concern Baseline Survey 2015-2016
3	CONCERN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO – SMP
4	Concern Worldwide - Final Report Oct 13 - Apr 15 - ARCCII
5	Country Report: support visit to DRC – Masisi, Humanitarian Protection Advisor, Laura Cometta, Emergency Unit Dublin, 7 - 20 April 2013.
6	DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO – NATIONAL POOR VULNERABLE INDEX
7	DRC Briefing Pack January 2016
8	Evaluation of Concern Worldwide's Emergency Response in Masisi, North Kivu, DRC Sarah Baily 2013
9	-Irish Aid; HPP Final 15.01.15 -Irish Aid; HPP DRC 2015-2016 NCE Request
10	Masisi Context Analysis Report 2012
11	NORTH KIVU STRATEGY 2015-16
12	-OFDA Proposal Phase I – III -Concern DRC Masisi OFDA Annual Report 2014 and 2015 -Concern DRC Masisi OFDA Q10 Jan-March 2016 April-June 2016
13	RAPPORT PDM CASH BANYUNGU
14	RAPPORT PDM DISTRIBUTION DE SEMENCE AXE BANYUNGU
15	Report of the review of the Concern DRC pilot CRM 22nd May – 2nd June 2011 Laura Cometta, Humanitarian Protection Advisor, Emergency Unit Dublin
16	Responding to Displacement Needs with Vouchers and Fairs Democratic Republic of Congo 2008-2009 Evaluation, Sarah Baily 2009
17	UNICEF DRUK Aid ARCCII Final Report
CONTEXTUAL INFORMATION ON DRC	
18	ACAPS Country Profile: Democratic Republic of the Congo, November 2015 http://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/acaps-country-profile-democratic-republic-congo-november-2015
19	Aljazeera; DR Congo opposition rejects talks over election http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/08/dr-congo-opposition-rejects-talks-election-160821050327293.html
20	Amnesty International DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO 2015/2016 https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/africa/democratic-republic-of-the-congo/report-democratic-republic-of-the-congo/
21	DARA; External Evaluation of the Rapid Response to Population Movements (RRMP) Program in the Democratic Republic of Congo 2013 http://www.unicef.org/evaldatabase/files/DRCongo_2013-001_RRMP_Final_Report.pdf
22	Democratic Republic of the Congo - Humanitarian Response Plan 2016 https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/fr/operations/democratic-republic-congo/document/rdc-aper%C3%A7u-des-besoins-humanitaires-2016

23	ECHO FACTSHEET; The Democratic Republic of Congo http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/drc_en.pdf
24	ECHO; EVALUATION OF HUMANITARIAN AID BY AND FOR NGOs http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/evaluation/2007/humanitarian_guide.pdf
25	Evaluation of ECHO-funded cash and voucher food assistance in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sarah Bailey, July 2014 http://www.alnap.org/resource/12806
26	Evaluation of NRC's 2012-13 protection and advocacy work in the DRC April 2014 Prepared by: Glenn O'Neil, Patricia Goldschmid https://www.nrc.no/globalassets/pdf/evaluations/evaluation-of-nrcs-2012-13-protection-and-advocacy-work-in-the-drc.pdf
27	Humanitarian action for children- UNICEF DRC Situation Report April 2016 http://www.unicef.org/appeals/files/UNICEF_DR_Congo_Humanitarian_Situation_Report_March_to_April_2016.pdf
28	IC Calendrier de fermeture et regroupement des sites de Kib Kishusha Kalinga Bihito Kilimani Kashuga 1 et Kashuga 2
29	IOM-Biometrics in DRC https://www.iom.int/news/iom-uses-biometrics-aid-displaced-democratic-republic-congo
30	IRIN News DRC – 14 various articles with a North Kivu focus https://www.irinnews.org/afrique/afrique-de-lest/drc
31	Living Conditions of displaced persons and host communities in urban Goma, DRC Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), Multisectoral assessment https://www.nrc.no/globalassets/pdf/reports/living-conditions-of-displaced-persons-and-host-communities-in-urban-goma-drc.pdf
32	Men women and GBV in North Kivu June 2014. Ingunn Bjørkhaug and Morten Bøås http://www.fao.no/~fao/images/pub/2014/20386.pdf
33	MONUSCU North Kivu Factsheet 2015 https://monusco.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/north_kivu.factsheet.eng_.pdf
34	Non-military strategies for civilian protection in the DRC Liam Mahony, Fieldview Solutions March, 2013 http://www.alnap.org/resource/9781.aspx
35	OCHA DRC Humanitarian Needs Overview 2016 https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/fr/operations/democratic-republic-congo/document/rdc-aper%C3%A7u-des-besoins-humanitaires-2016
36	OCHA DRC Humanitarian Update July 2016 http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ocha_rdc_bulletin_humanitaire_ndeg_3_-_14_juillet_2016.pdf
37	OCHA DRC Strategic Response Plan 2016 https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/fr/operations/democratic-republic-congo/document/rdc-plan-de-r%C3%A9ponse-humanitaire-2016
38	OCHA IDP Update June 2016 http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/rdc_factsheet_mouvement_de_population_du_deuxieme_trimestre_2016.pdf
39	Rapport d'analyse - Stratégie de Solutions Durables en RDC 2016 Microsoft Translator English
40	RRMP Booklet DRC https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/ru/topics/transformative-agenda/document/rrmp-booklet-drc

41	SIDA Humanitarian crises analysis 2016.pdf http://www.sida.se/globalassets/sida/sve/sa-arbetar-vi/humanitart-bistand/drc-humanitarian-crises-analysis-2016.pdf
42	SIDA Overview; Our humanitarian assistance in the Democratic Republic of the Congo http://www.sida.se/English/how-we-work/our-fields-of-work/humanitarian-aid1/ongoing-humanitarian-crises/our-humanitarian-assistance-in-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo/
43	Stratégie de SD pour les PDI et Rapatriés (Sommaire) 19 Juillet
44	The-Landscape-of-Armed-Groups-in-Eastern-Congo http://congoresearchgroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/The-Landscape-of-Armed-Groups-in-Eastern-Congo1.pdf
45	QUARTZ; The surprisingly simple economic case for giving refugees cash, not stuff http://qz.com/750020/the-deceptively-simple-economic-case-for-giving-refugees-cash-not-stuff/
46	WFP N Kivu Operational Fact Sheet 2016; https://www.wfp.org/countries/congo-democratic-republic
47	WHO DRC Country Overview http://www.who.int/countries/cod/en/
48	Women, Conflict and Public Authority in the Congo by Jeroen Cuvelier and Marie- Rose Bashwira http://riftvalley.net/publication/women-conflict-and-public-authority-congo#.V4wPhbiLSM8

Annex 2: Timeframe for the Evaluation

Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday	Sunday
Desk review 1-4						31/7 Travel from Iceland 5
1/8 Travel Arrival 15.15 Briefing Goma 6	2/8* Goma Meetings 7	3/8* Goma Meetings 8	4/8 Goma Meetings 9	5/8 Travel Masisi -Masisi Briefing, meeting with staff 10	6/8 Meetings with staff, in Masisi. -Final preparation of questionnaires, --Review of CRM 11	7/8 Masisi new material reading, Monitoring reports -By evening the Masisi ban came in place 12
8/8 Meeting staff Masisi 13	9/8 Meeting staff Masisi 14	10/8 Meeting staff, partner Masisi 15	11/8 External Meetings Masisi Travel back to Goma 16	12/8 -Meetings Goma 17	13/8 -Meetings Goma, results work 18	14/8 Results work, gathering outstanding issues 19
15/8 Meetings Goma Debrief Travel 20	16/8 Travel 21		Report writing 22-27			

Annex 3: External meetings

	Organisation	Name/ position	Email
1	OCHA	Fernando Arroyo Head of Office a.i.	arroyo@un.org
2	ECHO	-Mohamed Mechemache, Rapid Response Coordinator - Central & West Africa -Herman Chelo,	Mohamed.Mechmache@echofield.eu herman.Chelo@echofield.eu
3	UNHCR	Felix Ndama Wa Ndama Registration Associate	NDAMAWAN@unhcr.org
4	NRC	Benoit Poirier/ Area Manager NK	benoit.poirier@nrc.no
5	Former head of INSO	Banu Altunbas	banu.altunbas@international-alert.org
6	Food security cluster	Guy Onambele Cluster Coordinator	guy.onambele@wfp.org
7	UNHCR	Félix NDAMA <i>Registration Associate</i> UNHCR SO GOMA	Ext. : 90243(03)2421
8	Shelter and NFI cluster	Henriette Chigoho Chigoho Cluster coordinator	hcchigoho@unicef.org
9	WASH cluster	Chinook Terrier WASH Specialiste : Urgence et Cluster	cterrier@unicef.org
10	UNICEF ARCC	Gabriele Erba Monitoring specialist	gerba@unicef.org
11	Solidarité RRMP	John ? Head of Operations	No email, contacted over the phone
12	Handicap International	Ghislaine BUJIMBI Chef de projet Cellule Technique Inclusion	cti@handicap-international-rdc-dau.org
13	Save the Children	Jack Bantu, head of the education program	No email, put in touch by the head of office in Goma
14	MSF - Belgium	Dario Bertetto Field Coordinator	Masisi Coordo < msfocb-masisi-coord@brussels.msf.org >
15	Masisi Administrator	Dieudonné Kitiku Mutoko	N/A
16	MONUSCO	AK. Metei, Bravo 1. Commander of the Masisi Monusco contingency.	N/A
17	PACODEVI	David Munihere Mungu Team leader	pacodevipacodevi@gmail.com
18	IOM	MUHIMA MUHUMUTSA Philippe <i>National Information Management and Communication Officer</i>	pmmuhumutsa@iom.int <i>Did not agree to a meeting, questions were sent by mail and answered.</i>
19	Protection cluster	Bertrand Yamaha Ndjambou' Associate Protection Officer/Cluster	YAMAHAND@unhcr.org <i>Did not agree to a meeting, questions were sent and reminders to answer but has not replied.</i>
20	Concern staff; 12 key informant interviews with staff in Goma and Masisi.		